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Abstract 
 
In this thesis, I investigate the co-production of “place” and “need” in voluntary 
sector mental health care, in order to re-think and breathe new life into the problem 
of access to services. The research draws on ethnographic fieldwork from 2016-2018 
at three psychotherapy centres providing different specialised services in London. I 
describe how, in these places, the visibility of the “vulnerable migrant” client group, 
and notions of culturally specific need, reflects a global—but perhaps temporary—
“turn” to migration. I attend to the everyday practices of care providers working to 
“fill gaps” in mainstream service provision, and tell fragments of client stories about 
moments of access at each site. Drawing on data generated from interviews, observations 
and a creative method, I describe practices around the sociomaterial thresholds and 
doors to each service: waiting, accessing, assessing, gate keeping, and including or 
excluding. Part One, on “Place,” makes visible a paradox, whereby the work to 
create and maintain inclusive places for people who may not “belong” elsewhere in 
the mental health system, (re)produces the precarity of both people and places, 
positioned “always almost on the outside.” Part Two, on “Need,” extends this inquiry 
into boundary work and precarity, showing how working against mainstream 
classifications of need created possibilities but came at a cost. To produce eligibility 
and access to care, providers made mental health need legible through laborious 
negotiation between funders, their internal values and interests, and wider matters of 
concern. The ordering of these two parts builds the argument, grounded in theories 
of relationality and milieu, that places are not merely inert “context” but are 
generative of certain forms of need. The chapters in this thesis move away from 
seeing care providers as “solutions” to “unmet need,” opening up new problem 
spaces around the practice of doing need differently. 
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Chapter 1: Assembling the problem of access 
 
I follow the instructions of the word-processed sign reading “By appointment only, 
please use the bell to enter,” pressing the small white button and waiting for the buzz 
and the click of door giving in to the pressure of my other hand. The façade of the 
building is tiny, squashed in between local shops; on one side there’s an express 
supermarket, and on the other, a Lebanese café, whose tables and chairs spill out to 
the pavement in front of the therapy centre. The space I walk into counters the busy 
outside with its solid stillness. A small sequined wall-hanging catches my eye on the 
left, interrupting the series of doors lining the long corridor ahead. There is no 
reception desk, but in the doorway of the office, immediately on the right, hovers a 
woman who takes my name and enquires about whom I would like to see. The 
exchange of names and information is done standing in the corridor before I am 
guided to a small waiting room, where I sit down next to an overflowing notice 
board on one of several inwards-facing chairs. 
 
This moment, in many ways, was utterly unremarkable. And yet, it was the 
beginning of something. It was the first time I encountered the therapy centre that 
would become one of three field sites I would engage with intensively over the next 
eighteen months; entering and leaving through this door, and others like it, so often 
that they would quickly begin to disappear from view. Was this the moment I 
“accessed the field”? Or was it when I was told about the centre by a local mental 
health service provider, who said I should look them up— that they might be able to 
tell me something about so-called “hard to reach groups” in the area? Perhaps it was 
the moment when I sat down with clinical manager and director (who briefly 
occupied the role of “gatekeepers” to the visiting ethnographer) to establish shared 
concerns and interests that we might start building a project around. Maybe it was 
several years before this, when I myself began working in non-governmental 
organisations and on projects to improve access to services in the field of global 
mental health. I draw upon this particular moment of research “access” only 
fleetingly, in order to pinpoint a moment in time and (crucially for me) in place, that I 
can call a beginning.  
 
In this thesis, I orient my analysis towards such moments of access, as they are enacted 
by those who encounter and deliver mental health services in an inner city area of 
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London in the UK. I focus specifically on services on the peripheries of the 
mainstream health and social care system, in what is referred to in this context as the 
voluntary, or sometimes, the “third” sector. The beginnings I am interested in are 
those that mark people’s points of access into psychotherapeutic care. The moments 
in which they walk through the doors of a clinic can of course also be seen as 
arbitrary (just one in a series of many possible beginnings) but I argue that we can 
learn from analysing these moments in place, foregrounding their social and material 
context. Moreover, I argue that place is not ‘just’ context, but rather, it is generative 
and poses its own problems. This ethnographic orientation towards access as moments 
in place makes a break with mainstream analyses in public health research, which 
tends to frame “access” in far more generalised, abstract terms such as “pathways,” 
“barriers” and “facilitators.” And so, before I begin to unpack this methodological 
and disciplinary orientation in the chapters that follow, I want to take a look at some 
of these ideas that I am claiming to make a break with. In doing so, I hope to raise 
some of my concerns about their underlying assumptions.  
 
“Access” has emerged within public health as an object, as well as an objective: 
specifically, a key “priority for change” in the field of mental health (Independent 
Mental Health Task Force 2015). Access to mental health care, and healthcare in 
general, is often framed as something absolute, yet somewhat elusive, which you 
either “have” or you “don’t have.” It is a goal, something positive, and it is associated 
with inclusion and equality– public “goods” in themselves. Yet, as long as 
inequalities, resource shortages and unmet need exist, “access” denotes a problem 
more than it does a good. The persistence of vast inequity and discontent with levels of 
access to (mental) health care in a high-income country such as the UK, with a “free 
at the point of access” model of healthcare, is testament to this. Perhaps it is more 
accurate to speak of this public health object as a “problem” of access, rather than of 
access itself. Yet still, one would be hard-pressed to pin down any one problem as this 
object. For me, this is to be confronted with a huge set of practices, shaped by the 
values and infrastructure our healthcare system, as well as the ever-changing 
communities it serves; it is to be confronted with fundamental questions of what we 
are providing access to and whom it is for; what kind of disorder, distress or suffering 
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constitutes a need for professional intervention; and who remains excluded and 
invisible, no matter how hard we try to see them and the “gaps” they leave.1  
 
These are some of the messy complexities I try to keep in view within my 
ethnography of access, but they do not fit easily into the “problem-solution” models 
of public health and mainstream psychological services. In this general introduction I 
intend to produce something of a “snapshot” of how this problem of access is 
currently assembled in the field of UK mental health care. In following these lines of 
problematisation I seek to raise questions about what they might be foreclosing. It is 
from here that I begin to think about how this problem might be reassembled, in the 
chapters that follow: how it might encompass the processual, situated, material, 
spatial, human and non-human entities that make up access; perhaps as a different 
kind of problem, which is less static and more responsive to the ever-moving 
landscape of mental health and care.  
 
Accessing “the mainstream” in mental health care 
 
This ethnography tells a story of three separate but interconnected psychotherapy 
“counter-clinics,” as anthropologist Elizabeth Anne Davis (2018) might describe 
them.2 By this, I mean that they are non-state services, situated always in relation to a 
mainstream. Whether these relations make them entirely “counter” to mainstream 
mental health care, and/or mutually dependent on it, is a question that I grapple 
with in various ways throughout the thesis. In any case, it is necessary to lay out what 
these centres ran counter to, within the current system of psychotherapeutic service 
provision. The national programme, which has defined mainstream psychotherapy 
in England for the last fifteen years, is called Improving Access to Psychological 
Therapies, commonly known as IAPT. As the name suggests, “access” is at the heart 
of this project and the logics underlying it. The “psychological therapies” part of it 
 
1 The vocabulary of “treatment gaps” is now ubiquitous in the global mental health literature of access 
to mental health care, and has been adopted in national policy-making discourse (Farmer 2015; Patel 
et al. 2010) 
2 This notion of “counter clinics” has been put forward by Elizabeth Anne Davis (2018) in her 
introduction to the recent special issue on this theme in Medical Anthropology, referring to 
“politicized and otherwise ‘alternative’ clinics” in mental health (ibid, 6), which I discuss in Chapter 2 
of this thesis.  
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reflects a renewed public interest in talking therapy, amidst grave concerns about the 
over-diagnosis and medication of common mental disorders in the age of “big-
pharma.” I explore some of the historical antecedents to this programme, and its 
relationship to psychiatry, in the Interlude, mid-way through the data chapters of this 
thesis. Here, however, I seek to briefly shine a light on the particular logics of this 
mainstream project of “improving access” to psychotherapeutic care. 
 
The rationale for IAPT is usually presented through evidence of clinical need within 
the general population, maintaining an assumption that this need pre-exists services 
and is “out there” waiting to be met. This is not to say that there is an expectation 
that all needs can be met by this programme; at its heart, IAPT is highly pragmatic 
and aims to identify and treat only common mental disorders. These are depression 
and anxiety disorders, of a certain level of severity, measured by their “cluster level,” 
within a clinical guideline of assessing need. Crucially, the treatment (the vast 
majority of which involves cognitive behavioural therapy, though not exclusively) is 
evidence-based, and so the logic is that it will only work for this level and kind of 
need. Without entering into the extensive debates that have ensued since this was 
rolled out in 2008, about the validity and accuracy of measuring what “works” when 
it comes to psychotherapy, it is important to know that IAPT rests on principles of 
measurability, universalism, and national standards. In all these ways IAPT lives up 
to its role as “the mainstream” to the smaller, locally oriented projects, which this 
piece of research centres around. Crucially, however, these qualities do not make this 
project politically neutral, nor disconnected from the particular climate of austerity 
politics that was at its height when I started this project, and which I touch upon in 
some more detail below.3 The assumption that need exists “out there,” to be 
measured and then met by services serves a pragmatic function but it forecloses 
questions about the contexts and value systems in which need is understood, 
articulated, and mobilised. My job as an ethnographer is to ask these questions, and 
to understand what need does in relation to access, rather than to measure or define 
what it is. 
 
3 Critics such as Greco and Stennner (2013) have made direct links between the logics of IAPT and 
those of austerity politics and the decline of the welfare state, with these authors describing “an 
emphasis on individual duties and responsibilities…in a context where the mechanisms previously 
designed to provide a safety net against social ills are being progressively dismantled” (ibid., 10). 
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Filling “gaps” in austerity Britain 
 
Built into the logics of IAPT are ideas of coverage and completeness, but there is 
another, somewhat contradictory logic that has emerged within policies designed to 
improve access to mental health care. Echoing the core rationale for initiatives in the 
global mental health field, the notion of the “treatment gap” is now often a headline 
within UK policy documents, referring to the disparity between estimated levels of 
mental health need and those receiving care (Department of Health 2014a). 
However, this is often conflated with different kind of gap: that of a gap in service 
coverage, usually due to lack of resources. Particularly within the last decade, 
following the financial crisis and the subsequent 2010 election of a 
Conservative/Liberal Democrat coalition in the UK, austerity has heavily impacted 
the mental health care system (already a famously under-resourced area). As a result, 
there is an expectation that gaps will remain in care provision and that they must be 
filled by alternative means. Looking into this gap,4 we see that the voluntary sector 
has been positioned as a vital source of service provision in the UK: “a shock 
absorber in a time of need” (Foster et al. 2015). This is an impactful statement, which 
speaks volumes about the role of the voluntary sector at this time, but I want to 
continue gently challenging the assumptions that underlie it: do places and services 
really just “absorb” need? Or do they play a more active role in this story of access?  
 
What I have been describing here are general and inevitable shortcomings of mental 
health care in an era of austerity. These conditions are pertinent to my research 
because the centres I was engaged with were positioned precisely in this position of 
“shock absorbers.” But their concern, and the concern I take interest in, is not just 
the general unmet mental health need, but forms of need associated with particular 
“client groups,” as they are known in the field. Crucially, these services articulate and 
respond to these different forms of need in ways that the mainstream is not willing or 
able to do.  I do not study a particular “client group,” but I am interested in the role 
and visibility of these categories in particular spaces. For example, what emerges in 
 
4 As Bartlett, Garriott and Raikhel (2014) have asked the global mental health field, “what’s in the 
treatment gap?”  
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my research is the sense of urgency and traction in responding to the needs of 
migrant and refugee communities. This has become particularly visible since the 
migrant “crisis” (as it became known in the media) in Europe and the way in which 
this has filtered into national politics. In the UK’s current political climate, London’s 
super-diverse5 population has been confronted with infamous “hostile environment” 
policies (Consterdine 2018). Restrictions in access to appropriate care for migrants 
(and ethnic and cultural minorities in general) have made this particular gap in care 
striking and concerning to many, particularly those who resist such policies and who 
have been positioned to absorb their effects. 
 
So, whether referring to general or specific gaps in a fragmenting mainstream, the 
current narrative (which I have been reflecting upon here) is of the voluntary sector 
as an underappreciated but essential “filler”, “plug” or “bridge” to fill these gaps (see, 
for example, Flanagan and Hancock 2010; Stern, Hard, and Rock 2015; Maudsley 
Debates 2010). But there is one final development, which is important to know for 
the context of this research: that this too is being formalised and built into the current 
system of contracting clinical services in the UK. The “any qualified provider” policy 
of the Health and Social Care Act (2012) deploys voluntary services to provide care 
to underserved and specialised groups who find it harder to access services via 
mainstream clinical routes. This system frames non-state actors as partners of the 
state (Giddens 2013; Rees, Miller, and Buckingham 2014), raising questions about 
the degree to which these voluntary services can run “counter” to their state 
counterparts. As the boundaries between voluntary and mainstream care begin to 
leak, it becomes harder to think about clear wholes with gaps to be filled. In the 
chapters that follow, these shifting inside/outside, centre/periphery, part/whole 
logics are explored as spatial arrangements and products of everyday practices within 
my small cluster of field sites. 
 
5 The term super-diversity has been deployed in urban anthropology to describe Britain, and 
specifically London’s demography (Vertovec 2007; Hall 2013). These ethnographers’ work is discussed 
in parts II and III of Chapter 2 in this thesis. 
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Problematising mental health access: a research programme 
 
Before I turn, in my next chapter, to knowledge production from my own academic 
field, I want to briefly stay with the public health problematisation of access to mental 
health care. To set the scene of the research element of this construction of the 
problem, I look to a UK based field of research, aimed at analysing and ultimately 
improving access to mental health care. This work is increasingly embedded in the 
development of (complex) interventions aimed specifically to address the problems of 
limited access (e.g. Dowrick et al. 2016). And so whilst access gaps are, by their very 
nature, neglected areas of public health (compared to large scale evaluations of 
mainstream services, for example), the topic has a distinct and visible place within the 
health services literature. These concerns around access, coupled with the need for a 
research “population,” has produced programme of work that has centred around 
the contested term of the “hard to reach” (Mackenzie et al. 2012; Department of 
Health 2002). A keen self-awareness of the problems associated with categorising 
populations in this way has seen careful re-defining of this group in public (mental) 
health.6  My concern is not with further critiquing the use of such terms, but rather, 
with questioning their underlying assumptions: that needy populations exist “out 
there,” to reach or be reached.  
 
A trope that has emerged recently is that there has been too much focus on supply 
side factors and not enough on the demand side: an endeavour to shift attention 
away from services and on to the populations themselves, but one that I would argue 
reproduces much of the same ways of thinking about services and populations. Social 
scientists in this field have mobilised their expertise in gleaning the “patient 
perspective” focusing on their perceptions of barriers and facilitators to care, 
conceptualised along what is known as “pathways to care.” Work has also been done 
to bring these “sides” of supply and demand literature together, analysing service 
users’ “candidacy” and “fit” for services. This has resulted in a body of work that 
seems to be aiming for a complete comprehensiveness of perspectives and angles 
through integrative reviews and meta-ethnographies (Dixon-Woods et al. 2005, 
 
6 Examples include “underserved” (Lovell et al. 2014; Wang et al. 2005) and “vulnerable” (Tee and 
Lathlean 2004; Dixon-Woods et al. 2006) and “marginalised”(O’Donnell et al. 2016).  
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2006; Lamb et al. 2012; Garrett, Charlotte et al. 2012). Analytic concepts are built 
by codifying and analysing large amounts of qualitative data in order to capture the 
interactions between service users and service providers in the access process (Dixon-
Woods et al. 2006; Lamb et al. 2012). The irony is that that all this work to 
qualitatively refine, conceptualise, and operationalise “access” brings us ever further 
away from the practices and spaces that make up the everyday enactments of this 
problem. What is more, this supply and demand/barriers and facilitators approach 
(even as it becomes ever more sophisticated and comprehensive) still sees process and 
movement only within “pathways” to care, whilst the providers continue to be seen 
as static, inert absorbers of need. 
 
Situating this research project: a very brief introduction to the 
field 
 
I have been critically reflecting on the ways in which the problem of access has been 
assembled in public health, psychological services, and health services research. I do 
this not to claim this research is “wrong,” and certainly not to diminish the problem 
of exclusions and shortcomings in mental health care provision. Rather, I do it to 
think carefully about what these particular formulations of the problem might be 
foreclosing. My concern is that the assumptions I have been laying out have meant 
there has been very little attention to the specific social and material contexts in 
which mental health care is delivered. This may be particularly true in the case of 
psychotherapeutic care, because the therapy centres around talk, which is often 
disconnected from material and spatial contexts, and embodied experiences.7 My 
approach to knowledge production follows a rather different tradition, which assumes 
that practices and knowledge alike is always situated (Haraway 1988). So, without 
further discussion of this approach (which I leave to the chapters that follow) I turn 
now to my field sites. 
 
The centre I visited briefly at the very start of this chapter was an intercultural service 
located in inner city London, within a short distance from my other two sites. The 
 
7 An exception to this is the literature on “therapeutic landscapes,” which draws on psychoanalytic 
theory and is specifically focused on matters of space (Rose 2012; Bondi 2005a; Bondi 2005b) 
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centre was run for and by people from ethnic, linguistic, and cultural minorities, 
specialising in (but not restricted to) work with migrants and refugees. I call this 
service “Culture in Mind”—a pseudonym, as I use for all the services that feature in 
my fieldwork. Then there was the centre providing psychotherapy for women: a 
feminist project to include women who were otherwise excluded from these services, 
or at least unlikely to access them. This I call the “Pankhurst Women’s Centre,” often 
shortened to the “Women’s Centre” for brevity. Finally, there was the service set up 
not for a specific social group, nor for diagnosable condition, but for anyone 
struggling to cope with the loss of a loved one. I call this the “Stepping Stones 
Bereavement Service,” or more often, simply “Stepping Stones.” The centres were 
established separately: different from one another, and (crucially) different from the 
mainstream, both in terms of public services and traditional private psychotherapy. 
But of course this difference is also about sameness: they were all doing something 
different. At the core, this was about making talking therapy, of one form or another, 
accessible. Their work was about including people who they saw to be manifestly 
absent from both public (state provided) and private (paid for) psychotherapeutic 
consulting rooms.  
 
To provide this snapshot of where my field sites sit within the current landscape is 
perhaps to start at the end of another set of much more historical stories I could tell. 
The three voluntary organisations that I came to work with between 2016 and 2018 
all started their projects between the late 1960s and early 1980s. They were set up in 
response to particular perceived failings of the mainstream mental health systems of 
the time. These specific political and social projects that each organisation set up 
have taken on afterlives of their own: they occupy an established space in the 
landscape of charitable, non-biomedical, values-based community mental health 
care. Though I touch upon some of this history in the chapters that follow, I keep the 
specifics of each story to a minimum in order to maintain the privacy of my 
interlocutors. What I do hope to bring into sharp focus, however, is the ways in 
which these projects are constantly being remade anew, operating under new 
constraints, and re-aligning their work and values with emergent forms of mental 
health need.  
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In my approach to knowledge production on access, I am interested in these places of 
care, not as “supply side factors” but as material spaces, which are nevertheless far 
from static: I seek to make visible the transitory nature of voluntary centres and their 
changing permeability (whom they are open to, where boundaries are drawn and 
how they are maintained or breached). I push this idea forward through close, 
ethnographic work, zooming in on these places’ expanding and changing thresholds, 
entry points, waiting rooms, and changes of location all together, until their 
“objectness” is called into question altogether.8 Following on from this, I try to think 
differently about the so-called “demand-side factors,” by interrogating notions of 
“need.” Rather than assuming, as we often do, that need pre-exists places and 
practices of care, I try to understand how need comes into being in certain forms, at 
specific sites. In this way, I attend to the social and material processes of inclusion 
and exclusion, and the articulations and enactments of need; to reassemble this 
problem we call “access.” 
 
The chapters 
 
This first chapter has critically reflected on various problematisations of “access” in 
the fields of public health and psychological services. It is one of three introductory 
chapters, which position this piece of research contextually (1), academically (2), and 
methodologically (3). The data chapters of this thesis are then divided into two parts: 
first on Place (4, 5, and 6), and second on Need (7 and 8). The division and ordering 
of these parts is more than just a structure, and speaks directly to my methodology 
and argument, which I reflect upon in the Discussion and Conclusions (9). Below, I 
outline these chapters in some more detail. 
 
In Chapter 2, I orient my work within the literature that has informed this project, 
grounding myself in medical anthropology, and drawing upon science and 
technology studies and medical sociology. As I map areas of scholarship that are 
pertinent to my research topic, I also bring my writing into (at times critical) contact 
 
8 This way of thinking about objects is inspired by Lauren Berlant, who talks of them becoming 
“looser than they appear” and perhaps more of an “effect of interest in a thing we are trying to 
stabilize” (Berlant 2015). 
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with cultural psychiatry, migration studies and human geography. Echoing my 
misgivings about how we conceptualise service provision, I do not seek knowledge 
“gaps” to fill with my research, but rather, points of departure, provocations and 
“problem spaces,” (Collier and Ong 2005). In light of all of this, the chapter lands on 
my (re)formulation of the research problem, aims and questions. Chapter 3 is called 
“Placing Need: a methodology,” and forms my conceptual framing of the research, 
as well as a detailed account of my ethnographic practice within the project. The 
second section of the chapter, on “mapping and tracing,” introduces a specific 
creative method that I developed to understand spatial experiences of accessing 
psychotherapy, and which generated data that I draw upon in Part One of the thesis.  
 
Part One (on Place) visits each field site in turn: Chapter 4, “No Dumping!” focuses 
on the social and material management of exteriority; Chapter 5, “Sanctuary under 
Siege,” draws on different modes of making and managing safe therapeutic places for 
migrant and non-migrant women; and Chapter 6, “Placing Precarity,” is about a 
place of care that is itself transitory and unstable, and how this relates to practices of 
inclusion and (precarious) experiences of belonging. I break away from this first part 
of the thesis by way of an interlude, where I engage in a reflexive piece of writing that 
takes me, briefly, some way from my field sites. I use this to provoke questions and 
provide some historical backdrop for the next two data chapters.  
 
Part Two focuses on Need, and comprises the final two data chapters. Chapter 7, on 
“making diagnosis absent” takes a relational approach to understanding how mental 
health need is articulated by both service providers and clients. Here I explore 
proximity, risk and possibility in relating to one another and to an absent 
“mainstream.” In Chapter 8 (the final data chapter), I describe spaces of negotiation 
where certain forms of need are produced, with implications for eligibility and access 
to care. Here I make explicit how these elements of Place and Need work together, 
drawing on the vitalist notion of the milieu. Chapter 9, the Discussion and 
Conclusions, synthesises the findings from the two parts and considers the 
implications they have for reassembling, and rethinking, the problem of access to 
psychotherapeutic care. 
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Chapter 2: Special services, problem spaces, and spatialised 
problems (a literature of “access”)  
 
Elusive terms such as “the hard-to-reach” and other umbrella terms for 
marginalisation in healthcare reflect the unstable nature of these social categories. 
Some groups and their specific needs emerge as significant to mental health and 
public health discourse, whilst others recede from view at different points over time. 
This pattern of changing visibilities takes place in the intersecting worlds of politics, 
public health, and the academy, meaning that the literature produced does not 
simply represent concerns about access, in/exclusion or marginality but rather, it names 
and gives shape to these concerns. In this chapter, I move through different iterations 
of categories or “kinds” (Hacking 1995) that have become salient and visible in the 
research/public-health/psychiatry nexus. I start with more general debates about 
working with difference and the “politics of recognition” in mental health care in 
Part I, about “special services” and “counter clinics.” In the next part of the chapter 
(II), I describe the “turn” to migration and mobility in anthropological and global 
health discourses on access to care. I use this as a case study to argue that academic 
infrastructure contributes significantly to framing migration, (mental) health, and access to 
care, as coherent “matters of concern” (Latour 2004b).9As I move through this work, I 
illuminate the ways in which anthropologists and other critical social scientists have 
opened up “problem spaces,” which have relevance to my own lines of inquiry. 
 
In the third part of the chapter (III), I seek to breathe new life into problems of access 
by reaching out to allied disciplines and shifting scale somewhat. This part moves 
away from broad narratives of globality and citizenship and into the micro-
geographies and materialities of accessing care. It tells a story of convergence 
between several disciplines (human geography, science and technology studies, and 
medical sociology), which have all inspired my orientation towards analysing access 
as moments in place, as I have described it in the introduction to the thesis. This work, 
on the social and material contexts of care provision, informs much of my own 
ethnographic and theoretical approach to the project. Part IV—“from place to 
milieu”—introduces some theoretical ideas that I use to move between the 
 
9 For a discussion of “matters of concern” see Latour (2004c, 2004b) and specifically on the making of 
global matters of concern in mental health care, Moser (2008)  
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ethnographic sections of the thesis. Finally, I (re)formulate my research problem in 
light of the literature and contextual information I have set out in this chapter, 
introducing my conceptual framing of this problem, which I explore more fully in the 
methodology chapter which follows. 
 
I. Mental health care, otherwise: “Special services” and 
“counter-clinics”  
 
In this first part of the literature review, I look at a number of ways in which 
anthropology has explored, come into contact with, and intervened in psychological 
and psychiatric practice. In doing so, I think through what anthropology has to offer 
debates on inclusion, exclusion and access to care. I do this through attending to two 
narratives of mental health care - conceptualised and practiced “otherwise”. First, I 
explore debates around “special services” (Bhui and Sashidharan 2003) and then look 
at several ethnographic accounts of “counter clinics” (Davis 2018). I also take a 
section, between these, to explore what I call “counter-practice” within mainstream 
settings. Broadly speaking, “special services” is about care provision designed for 
people or communities characterised by difference (or, put more critically, “otherness”). 
“Counter practice” is about different practices within the constraints of the 
mainstream, and “counter clinics” – a phrase coined recently by Elizabeth Anne 
Davis (ibid.) to describe politicised and alternative services—is about the care providers 
and therapists who “do things differently” in one way or another.  
 
This should not be read as an extensive background to the academic field of 
anthropology and mental health, and rather as means to set a particular scene, which 
I can bring into contact with other disciplinary fields in the pages that follow. I am 
uncomfortable with the idea that this is a “review” at all, as there is a vast and rich 
anthropological literature of psychology and psychiatry in Euro-American cultural 
contexts (Fassin 2012; Luhrmann 2011; Rose 1998; Young 1995, to name a few). 
However, I am primarily interested in work that deals with places and providers of 
care working outside or on the margins of psychiatry, making this system of 
knowledge and practice a vital backdrop and context to my own work, but not its 
focus. Similarly, whilst I acknowledge the rich literature on anthropologies of psychic, 
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social and psychosocial suffering (for example, Biehl 2013; Biehl, Good, and 
Kleinman 2007; Good et al. 2008), my interest in mental health “need” is less about 
what mental distress and suffering “is” than about alternative ways of knowing and 
enacting this need within (and in order to gain access to) specific kinds of services.  
And so, I draw on the large bodies of work I have just touched upon above only to 
the extent that it helps me to make sense of what is seen as “dominant” and 
“mainstream” in mental health care, and what might run counter to it. 
Special services: the politics of recognition in mental health care 
Fifteen years ago, in 2003, a debate piece was published in the British Journal of 
Psychiatry entitled “Should there be separate psychiatric services for ethnic minority 
groups?” (Bhui and Sashidharan 2003). Two eminent mental health practitioners (a 
psychiatric epidemiologist and medical director of a mental health trust), both from 
ethnic minority backgrounds, whose work focused on issues of ethnicity and 
psychiatric services, argued the two sides of this debate. One side formulates 
arguments that ethnic and cultural diversity necessitates:  
“Choice and a mixed economy of care, suited to the needs of the individual and 
flexible enough to accommodate difference.” 
The other side criticises such thinking, which: 
“Prioritises race or cultural difference over ethnic inequalities and, as a result, 
advocates culturally specific service solutions rather than striving for equality in 
service provision.”  
As it is a short debate piece in a medical journal, the reference list is short, and 
located firmly within policy and the field of psychiatry. But within the text, there are 
many themes and issues that anthropologists have puzzled over for a long time: about 
psychiatry’s role in the production of difference, but also its capacity to accommodate 
and embrace difference; the relationship between cultural difference and ethnic 
inequality; the way the afterlives of colonial histories can be at once recapitulated and 
challenged in efforts to create progress within this arena of research and practice. 
There are, I think, two reasons why anthropologists (still) have so much to say about 
the issues raised in this BJP article; one is that the dilemma they refer to (about how 
to work with and represent difference) is of primary concern to medical 
anthropologists, and another is that there has been significant overlap between the 
fields, for example within the sub-field of transcultural psychiatry, which I describe 
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below. Far from using this paper to suggest resolutions to this discussion, I treat it as a 
spring board to draw out some of this anthropological attention and persistent 
problems around who gets access to what services, and the politics of “difference” 
and “specialness” in institutional contexts. This can therefore be read as a case study 
that I use to explore higher-level questions and to describe a historically situated 
debate. 
 
The argument, from Kam Bhui, that there should be separate, specialised services for 
ethnic minority groups rests on both epidemiological and health services research 
that black and minority ethnic (BME) groups have worse experiences of mental 
health services in the UK than their white counterparts. He refers to a largely UK-
based literature that can be found on access and pathways to care (Sass et al. 2009; 
Bhui et al. 2014), as well as the quality and acceptability of services to people because 
of their cultural background and the cultural contingency of psychotherapy (Bhugra 
and Bhui 1998; Kareem and Littlewood 2000). This body of work also reveals the 
persistent, disproportionately high rates of involuntary detention of people from black 
and minority ethnic groups with mental health problems, compared to their white 
counterparts (Audini and Lelliott 2002; Morgan et al. 2004). These are complex and 
urgent topics, which continue to generate critical work, but at this point it is worth 
pausing to contextualise how these issues have been made visible and how this 
category of difference has been employed in a particular context.  
 
The discussion centres on a “form of alterity,” as Laurence Kirmayer calls it, 
applying philosopher Charles Taylor’s (1992) ideas on the “politics of recognition” in 
multicultural health care (Kirmayer 2011). The politics of recognition is a key 
concern in the field of transcultural psychiatry: a global field of research and practice 
concerned with social and cultural determinants of psychopathology and 
psychosocial treatment of disorders. It is a discipline that gets put into practice 
slightly differently in different contexts. In the UK, a tradition of postcolonial 
scholarship has developed around the negative effects of categorising people 
according to race, but also acknowledging race and institutional racism as powerful 
organising features of the mental health system (Littlewood 1990; Lipsedge and 
Littlewood 2005). The 1980s saw momentum to establish explicitly ‘anti-racist’ 
projects and clinics in non-mainstream, often voluntary sector, settings driven largely 
 25 
by notions of political Blackness (Kareem and Littlewood 2000; Fernando 2005; 
Bourne, 2016). More recently, the acronym “BME” for Black and Minority Ethnic 
has been adopted in a somewhat clumsy meeting of these politicised narratives and a 
more sanitised public health-speak. 10  This composite category has become 
meaningful in advocacy work for improving access to services that are sensitive to 
cultural and racial issues, as well as an organising principle for research on multi- or 
transcultural healthcare. 
 
The problem with this culture and ethnicity-based politics of recognition, says 
Sashidharan in the debate piece, is that “we almost immediately think about 
‘separate,’ ‘different’ and ‘them’ requiring ‘special’ attention, outside of the 
mainstream… the emphasis on ‘differences’ between White and non-White continues 
to be a major preoccupation within Europe” (Bhui and Sashidharan 2003, 11). In 
other words, attention to difference between groups undermines a potentially more 
urgent need to attend to equality. The contention this debate raises between values of 
equality and values of diversity and difference is not unlike Fassin and Rechtman’s (2005) 
genealogical account of French mental health. They reveal a paradox in the very 
different values that are held up in parallel to each other (values of both universalism 
and culturalism). One practical similarity between what they observe in the French 
context and the UK context is that attention to difference and diversity is often 
located outside mainstream or state-funded systems of care (Fernando 2005; Bhui 
and Sashidharan 2003; Mayblin and Soteri-Proctor 2011). What this often means for 
non-state special services is, as Fassin and Rechtman elegantly summarise, “the price 
of liberty for these initiatives is their marginality” (2005, 354). All of this points to the 
costs and trade-offs of providing special attention to difference and otherness; a 
subject about which there is much more to say, and that will be discussed at various 
points in this ethnography.  
 
 
10 Yet more recently, the official acronym grew to explicitly include Asian (BAME), then Refugee 
categories (BAMER)—a development made visible by looking back 15 years to Fernando’s (now 
apparently out-dated) declaration that “The current style in the UK is to describe all settled minority 
ethnic groups under one umbrella term ‘black and minority ethnic (BME) communities.’ This 
category excludes recent immigrants who are refugees and asylum-seekers. The main subgroups 
identified within the BME category are Asian…Chinese… black Caribbean/African-
Caribbean…black African” (2005, 421). 
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What I want to point out here is that we are left with something of an impasse from 
these two sides of the debate and the paradoxes that ensue from it (which remain live 
in academic and wider public debate today). This is, in a way, puzzling, given that 
the influence of anthropology has the potential to provide possibilities for moving 
beyond such an impasse between psychiatry and the social sciences (Cooper 2016) or 
thinking “otherwise” (Restrepo and Escobar 2005) about problems that were perhaps 
once confined to small fields of expertise. The influence of anthropology within 
cultural psychiatry has done much to examine and disrupt ethnocentric, diagnostic 
approaches to mental health, through embracing notions of culture as relevant for 
psychiatry (Gaines 1992; Kirmayer 2005). It draws on ethnographic studies of “local 
cultures” to inform and critique clinical diagnosis and care of psychiatric conditions 
(e.g. Kleinman 1988). But its approach to ethical and conceptual questions of how to 
organise care (such as those I have been discussing here) tends to miss the 
anthropological commitment to close ethnographic observation of the everyday. 
There is a tendency to draw on established knowledge from within its discipline to 
make broad statements about how care should be done. I am interested in watching 
these debates and paradoxes as they “hit the ground”; how do the men and women 
who provide and encounter these “special services” participate in or (re)frame these 
debates in their everyday practices? How are big ideas such as “liberty” and 
“marginality” situated, sensed and enacted in particular places? How might neatly-
formulated trade-offs between cultural sensitivity and equality get entangled in the 
messiness of organisational practice, emergent identities, and shifting boundaries 
between “the mainstream” and “other” services? In the following section, I focus on 
literature that follows this style of enquiry (though not these precise questions), and 
which is grounded in ethnographic work, generating further empirical questions on 
the topic of non-mainstream mental health care.   
Counter-practice 
Tomas Matza’s (2018) ethnography of psychotherapeutic practice in post-socialist 
Russia arguably tells a story of “non-mainstream” mental health care, given its 
political and cultural exteriority to Euro-American psychiatry and psychology. 
However, the clinical field sites in this story focus on a municipal centre for child 
psychology and a private, commercial provider that enacted a kind of coordination 
between market and state, and a more general global agenda (seen also in Raikhel 
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and Bemme’s (2016) analysis of the “the psy-ences’” changing relation to the post-
Soviet state in the era of global mental health). This means I would not align it with 
the alternative, extra-state “counter clinics” that I describe below (or indeed that I 
examine in my own work). However, I do think there is much to be learnt from this 
text about some of the problems—about improvisation, precarity, and “doing things 
differently”—that I see in this body of work. As such, I instead focus on some of the 
counter practices that Matza identifies in the former (municipal) field site, which he 
describes as occupying a space in a “social margin.” This provides a case study that 
in some ways reflects a wider pattern of societies under economic austerity “pressing 
the therapeutic increasingly toward measurability” (ibid. 2018, 148). Supporting his 
claim, Matza cites several anthropological critiques of austerity, measurability and 
audit culture globally (Strathern 2000; João Biehl and Petryna 2013; Luhrmann 
2000). In the chapters that follow, I draw on one particular element of this, which is 
referred to in the book as “administrative legibility” (Matza 2018, 152). 
 
Of particular interest in Matza’s Post-Soviet ethnography are the observations of 
tensions between these governmental norms and the practices carried out by 
practitioners. This, it is argued, is a result of the indeterminacy of legal and therapeutic 
norms in this centre. These indeterminate (or “fuzzy”) norms, in turn, opened up 
space for improvisations, such as crafting services with other municipal organisations 
and (on a more therapeutic level) refusing “the category of the cognitive,” or 
cultivating friendship in a therapeutic relationship. Crucially, however, these 
improvisations do not come close to anything like a reversal of power relations: the 
flipside of these spaces and opportunities is the danger they present to practitioners 
who might be accused of wasting resources or having no measurable impact. As such, 
the ensuing “precarious care” that Matza describes challenges any assumptions we 
might have formed about precarity being a sole concern for mental health 
practitioners working in extra-state or voluntary services. Is it something about the 
“counter—ness” of spaces and practices that makes them inherently precarious? Is 
there a specific mismatch between the indeterminacies in mental health care and 
measurability, which makes almost all therapeutic practice in this field risky and 
vulnerable to criticism, even failure? What other overlaps might we see between 
state/non-state improvisations or counter practices at the “social margins”? 
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“Counter-clinics”  
In my discussion of transcultural psychiatry and its overlap with medical 
anthropology, I challenged the idea (implied by trends in this field) that ethnography 
is solely for studying “local cultures” or  “Others” that will receive care, or even the 
“cultural system” of psychiatry as the provider of care. In this paradigm, 
ethnography generally serves to help psychiatrists take seriously the cultural practices 
and beliefs of diverse patient groups. It also helps to critique traditional psychiatry, in 
order to present frameworks to “do psychiatry better”. This does important work—
these critical voices are often from trained psychiatrists, meaning they are impactful 
and enable the successful “travel” of the discipline that has been well documented in 
anthropologies of psychiatry (e.g. Kienzler 2012). Yet, it misses some important 
opportunities to look at “culture” and “difference” outside of these realms of 
psychiatry and ethnic diversity, and attend to other oppositional ideas and practices 
in mental health, perhaps through different theoretical lenses.  
 
There is now a vast and growing literature on peer-support work in mental health. 
Although this is beyond the scope of this thesis, I do want to draw attention to one  
particular ethnography that took place in the early stages of this trend. A now 
international network of “voice-hearers” was forming in the UK, providing mental 
health support through friendship and peer-to-peer therapeutic practice. Lisa 
Blackman (2007, 2001) worked closely with this user movement and put Roland 
Littlewood, Maurice Lipsedge, and others at the intersection of medical anthropology 
and cultural psychiatry, into conversation with feminist science studies and affect 
theory (Haraway 1998; Barad 2003; Brennan 2004). The Hearing Voices Network 
and her collaboration with it “represented a radical challenge to the alignment of 
body, culture and identity in the production and understanding of psychopathology” 
(Blackman 2007, 2). This approach is less about foregrounding the cultural over the 
biological, but rather to say that social and psychological life is “made biological,” 
partly though scientific practice but also in its entanglement with the body. What this 
kind of work tells us is that there are ways of looking at embodiment and the 
materialities of mental health and care without ascribing to hegemonic psychiatric 
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paradigms.11 Equally, it avoids purely “cultural” approaches that pit spirituality and 
the psyche against the biomedical. As others have done across different contexts 
(Hyde 2016; Swerdfager 2016; Jain 2016), Blackman charts alternative organisations 
of power and expertise. In this case, it is done through a disruption of boundaries 
between expert and patient, science and culture, selves and others. 
 
More recently, this notion of “counter clinics” was put forward by Elizabeth Anne 
Davis (2018) in her introduction to the special issue on this theme in Medical 
Anthropology, which aims to capture “new narratives” about psychiatry. The 
contributors work from an assumption that “DSM-style” psychiatry has become 
much less centralised and monolithic than it once was. Of interest to me, is the 
attention to the situatedness of these projects, “outside, alongside, or oppositional to 
mainstream psychiatric settings.” Moreover, I use this special issue to shine a light on 
current anthropological depictions of therapists working in “politicized and otherwise 
‘alternative’ clinics” (ibid, 6). Alongside Sandra Hyde writing on rural therapeutic 
communities for drug-users, and Li Zhang on psychological training for urban 
middle classes in post-socialist China (Zhang 2018; Hyde 2016), this series includes 
Christiana Giordano’s (2018) ethnography of contemporary ethnopsychiatry in an 
Italian clinic for migrants. With particular relevance for my work, Giordano’s piece is 
interwoven with a historically situated account of community-based, diagnosis-free 
care of the mentally ill. What all of these papers have in common is that they think 
with these new modes of doing psychology and psychiatry, which exist in a fast-
moving political landscape. This means their mode of critique is less focused on pure 
Foucauldian analyses of power and control (though many of the papers are deeply 
influenced by this approach) and more on the frictions and paradoxes that arise in 
these complex assemblages of state, psyche, individuals and communities. 
 
Perhaps the most interesting example of this shift outwards, to a more dispersed and 
interconnected view of power and resistance in mental health than straightforward 
critiques of medicalization or social control, is Dominique Béhague’s (2018) 
contribution to the issue. The piece echoes, in some ways, earlier work in which she 
 
11 Blackman’s later work on “immaterial bodies” (2012) provokes the idea that equally, we can, and 
should, attend to the psychic and the immaterial without giving up on ideas of the material and 
embodied. 
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has portrayed the “institutional expansion of psychiatric expertise” in all its 
heterogeneity and fluidity (Béhague 2008b, 141). In this work, connections (rather 
than polarity) between psychiatry, and institutions such as schools, the military, and 
community-based initiatives are foregrounded (Béhague 2008a). In the 2018 piece, 
however, she attends also to the making of a certain “kind” of psychiatric problem—
“adolescent” motherhood—and the psychologised science that gained traction 
around this. A particular point of interest for me is her exploration of the ontological 
politics of how this problem was co-constructed by science, the clinic and the 
everyday (Jasanoff 2012), but also how it emerged as psychological suffering for some 
women but not others.  
 
As I come to discuss in the rest of this chapter, and the thesis more generally, I am 
interested in the way categories or “kinds”12 (such as “BME communities,” but also 
“vulnerable migrants” and “disadvantaged women”) play into the understandings 
and articulations of mental health “need” but also the way in which need is enacted 
and performed as eligibility criteria for care. If these categories or kinds (like 
“adolescence” in Behague’s work) are “good to think with” (Béhague 2018; Harding 
1996), it is useful to ask: who is doing this thinking, and how does it help such 
categories gain or lose traction, in particular (counter) clinical spaces? I would like to 
return to problems of using the diagnostic model to determine mental health need, 
and to think through them in relation to oppositional places and practices, such as 
those documented in these counter-clinics. How, then, is need co-constructed 
between existing clinical frameworks, social categories, and various projects aimed at 
identifying and meeting “different kinds” of need? 
 
In this first part of the chapter, I have set the scene within a particular sub-field of 
anthropological literature which has pointed to debates around various specialised 
services, as well as counter practices, and “counter clinics” which challenge 
mainstream models of providing mental health care. Through this, I have looked at 
the way in which articulations of human “kinds” bring certain needs into being, and 
in doing so, enable and constrain certain kinds of care and access to this care. In the 
 
12 Behague uses “Kinds” in reference to Ian Hacking’s notion of “human kinds” that get produced 
through “looping effects” between knowledge of the object and the object itself. (Hacking 1995, 2006)  
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following part of the chapter, I look to a particular “kind” which has emerged both in 
global health and anthropology itself.  
 
II. Problem spaces in the access literature (the case of 
“migrantizing” and “de-migrantizing” research) 
 
I now explore access through the lens of a particular matter of concern: migration, 
in/exclusion, and access to care. This shifts me away from a sole focus on mental 
health care, but provides something of a case study that encapsulates key issues that 
are relevant for my own work. It also reflects the contemporary turn to migration and 
mobility since the so-called “migrant crisis” entered public consciousness 201513. I 
focus on this case as a means to explore the call to action, which mobilised 
researchers and professionals to attend to the exclusion of non-citizens from their 
rights to healthcare in “host” countries. But perhaps more importantly, to explore the 
formation of critical spaces that came along with this, and which I find useful in 
framing my own work. I highlight the ways in which this academic work has become 
generative and intervened in the world, making issues visible, mobilising or diverting 
resources away from them, and problematizing them within public opinion and 
advocacy. To describe this waxing and waning of critical attention, I use Dahinden’s 
(2016) idea of “migrantizing and de-migrantizing” the social science literature to 
structure this case. Through creating three specific “problem spaces,” which I 
describe in some detail, I treat academic work as an actor of sorts: the interests it 
represents, the traction it gains, and the distance it travels, has profound effects in the 
field of public health and in public life more generally. I point to the ways in which 
the field of migrant healthcare access has been (sometimes simultaneously) productive 
and problematic, and how this has shaped choices I have made about this project.  
The making of a “global matter of concern” 
Attention to migration and migration studies has grown exponentially in weight, 
scope and economic value in the last two decades. As Janine Dahinden (2016, 1) has 
 
13 Already, the narrative function of “crisis” itself has been challenged and contested in important 
ways (Andersson 2018; Roitman 2013). 
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noted, this has gone beyond simply being “in vogue, becoming institutionalized in 
degree programmes and specialised journals.” This has developed in tandem with 
building the research agenda on access to care, within a particular vernacular of 
rights and entitlement, producing it as a “global matter of concern” (Latour 2004b; 
Moser 2008). By saying it is produced as a matter of concern does not suggest that the 
problem in “made up” nor does it deny the embodied suffering or exclusion that 
restrictions to access cause. Rather, it is to understand that the visibility and political 
weight of a global field of knowledge and set of concerns, requires work to create and 
maintain. This set of concerns revolves around increasingly recognisable issues of 
universal rights to (mental) health (see discussion below on Willen 2011) and 
equitable access to healthcare and utilisation of services (e.g. Lindert, Ehrenstein, and 
Priebe 2012). This has been a productive “call to action,” mobilising attention and 
resources to otherwise under recognised areas. 
 
The process of bringing these elements together and making a normative case for 
their investigation produces a curious blend of “the global” and “the local.” Despite 
the topic of migration being inherently transnational and the global, many of the 
scholars working in this field, particularly within transcultural psychiatry, strongly 
emphasise “the local” (Bhugra and Bhui 1998; Kirmayer et al. 2011; Fernando 2005; 
Tribe 2002). Here, there is an important critical point to be made about the category 
of the global itself. Bemme and D’souza (2014) critique the polarisation of “global” 
and “local” approaches in global mental health and its claims on the universal nature 
of human rights and evidence, and the idea that concepts such as community and the 
social are bound to the local. Thinking about migration, mental health, and access to 
care as a global matter of concern might usefully involve an “unravelling” of these 
discourses (Stubbs 2005). We might reframe these problems as neither specifically 
local or global but rather as a “problem space” for anthropological questions (Collier 
and Ong 2005).  
 
I find Collier and Ong’s concept of the problem space useful to think with for a 
number of reasons, but chiefly because it generates critical reflection rather than an 
immediate solution. As well as a “call to action” this turn to migration has seen a wave 
of critical responses from anthropology scholars. In the sections below, I outline a 
number “problem spaces” that have opened up this topic to critical reflection. In 
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attending to them, it becomes clear that the call to action and the construction of this 
particular matter of concern was not only productive in terms of directing attention 
and resources, but in stimulating academic critique and debate: migration has 
become “good to think with” (Harding 1996; Béhague 2018).  
Problem space 1: bio-sociality and diagnosis as gateways to access 
One such space is a specific critical view on traditional frameworks of studying access 
to care. Alongside those who have critiqued the implied “tangibility” of barriers or 
obstacles for migrants (Larchanché 2012), this problem space interrogates the inherent 
helpfulness of facilitators to access for migrants. A now long-established line of critique, 
is the problematisation of psychiatric diagnoses being used to identify mental health 
need, and thus make people eligible for care. This gained particular strength with 
regards to refugees and asylum seekers in the 1990s, revolving largely around the 
emergence and controversy of the PTSD category. It was no doubt shaped by Allan 
Young’s seminal ethnography on production of PTSD in post-Vietnam war America 
(1995). Charles Watters (2001; Watters and Ingleby 2004) draws on Young’s work in 
order to cast critical light on the variability of epidemiological research on refugees 
and PTSD. This extended beyond questions of individual need, gaining particular 
traction when it exposed the pressures NGO and aid agencies felt to use the category 
to mobilise resources (Watters 2001; Stubbs 2005). These critical perspectives on the 
use and misuse of psychiatric diagnoses with refugees formed a sub-field for 
European-based critical “post-psychiatrists” (Bracken, Giller, and Summerfield 1997; 
Summerfield 1999, 2001, 2005; Bracken and Thomas 2001). What this work is 
perhaps missing, however, is a sensitivity to the afterlives of diagnostic categories: 
what happens to them as critique and psychiatric practice become so enmeshed? 
 
A connected body of work has built on the literature on the strategic use of bio-
socialities, and in particular the psychological condition of trauma in the governance 
of migrants and immigrants. In their review on the “production and management of 
risk, illness, and access to care,” Sargent and Larchanché (2011) dedicate a section to 
the political economy of migrant health/care, including a range of studies which 
have looked at the social production of sickness and the way it plays into the way 
migrant bodies are governed and managed. They draw particularly on Goldade 
(2009) on the way the “suffering body” has been used strategically to make claims on 
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the state (illustrating constraints on medical citizenship) and Larchanché (2012) on 
the turn, in France, to the “management of socially deviant and psychologically distressed 
African families” (p 347, emphasis added). A key problem with this, they imply, is the 
conflation of “cultural” or “ethnic difference” with “psychological difference” or even 
deviance. This builds on a longer critical tradition, which I described in the first part 
of this chapter, that shines a light on psychiatry’s tendency to “other” in more ways 
than one (Lipsedge and Littlewood 2005; Fassin and Rechtman 2005).   
 
Miriam Ticktin (2006; 2011) and Didier Fassin (2012; Fassin and Rechtman 2009) 
have focused their attention on humanitarian logics in the governmental and public 
health response to migration, both globally and with a particular focus on the French 
context and its asylum laws (the “illness clause”). The first is the broad concern about 
how the new “vocabulary of mental health”, particularly in relation to migration in 
the French context, shapes narratives about socially marginalised people: what may 
once have been described in terms of exploitation or material deprivation is now 
expressed in a language of psychopathology (Fassin, 2012, p. 26). This reflects 
Metzl’s now popular call to replace “cultural competency” in transcultural healthcare 
with “structural competency” to avoid individualising the social determinants of 
mental ill health (2014). These critiques have powerfully shed light on the “sharp 
end” of migrant access to health and care in high-income settings, pinpointing how 
individual suffering can be co-opted as a means to govern and grant or deny 
citizenship. But what of the slightly greyer areas, where inclusory logics around 
migration remain ambivalent and fraught with more subtle (threats of) exclusion? 
The next problem space goes some way in addressing this. 
Problem space 2: deservingness and the “right to health”  
A distinct problem space has formed around the question of deservingness to health and 
healthcare, which Sarah Willen (2012) has identified as distinct from both formal 
assertions of entitlement and practical issues of access (which in themselves can sit in 
tension with one another, as Liana Chase and colleagues (2017) have shown). 
Deservingness, Willen surmises in her introduction to a special issue to the problem 
in 2012, had been seriously understudied prior to that moment, pointing to the way it 
had been renegaded to the parenthesis of Ruiz-Casares and colleagues’ research 
question: “Which children (should) have the right to healthcare?” in an important 
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paper analyzing legal rights and access to healthcare for undocumented children 
(Ruiz-Casares et al. 2010). Willen’s observation bears out in that most of the critical 
literature on migration and access to care has focused on specifically exclusory 
practices (Rousseau et al. 2008; McKeary and Newbold 2010; Arnold, Theede, and 
Gagnon 2014, for example), or illegality (Miklavcic 2011), though deservedness as a 
concept was not entirely new to the conversation (see Yoo 2002 for a print media 
analysis of “undeserving” older immigrants).  
 
Another important shift is the increased attentiveness (often with an ethnographic 
gaze) on the practices and performances involved in the moral, ethical, value-laden 
work of providing access to migrants. Seth Holmes’ (2012) long term ethnographic 
work on the clinical gaze on Mexican migrants in the US has, for example, revealed 
the “subtle blame” that practitioners lay upon migrant workers for ill health, despite 
saying they believed them to be deserving of medical attention. Also making use of 
the power of ethnography to complicate and reveal divergences in institutional care 
logics, Gottlieb and colleagues (2012) tease out the ways humanitarian healthcare 
provision, legal claims to individual rights, and an overtly political struggle against 
exclusion, all embody different definitions of “deservingness.” Similarly, Marrow 
(2012) employs the idea of “deserving to a point” in her ethnographic analysis. In 
looking further into charity and humanitarian settings to complicate and further 
question the dynamics of giving and receiving care, ethnographers such as Darling 
(2011) and Huschke (2014) have explored practices of “constructing welcome” and 
“performing deservingness” respectively. Whilst both authors acknowledge the 
necessity to “fill gaps” in systems of care to ensure migrant communities can access 
services, they each problematise certain modes of belonging and deservedness: 
namely, how such modes of being are produced within imbalanced power relations 
and engender passive or docile recipients of care (ibid.)  
 
Thinking about deservingness more conceptually, such questions can be understood 
as a means to interfere with or disrupt the seemingly simple notion of  “right to 
health.” Monica Greco (2004) has persuasively argued for problematising this notion 
in light of practices of privileging and silencing different voices that might determine 
“health” as well as “civil and political rights”. Ultimately, she argues that the concept 
of health is indeterminate, drawing on the work of Georges Canguilhem (1991) to 
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talk of health not as a fixed organic state of being “normal” but as a set of socially 
and morally contestable norms14. She advocates for “placing indeterminacy of health 
at the centre of analysis, rather than at its margins” (ibid, 17), in order to allow for a 
wider range of possibilities for healing and health (beyond a singular scientifically 
rational one). This questioning of the singularity of health, and more specifically a 
“right to health” is something that Willen has taken forward with regards to a 
“migrant right to health”, urging medical anthropologists to “take it as an object of 
ethnographic analysis and explore how it is invoked, debated, and resisted in specific 
contexts” (2011, 303). Willen points out that deservingness (as a local configuration of 
moral and ethical commitments towards “illegal” migrants and other vulnerable 
groups) makes up the content of a “right to health” more than fixed national or 
international human rights law does. Indeterminacy and deservingness comes up yet 
again in Heath Cabot’s work on the social aesthetics of eligibility for Greek NGO aid 
for asylum applicants.  Building on Fassin and Ticktin’s work (see above) on 
particular regimes of truth in asylum procedures, she argues that the way aid givers 
and receivers make sense of each other can also undermine normative frameworks of 
assessment: 
 “Even when aid encounters invoke normative… conceptions of truth, deservingness, 
and credibility… Eligibility determinations are, at base, deeply indeterminate.” (Cabot 
2013, 454, my emphasis) 
 
Though these problems have been grounded in ethical theory (which the theoretical 
framing of this thesis does not fully stretch to), these problems of indeterminacy and 
local commitments in healthcare are of interest to me. Given the now familiar 
arguments (outlined in the section above) against fixed diagnostic assessments of 
trauma and suffering, how do mental healthcare providers articulate different 
assessments of “need”? Could similar arguments be made about the indeterminacy of 
this need? Questions around indeterminacy—this time of healthcare need—has been 
raised within the bioethics literature (Juth 2015; Herlitz 2017; Gustavsson 2014) but 
from a purely theoretical perspective. Throughout this thesis, I explore how we can 
attend empirically to some of the local ways that mental health need is (re)configured 
 
14 Greco (2004) moves towards an alternative to what she calls the “mainstream approach” which, she 
argues, bypasses this indeterminacy and focuses instead on resource distribution. 
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and negotiated, for migrants and other service user groups. I inquire into how need is 
enacted, made legible, or recognised as indeterminate, and to what end. 
Problem space 3: vulnerability and precarity 
This is a problem space that reaches beyond the issue of migration and access to care 
but is nevertheless an important component of the broader critical perspective that I 
mentioned in the introduction to this section on the cultural template of “the 
vulnerable migrant,” which has become so salient in public health and rights 
discourse (Fassin and Rechtman 2009; Fassin and Rechtman 2005). The category is 
used to mobilise support within advocacy and policy for people without (secure) 
citizenship, and particularly for those in need of health or social care (Fassil and 
Burnett 2015, MIND commissioning guidance; The Lancet 2007; Langlois et al. 
2016). I want to briefly chart some different conceptualisations and theorisations of 
vulnerability and precarity in relation to migration. Moving away from essential or 
static notions of who “is” vulnerable or precarious, I am interested in lines of enquiry 
that explore these conditions as “embodied,” “constructed” and “in the making.” I 
use them to think about how these conceptualisations might produce different 
directions in public debate and the organisation of services. As I outline below, 
critical scholarship from anthropology and elsewhere in the social sciences has raised 
questions about how vulnerability and precarity are “made” in various (structural, 
discursive, performative or enacted) ways.  
 
One angle that vulnerability has been explored in relation to migrant experiences is 
through “embodied vulnerability” (Quesada 2012), which among other things, 
involves the accumulation of structural vulnerabilities or hardships that in turn cause 
ill-health. The idea is that these structural experiences shape subjectivities, which 
already takes us a step away from ideas (perhaps inadvertently propagated by the 
public health literature cited above) that migrants are somehow inherently 
vulnerable, or that this vulnerability is an abstract social category. Others have 
adopted a slightly different vocabulary: that of precarity, to describe “life-worlds that 
are inflected with uncertainty and instability” (Waite 2009, 7). This has been put 
forward to differentiate vulnerability as a condition from precarity as both a condition 
and a possible point of mobilisation amongst those experiencing it (ibid.). This frames the 
concept of precarity as pertinent to the experiences of particular groups in society, 
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and in particular migrant groups (for an overview of this nexus, see Paret and 
Gleeson 2016), This line of thinking feeds into the association between precarity and 
placeless-ness or displacement.  
 
Others, in contrast, have invoked the idea of precarity as a more shared, existential 
state of being. Notably, Judith Butler has suggested that, although the experience of 
precarity is dependent on the organisation of certain economic and social relations, 
“no one escapes the precarious dimension of social life” (Butler 2012, 148), or, in the 
words of Lauren Berlant, in conversation with these ideas on precarity, “we are all 
contingent beings” (Puar 2012). In other words, no one person or group occupies an 
inherently precarious position; it is part of a common sociality that is constantly and 
variously in the making. This conceptualisation will be useful in the concluding part of 
this section, in which I summarise these critiques by looking at a call to “de-
migrantize” research on this topic.  
“De-migrantizing” the literature? 
By way of a conclusion to this part of the chapter, I describe a current critical 
perspective that touches upon (though cannot fully encompass) all three of the 
“problem spaces” I have outlined above. This perspective has been usefully defined 
by Janine Dahinden in her “plea” for the de-migrantization of research on migration 
and integration (Dahinden 2016). I started this section by arguing that the vulnerable 
migrant category became a key organising principle in academic work on access and 
in/exclusion to care in high income settings, and that the creation of a global matter 
of concern around this category has been a productive “call to action,” mobilising 
attention and resources to inequalities and injustices in healthcare access. But I have 
also foregrounded a number of problem spaces that have opened up, in an equally 
productive (though critical) manner, around this issue of migrant access to care. 
Dahinden’s plea revolves around the argument that research into migration—with its 
entanglement notions of the nation state and ethnic difference—reproduces the 
categories (of nation states and social groups) and the “apparatus” of migration 
practice and discourse that it tries to critique. There is growing recognition, in and 
out of the academy, of the unstable nature of such categories; prompting many to try 
and disrupt the terminology used describe them. Sarah Willen, for example has taken 
to using the terms “im/migrants” and “im/migration” to “indicate that the 
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boundary between migration and migrants, on one hand, and immigration and 
immigrants, on the other, is both porous and shifting.” (Willen 2011, 325). I would 
argue that the critical voices I have discussed above, which comment on the 
conflation of ethnic “difference” with psychological “difference” (Sargent 2009; 
Lipsedge and Littlewood 2005) or the framing of migrants as somehow inherently 
vulnerable (Fassin and Rechtman 2009), all echo this broad idea that the 
“migrantization” of the social sciences has brought with it problematic consequences, 
as well as advocacy and the mobilisation of resources.  
 
Dahinden suggests several strategies to “de-migrantize” this field of research, mainly 
from the migration studies literature, which aim to re-orient analyses towards parts of 
whole populations, and towards “common sense” categories (what I would probably 
call categories as ethnographic objects). However I end on two related but perhaps more 
ethnographically grounded viewpoints that open up some ways out of the impasse 
that she has described. One is Cabot’s recent project (following the work I cited 
above on the social aesthetics of eligibility for asylum aid), which inquires into 
changing notions of belonging and citizenship as “regular Greeks” experience forms 
of marginalisation under austerity that begin to mirror the experiences of migrants 
and refugees (Cabot 2016). Adding empirical weight to the conceptual conversation I 
touched on above about precarity in-the-making, Cabot has charted the “ongoing 
precaritization of a [Greek and non-Greek] populace that increasingly does not 
recognize itself ‘at home,’” culminating in the recent fires which left “Greece 
burning” (ibid. 2018). As such, her work skilfully explores issues of belonging and 
non-belonging, place and precarity (important contributions from the field of 
migration and mobility) but opens up her analytical lens to reveal how these issues 
touch migrants and non-migrants in similar, different or surprising ways.  
 
The other anthropological perspective that I want to draw upon that de-essentialises 
and complicates narratives about migration and diversity is Steven Vertovec (2007) 
and his now much-cited critique of Britain’s public understanding of immigration 
and multi-cultural diversity. Here he reconceptualises using a framework that he 
terms ‘super-diversity.’ Using London as a case study of a contemporary metropolis 
whose immigration history dates back to before the twelfth century, he charts the 
“diversification of diversity” that he argues has led to a complex interplay of 
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variables, challenging the old labels of ethnicity and/ or country of origin. He 
contends that as well as these socio-cultural differentiations,  
 “…immigrants’ channels of migration and the myriad legal statuses which arise 
from them are often just as, or even more, crucial to: how people group themselves 
and where people live, how long they can stay, how much autonomy they have… 
and to what extent they can make use of public services and resources (including 
schools, health, training, benefits and other ‘recourse to public funds’).”  
(Vertovec 2007, 1035) 
This has been taken up as a useful conceptual starting point for new ways of looking 
at urban mobility and diversity, which I will pick up on in the section below. 
 
III. Access, inclusion and exclusion in place 
 
In this part, I tell a story of convergence between several disciplines—human 
geography, science and technology studies (STS) and medical sociology—which 
medical anthropology has in various ways borrowed from, and which each have been 
influenced by medical anthropology. Whilst each disciplinary field has its own 
approaches to exploring access, inclusion and exclusion to (mental) health care with 
spatial and place-based sensibilities, I draw out important points of mutual influence. 
I seek to demonstrate how these disciplines are currently nudging upon a point of 
convergence, both methodologically and theoretically, which I tap into in my own 
work and positioning. I begin this section by staying briefly with the issues raised in 
the last part of this review, about the field of migration and its points of contention, 
offering a different (space and place focused) lens through which to view them. I use 
this to suggest a way of thinking about the (potentially problematic) migrant identities 
discussed above—or indeed any number of identities relevant to problems of “who 
gets access to what care”? This involves a re-framing from questions of what, or who 
you are to questions of where you are: what I call “spatialising the ‘identity trap.’” I argue 
that this is an important methodological shift away from static or identity-based 
framings of issues around access to care to more situated, place-based ones.  
 
Although my first example is from anthropology, the beginning section focuses 
mainly on a subfield of human geography that has contributed to my literature base, 
particularly as I follow it to its “cultural turn” and specific focus on the study of care. 
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I go on to draw from the disciplinary field of STS, and in particular the translation of 
STS principles into the field of care and “caring architecture” (Nord and Högström 
2017). This is where I introduce important concepts that I carry into my own 
methodology and analysis such as enactment and relationality. The final section picks up 
on pertinent areas of medical sociology, which also put these concepts to work. As 
such, I will be charting the convergence of three main disciplinary areas relevant to 
(mental) health, access to care and (in some instances) voluntary provision of services: 
first, human geography, then STS and material semiotics, and finally, medical 
sociology, focusing on the themes of “materiality, mundane care and moments of 
access.” I pull all of this together by identifying the theoretical underpinnings that 
help create this point of convergence, but which may also mask different gaps or 
unresolved problems, which I hope my own work will help to expose and intervene 
in. 
Spatialising the “identity trap” 
Returning briefly to the problems associated with ideas of fixed identity-based 
categories from the last section, ethnographers have homed in on the inherently 
situated, spatial nature of access, in/exclusion and im/migration. The concept of 
super-diversity (Vertovec 2007) that I outlined in the previous section is something 
that Susan Hall (2013) has investigated spatially, through an urban street 
ethnography based in inner London. Rather than studying a particular ethnic or 
cultural community, Hall and her colleagues worked from a particular site in which 
super-diversity could be made visible at different scales (symbolic macro, collective 
meso, and intimate micro scales). The street is conceptualised as a “frontline of sorts” 
based on local understandings of its role as a border between the deprived and more 
affluent areas. As such, the site is described as a “place of reception in the city into 
which migrants arrive and share space with established residents.” (ibid., 10). This 
resonates with my own objective to study the flows (or lack thereof) of mental health 
service users into a space which is made up of an expressly ‘diverse’ collection of 
identities. Hall’s street is pertinent to many public or third sector healthcare settings, 
particularly in inner-city contexts, where the boundary of a particular place is also 
the threshold of a concentrated space of super-diversity. 
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The significance of the threshold/frontline/boundary space in relation to the 
movement of people in a contemporary “cosmopolitan” world, has been theorised in 
depth by anthropologist Michel Agier (2016) in his work on Borderlands. Although 
not anchored in any one site, his exploration of migration (drawing the work of 
philosopher Etienne Balibar) is decisively focused on spatial situations. The book 
opens with an emblematic scene where a particular configuration of young Afghan 
men, police, and local residents constitute a border control space at the port of 
Patras. But as the argument develops, we can see that the spatial conceptualisation of 
frontlines, thresholds, inside/outside, inclusion/exclusion, entitlements and/or 
deservedness, hospitality/hostility, and—perhaps most essentially—human 
encounters unfolds without the need to expressly study ‘migrants’ as such. This offers a 
key methodological approach with which to avoid what Agier terms the “identity 
trap” of using static categories to describe people’s subjectivities in contemporary 
movements; an approach which foregrounds contexts and processes to describe the 
“presence of the subject in situation” (Agier 2016, 136)” Replacing the essentialised 
subject with the subject in situ is the theoretical shift underlying the proposition I 
made above, to move away from questions of who one is to where one is in explorations 
of access and inclusion in healthcare. Key to this is the concept of relationality of 
people and places, which I will explore more fully below.  
Micro-geographies of access and care 
Staying with anthropological investigations of migration and access to care for one 
more example, I refer to Parkinson and Behrouzan’s (2015) ethnographic work on 
therapeutic geographies and the politics of access for Syrian refugees in Lebanon. 
Their approach to studying health care encounters extends Dwachi et al’s (2014) 
ideas of therapeutic geographies, to “underscore the inherently variable micro-
dynamics of healthcare access” (ibid. p.326). These micro-dynamics bear out in the 
data as specific encounters, such as an extended bureaucratic process in an obstetrics 
waiting room, which invokes rumour about care being dis-incentivised in this way for 
refugees on a much bigger scale in the host country of Lebanon. This supports and 
animates the ethnographers’ claim that their case exposes the “politics of access” 
rather than simply the presence or perception of services (as much of the qualitative 
literature of access to care does). When embedded in a broad socio-political 
understanding of context, then, a focus on the “micro”—perhaps counter-
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intuitively—can offer a wider lens on the politics of access than “systems level,” 
population-based, or even qualitative research with a large population sample. There 
are elements to this argument that are drawn from a more general anthropological 
trope on the benefits of focused, situated ethnography, but the particularly spatial 
element of their argument can be traced to approaches in human geography, which I 
attend to below. 
 
Human geography is about people and their spatial patterns and relations, and has 
generated a large body of work on “mental health geographies” (for reviews, see 
Curtis 2016; Philo and Wolch 2001). In the late 90s and early 2000s, human 
geographer and ethnographer Hester Parr (2000, 1997, 2011) built her work around 
“micro-geographies” of mental health settings in the aftermath of de-
institutionalisation in the UK. Again, the “micro” is firmly embedded in the 
“political,” which is at once immediately close and expansive in scale. She would for 
example integrate her own sketch maps of the space with ethnographic field notes on 
a wide range of contextual material. Drawing on the classic ethnographic study of 
psychiatric patients in the US by Estroff (1981), she was interested in the “hidden 
social geographies” of what she calls semi-institutional places, given their position as 
voluntary services that had been appropriated by statutory health and social welfare 
departments following the closure of formal psychiatric settings. As do many of the 
ethnographies I have cited above, this in-depth work complicates straightforward 
conceptions of “exclusion” and social identity. 
 
Rather than understanding people with mental health problems as consistently and 
equally “excluded,” Parr found boundary-setting around acceptable and 
unacceptable identities was done by staff and service users through individuals’ use of 
space, behaviour and bodily performances. This work was grounded in geographies 
of exclusion (Sibley 2002), the historical context of access and utilisation on mental 
health services (Philo 1995) and policy work on the restructuring of care into  a 
contract system (Kearns and Joseph 2000). However, what brings Parr’s work (and 
the work that was influenced by it) much closer to the anthropological and STS 
literature I mainly draw upon is the long-term ethnographic engagement with 
particular places and the relationships that form within these places. What sets it apart 
from my work is its post-structuralist grounding and— in Parr’s earlier work at 
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least— a focus on identity formation and the way that disciplinary practices “leak in” 
from the “shadow state” (Wolch 1990). What happens when relations between state 
and voluntary settings become yet more blurred, and the distribution of power more 
difficult to trace?  Could we re-conceptualise spatial ways of thinking about identity 
formation such that identity is not just a product of spatial (as well as power) 
arrangements, but rather, that it is part of what makes up space and place? Can we 
“represent” spatial arrangements using floor plans or indeed any static map? These 
are questions that begin to get answered through the convergence of this body of 
work with STS-influenced care literature. In the following sections, I draw these 
threads together using literature that speaks to my own work. 
The “cultural turn” in human geography 
Continuing the investigation into deinstitutionalised mental health geographies, the 
growing reliance on the voluntary sector to deliver the care that had been the sole 
responsibility of state institutions captured the attention of scholars in what Wolch 
and Philo (2001) called the first and second “waves” of mental health geography in 
their review. Of interest are projects that provide ethnographic detail to the rather 
sweeping structural critiques on, for example, the “shadow state” thesis (Fyfe and 
Milligan 2003), the ability for the sector to meet welfare needs (Milligan and 
Conradson 2006; Fyfe and Milligan 2003; Dear and Wolch 2014) and mental health 
in high income post-asylum contexts (Milligan 2000). Against this backdrop, 
questions of care “captured the imagination” of scholars in human geography, which 
pulled attention away from policy and structure, and towards spaces, practices, and 
experiences in the field of health and welfare (Conradson 2003b).  
 
Looking to the legacy of the “cultural turn” in this academic field (Philo and Wolch 
2001) I am interested in projects which (with their ethnographic sensibilities) bring 
the discipline into particularly close contact with anthropology and related science 
and technology studies literature on this topic. Darling’s work (2017, 2011), which I 
mentioned briefly with regards to his ethnography of “welcome” in asylum-seeker 
drop-in centres, has also looked at how spaces are constructed around an ethic of 
care, whilst casting a critical light on the a-symmetrical (active/ passive, powerful/ in 
need) nature of giving in these contexts. Another shift towards a more affect-oriented 
and STS influenced approach is David Conradson (Conradson 2003a), who has paid 
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particular attention to the “doing [of] organisational space” in the formation of 
voluntary welfare settings in New Zealand. Compared to studies with a more classic 
geographical focus, such as those that (usefully) identify “marginalised services… for 
socially marginalised people” (Johnsen, Cloke, and May 2005, 334), Conradson’s 
approach to “doing space” opens up yet more analytical possibilities for 
understanding how—to stick with the same example—socially marginalised people 
might “make up” socially marginalised spaces, and vice versa. I will explain these 
analytical possibilities more fully over the next section. 
STS, material semiotics, and care “in place”  
Science and technology studies (STS), sometimes known as “science, technology and 
society” or “science studies,” is a relatively young discipline, which has been 
concerned with social and cultural analyses of the knowledge and materiality of 
science since the 1970s (Law 2008). Closely connected to this is the field of “material 
semiotics”: the study of relations in their material and spatial context. These fields of 
scholarship are underpinned by assumptions of the reciprocal constitution, or co-
production of facts, artefacts and meanings (Latour 1987; Haraway 1988; Jasanoff 
2012; Pickersgill 2012). Much of this thinking is underpinned by actor network 
theory, which posits that all of these (human and non-human) elements are held 
together and interact in a web of relations (Latour 1987; Law and Hassard 1999). 
Relationality is a key organising concept, which insists that social and material 
entities are not only connected, but that they exist in their particular form because of 
these connections.   
 
More recently, there has been a shift in the application of STS oriented research. 
These principles no longer focus solely on laboratories or the production of scientific 
knowledge, and are now often applied to topics and locations of care, such as those I 
have been describing above. What remains central to this way of thinking is that the 
world is constantly “in-the-making,” and the social and material are co-produced. As 
STS scholar, Ingunn Moser, has put it:  
“objects and subjects, facts and artefacts, material and social conditions, social actors 
and practices are equally made and sustained in and by means of on going relations” 
(Moser 2017, 89) 
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Whilst it had been important to frame scientific “facts” and “objects” as relational 
products—i.e. “made up” in a network of relations (Latour 1987, 1992; Callon 
1986), it also became necessary to talk about care as emerging not just from social 
interactions but also from spatial practice and production. To illustrate this point, 
Moser (ibid.) describes the architectural arrangements of a care home for people 
living with dementia: aspects of the garden, coffee table or hair salon that produce 
various possibilities for people to participate in social life. What animates the more 
difficult to grasp idea that these places are also produced and dependent on social 
actors is the ethnographic material describing the way a resident with dementia 
behaved in and enacted the institutional space in a different way to the way she, the 
ethnographer, was enacting it. The resident found herself on the unfamiliar territory 
of public transport, whilst the ethnographer (who introduces the scene as firmly based 
in the care home) was left to think about what we can learn from these multiple and 
contradictory enactments of space. This points to a second (though tightly connected) 
organising concept, which I adopt in my own work: enactment. Enactment is the 
process by which people and things, bodies and subjects, are constituted in practice; 
taking shape in their relations to one another (Mol 2002; Law and Lien 2013). 
 
I too have been interested in the way that people accessing particular mental health 
settings might also be enacting or “making up” these settings. This provokes a very 
different angle on the relations between people and care providers, compared to 
public health ideas such as “candidacy” (Dixon-Woods et al. 2006) or “fit” between 
people and services (Lamb et al. 2012), which I described in the introduction to this 
thesis. If subjectivities and places do not pre-exist these encounters, how does that 
change the kind of questions we ask about which services are appropriate for whom? 
How might it shift traditional questions about people’s experiences of services, towards 
an engagement with situated practices and what they produce or enact, besides 
individual experience? 
 
Perhaps most clearly in dialogue with the human geography literature I have 
described above, though firmly situated within STS and material semiotics, is 
Jeannette Pols’ work on mental health care in a context of de-institutionalisation in 
the Netherlands.  Pols and her collaborators (Ootes et al. 2013b; Ootes et al. 2013a; 
Pols 2016) have considered questions of integration and participation as part of a 
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broader project about citizenship for people with long term mental health problems. 
The approach is grounded in “empirical ethics” (Willems and Pols 2010), which is 
aligned with the sub-discipline empirical philosophy, which Annemarie Mol (2002) is 
well known for. In the spirit of this approach, Pols has put forward “an empirical way 
of studying citizenship that looks at the relationships between people and the way 
these relationships are materially mediated and form social spaces” (ibid. 2016, 178). 
Looking beyond regional spaces such as the neighbourhood, Pols suggests ways of 
researching how people create new and different socialities such as caring 
communities amongst outpatients or online networks. Also central to this work is the 
relationality of people, material objects and socio-material space.  
 
Although Pols’ approach resists being confined to thinking in terms of geographical 
regions, concepts of space and place remain central. A key piece of empirical work 
(which fed into Pols’ 2016 paper) presented a way of thinking about citizenship and 
belonging as “being in place” (Ootes et al. 2013a; Ootes 2012). Ootes and Pols’ 
ethnographic work in long-term mental health facilities pointed to the ideal of being 
“in-place” because it encompassed the sociality of inclusion and belonging, plus 
inclusion in the material environment; it also spoke to the material comfort of being 
“at home” without its static point of reference. This way of thinking about space 
draws from the STS principles described above, as well as concepts of “topology” 
from this field (Law and Mol 2001, 1995).15 As such, space is thought of not just in 
terms of fixed buildings or coordinates, but in terms of how spaces are held together 
by notions of citizenship and other social phenomena. Just as Ingunn Moser talked of 
people enacting places, these authors engaged theoretically with the idea that “places 
can enact relationships” in mental health contexts (2013b, 16), citing Latour’s (1987) 
assertion that places and objects have agency of their own. This sense of symmetry 
between people and their socio-material environment (each “acting” on one another) 
is central to the concept of co-production in STS. 
Materiality, mundane care, and “moments of access”  
 
15 Theories that draw on the concept of topology (originally drawn from mathematics) have sought to 
understand the social world spatially, but have pushed beyond classic understandings of space 
measured by two or three-dimensional coordinates. Building on actor network theory, they argue that 
there is also a network space, in which complex sets of relations hold objects together, or indeed, let 
them fall apart (De Laet and Mol 2000; Law and Mol 1995, 2001; Law 2003).   
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A final thread that I want to follow in order to bring together these converging 
disciplinary approaches to place and (access to) care is one that originates in medical 
sociology. This discipline, with it roots in the study of medical organisations and 
institutes, has become intertwined with STS as these scholars share an interest in 
relational logics and materiality (Law 2008). A recent special issue on the 
materialities of care (Buse, Martin, and Nettleton 2018) and new materialism 
(Brownlie and Spandler 2018)16 makes visible just how much conceptual and 
disciplinary overlap there is between this literature and the bodies of work I have 
described above. The relatively recent sociological focus on architecture, for 
example, draws directly on science studies for “understanding how social relations 
are built into architecture” (Martin et al. 2015, 1011); whilst science studies scholars 
exploring “caring architecture” (Nord and Högström 2017) draw on work from 
human geography, to think through concepts like “therapeutic landscapes” (Andrews 
2004; Rose 2012). Whilst acknowledging these disciplinary overlaps, I discuss the 
following work as a sociological conversation about how places and identities emerge, 
how place, non-place and liminality is experienced, and processes of inclusion, 
exclusion and access happen in healthcare settings. I am particularly interested in 
Joanna Latimer’s discussion of “moments of access,” and how these moments 
produce citizens (Latimer 2018; White, Hillman, and Latimer 2012, 73)—a concept I 
return to in my methodology chapter below. 
 
The theme of being excluded and/or out of place has been explored extensively within 
this body of literature. In earlier work, Buse and Twigg (2014) were concerned with 
the notion of “looking out of place” in residential care settings. They describe the 
tension between the language of “home” used to describe these settings and the way 
in which they are often seen as transitory or liminal places such as earlier work has 
observed in hotel lobbies (Tallack, 2002). They argue that this interpretation by 
residents framed these care settings as more like “non places” (Auge 1995) than 
“homes,” and that practices of carrying a handbag were demonstrative of them 
feeling transitory and out of place. Another kind of liminal or in-between space that 
 
16 New materialism, Spandler and Brownlie (2018, 257) tell us, “asks that we pay attention to human 
and non-human assemblages and the multiple relations within them, which include objects, people, 
relationships, emotions, resources and buildings as well as economic or legal processes, and cultural 
practices and expectations such as reciprocity. All these elements, new materialists suggest, have 
material effects.” 
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has been looked at through the lens of materiality is the waiting rooms that Susan 
Bell describes in her hospital ethnography of a service for immigrant and refugee 
patients (Bell 2018). Though inherently liminal (a “node that links the inside of the 
hospital to the outside”), only some of these places were “non-places” in that it 
depended entirely on the design features, conversations, and visual signs that came 
together at any one time. She argues that these spaces can “create solitude, anonymity 
and similitude” (Auge, cited in Bell, 2018) but they can also “create and enhance 
transnational networks of support that can flow into the exam room and out into the 
community outside of the clinic” (ibid. 2018, 318). 
 
IV. From Place to Milieu 
 
In this last part of the chapter, I have told a story of convergence between the three 
bodies of work around the theme of “situating access, inclusion, and exclusion.” Out 
of the literature I have been describing on materiality and place, well-formed (and 
now well-rehearsed) arguments have emerged about the co-production of social and 
material worlds. I go on to build on this body of work, particularly in Part One of the 
thesis, where my focus on place pushes the materiality of access to the foreground. 
Place, then, does the work of grounding this thing we call “access” in the material 
environment: it happens on thresholds, through doors, and in between-spaces like car 
parks and waiting rooms. It brings questions of who is inside and who is outside into 
focus, visually, as well as figuratively. We are made aware of inside-ness and outside-
ness through the spatial and material features of care settings, and the practices that 
create and manage them. Place making and building becomes constantly relevant: 
dynamic and on-going, rather than a predefined background to practices of access 
and inclusion. 
 
 I have been describing the ways in which the analytical use of place has helped with 
the placing of people and identities: understanding them in specific situations, and 
therefore in situ. I have also charted the placing of care providers, moving away from 
their positioning in policy and structure and into the landscape of geographical areas, 
cities, and health and social care arrangements. Perhaps the most important point in 
all of this has been driven home by the material-semiotics literature: that the sociality 
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and materiality of place co-constitute one another. This means that place need not 
foreclose discussions of “the social,” social relations are built into the material 
environment, and socialities are shaped and afforded by that environment. Put 
differently, we social scientists have become confident in our analytical use of place to 
foreground the materialities of inclusion and exclusion in health and care, because of 
a refusal to let the material become detached from the social.  
 
In the chapters that follow, I work up to conceptually extending my use of place to 
something yet more dynamic and more closely related to the multitude of individuals 
that encounter these places of care; whose need their care is organised around. This 
conceptual extension takes me to the notion of the milieu, which comes into play in 
Part Two of the thesis. Milieu is most commonly known as a person’s social 
environment, though it has roots in the physical and natural sciences. It is a notion 
with a complex and various genealogy in science, philosophy, and therapeutic 
application. There are, for example, writings from the eighteenth century on milieu 
as fluid matter and a whole body of psychiatric work and practice based on the idea 
of the “therapeutic milieu” developed in the late 60s. However, I seek to employ it in 
a particular and rather more conceptual way, referring to a vitalist approach to the 
problem of the individual in their environment (Canguilhem 1952/2001). In doing 
so, I join current conversations on the milieu: in medical anthropology, for example, 
Hannah Landecker and Todd Meyers in a recent collection of texts revisiting 
Canguilhem (Coren and Brinitzer 2019) and from a little more distance, Biehl and 
Locke (2010); as well as in social theory (Eyers 2013; Greco 2019). In the thesis, I 
keep my discussions close to my ethnographic material, rather than venturing too far 
into theoretical discussions about the history and genealogy of the concept. However, 
I devote a little space here to make clear the theoretical genealogy of “milieu,” the 
different meanings that emerge from it, and what it does (and does not do) in the 
context of my own work. 
Which Milieu?  
I have alluded to the many different versions of the concept of the milieu in the social 
and life sciences. My interest with the notion of milieu in relation to need came from 
the essay of Georges Canguilhem, The Living in its Milieu (Canguilhem 1952/2001). 
The essay seeks to identify the meaning and value of milieu as a “category of 
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contemporary thought” (ibid, 7) through its forays through the ages of the life 
sciences. Threaded through this history, however, is the author’s own orientation 
towards a particular form of vitalist philosophy, which is concerned with life in its 
many forms and processes: both human life and beyond. And so, whilst a multitude 
of understandings of the term and concept are discussed, one theme running through 
it is the difference between Canguilhem’s vitalist ideas of the milieu, and a more 
mechanistic notion of milieu as “outside surroundings,” grounded in Newtonian 
physics. What I take from this argument is that the idea of “surroundings,” defined 
purely by their static exteriority, does not allow for the lively, vital, or radically 
relational conceptualisations of place that become possible through Canguilhem’s 
lines of thinking. Such static “surroundings” are reminiscent of the stubbornly inert 
background that characterises so much of public health discourse on “context”. 
Similarly, thinking of milieu as a set of “influential circumstances,” working 
mechanistically on the organism, smacks of the causal, linear problematisations that 
characterise many intervention models in healthcare. As such, mechanistic notions of 
environment or context fail to engage with the on-going, dynamic way in which the 
living shapes its milieu as a function of its values and needs (Canguilhem 1952/2001, 
9).   
 
It is the more relational, vital notion of the milieu that I draw upon in my work, and 
which helps me to think through the problem of need in place: the dynamic emergence 
of mental health need in particular places of care. More specifically, I draw on two 
key elements of Canguilhem’s milieu in my work, to conceptually extend my ideas 
about place. The first, which I have already begun to describe, is the relational space, 
centred around and shaped by living individuals. Where places are defined by a more 
straightforward relationality between inside and outside, Canguilhem’s milieu 
conjures a more radically relational idea of inside/outside, centre/periphery, which is 
a function of how environments are lived, made by, and constrain a multitude of 
people and other organisms. A vitalist understanding of milieu is therefore relational 
because it is never a given: it is constituted by the living things that inhabit it. And it 
is multiple because it is centred around each and every one of these living things, and 
never a totality. For me, this is crucial to understanding how I come to describe the 
emergence of forms of mental health need in psychotherapy centres: that these 
centres do not impose particular forms of need on people, yet nor do their needs or 
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the milieu exist independently from the encounter—the moment of access. I go on to 
describe the dynamic emergence of need in the relational space of care settings, 
working alongside and in tension with the more bureaucratic constraints of mental 
health care. 
 
The second element of Canguilhem’s vitalist milieu that I draw upon is the ethics of 
putting the living—in this case, individual humans—back into the story of the story 
of place. Practices of knowing individuals and their needs emerge in the ethnographic 
material that follows as a powerful organising principle in my field sites. 
Canguilhem’s vitalism allows me to attend to the humanist ethics of my interlocutors, 
whilst maintaining a commitment to the productive “liveliness” of that which goes 
beyond the human: places, the material practices of access, and so on. In the words 
of human geographer Chris Philo, talking of Canguilhem as a forerunner of post-
humanism, “…he can arrive at ways to hold both vitalism and humanism ‘in 
suspension’ relative to one another” (Philo 2007, 97).  This moves us closer to 
contemporary readings of vitalism, which privilege its relational and processual 
commitments (Fraser, Kember, and Lury 2005) as well as its ethical demands (Greco 
2005). In bringing the “living” back in, I hope to attend more carefully to the 
presences and absences of “humans in need,” which the work of inclusion and access 
was organised around in my field sites. 
 
A final word on the question of “which milieu?” responds to the fact that the concept 
continues to be revitalised and used anew. Notably, Biehl and Locke (2010, 2017) 
have, with broad reference to Deleuze, employed the notion of the milieu in order to 
talk of an “anthropology of becoming.” Their rethinking of “being” to “becoming” (a 
state constantly enacted though time and space) resonates with my broad thinking 
about life as an inventive, relational process. I too engage with Deleuzian ideas about 
people and places as changing, unfinished things: I have been fascinated by their 
famous rhizome, which has “neither beginning nor end, but always a middle (milieu) 
from which it grows and which it overspills” (Deleuze and Guattari 1988, 21).  
 
The way in which Biehl and Locke adopt these ideas, however, diverges from my 
own ethnographic use of the milieu. These authors are concerned with rather more 
grand narratives of hopes and desires in relation to structural violence and social 
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suffering (João Biehl and Locke 2010). The temporality of becoming through these 
narratives that Biehl and Locke use to describe “a people yet to come” (ibid.) directs 
our attention to life-stories and imagined futures—a more classic domain of 
anthropology. But what about the moment-by-moment emergence of need in a given 
milieu?  What I am interested in is a more modest idea of moments in place. The entities 
that “become” at these moments are in a different kind of movement: one of 
adjustment, improvisation, responsiveness to place and its demands. As the 
ethnographic material unfolds, it also becomes clear in my work that the milieu 
incorporates the precarity that is inherent in need, care, and living, rather than being 
the backdrop for stories of precarity and suffering as in more classic anthropological 
approaches. 
 
My focus on vital concepts of need and milieu, rather than distinctly Deleuzian ideas 
of desire and wide-open “becomings,” is important for me because of the kind of 
problems it orients us towards and helps us to re-think. By this, I am thinking back to 
the problematic set up in the introduction: the public health model of “meeting the 
need,” working from centre to periphery. How might we re-think this, given the 
more dynamic, relational processes, located in space and place that I have been 
exploring here? 
 
V. Problem (re)formulation, aims and questions  
 
In light of the ideas I have been discussing above, I want to revisit the “problem” as I 
have described it in the introduction as a public health problem. As it stands, I see a 
notion of “access” through the lens of public health and psychological services, which 
I have argued is less of a public “good” as it is an inherent problem. I have described 
this problem in terms of the persistence of vast inequities and discontent with levels of 
access to (mental) healthcare, and in particular, to talking therapies in the UK—a 
high-income country with a supposedly “free at the point of access” model of 
healthcare. I have also pointed to two contemporary policies that have been put in 
place to tackle the problem of access to mental health care in this context: one is the 
national “roll out” of Improving Access to Psychological Therapies (IAPT) 
programme and the other is the “any qualified provider” policy of the Health and 
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Social Care Act (2012), which deploys voluntary services to provide mental health 
care to underserved and specialised groups who find it harder to access services via 
mainstream clinical routes.  
 
Already, a contradiction emerges. “Access” has been framed as a universal problem, 
to be solved by putting in motion population wide, evidence based medicine logics, 
whilst at the same time it has been framed as a problem of certain communities with 
particular needs.  The seemingly straightforward problem of “not enough access” 
meaning high levels of “unmet need” in mental health care becomes therefore 
difficult to uphold, much less solve, in its current formulation. I see a toolbox 
emerging from the existing work on this topic, at the intersection of several 
theoretical and disciplinary fields, which helps me generate new ways of thinking 
about this problem, through crafting questions that are not only answerable but 
“inventive” (Wakeford and Lury 2012).  
 
One of the aims of this thesis, then, is to reformulate the “problem” of access, using 
both the existing scholarly work I have been synthesising here as well as my own 
ethnography. It is at this point that I begin to identify an anthropological problem, from 
the array of perils (in the literature I have discussed) that appear to come with 
addressing shortcomings and inequalities in access to mental health care. I have 
shown that these perils are not just the ones we are now familiar with in 
medicalisation or “psychiatrisation” narratives, where psychiatric diagnoses silence 
other ways of understanding mental distress. They also cover the perils of countering 
this psychiatric dominance with “special” services: perils of reifying ethnic, racial or 
cultural difference and of trying to pin down complex or even indeterminate concepts 
such as “health” or “need,” to reiterate a few that I have teased out of the literature 
above. I am interested in addressing these more anthropological problems around 
difference and mental health need in my work. I have drawn inspiration from wider 
literature to breathe new life into these problems, by foregrounding place, space and 
socio-materiality in my investigation. One way I do this within the thesis is by quite 
literally frontloading the data chapters that revolve around themes on place, ordering 
them to form “Part One” of the ethnography and following with my analysis of need 
within these settings in “Part Two”. In the discussion chapter, I reflect on what this 
problem formulation does analytically, and importantly, what it might do for care 
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providers in the voluntary sector, who are increasingly being positioned as a 
“solution” to the problem of access and unmet need. 
 
I argue that this approach to the research problem is an important shift away from 
static or identity-based framings of the problems of access to care, to a more situated, 
processual and spatialised one. But this must be operationalised in the methodology 
as well as the conceptual work of this project. This leads me on to the next aim, 
which is to observe and describe access “in-place”: by this, I mean generating data on 
access and inclusion in particular places, and further, by treating “place” as a product 
of spatial practices, materials and relations. I am interested in how place comes into 
being through the practices of accessing care, and including or excluding potential 
service users in the three psychotherapy centres that were my field sites. I developed 
a creative “mapping” method, which allowed me to explore how these centres were 
constantly being “made” and “remade.” As I go on to show in my data chapters, this 
was sometimes done quite literally from scratch, due to financial pressure and a 
changing urban environment. At other times, place making was achieved through 
the everyday work of (material and metaphorical) maintenance of spaces and their 
boundaries. Here, I ask how these processes might play into notions of the “counter-
clinic” defined by its “differentness” to the mainstream, broadening my analysis of 
boundaries and relationality to different scales within the broader landscape of care. 
 
Inspired by work in the field of material semiotics and notions of the “liveliness” of 
place, which I have described above, I push these ideas yet further, considering how 
place might, in various ways, be an active medium in these field sites. This will inform 
the research aim and questions for the second part of the ethnography, about the 
enactment of mental health need. As I have outlined in the literature review, I am 
interested in “different kinds” of mental health need and how “different kinds” of 
care providers recognise, articulate and operationalise this as eligibility criteria for 
accessing care. In particular, I am interested in how this is done in the absence of, or 
in relation to, mainstream clinical frameworks such as diagnostic classifications. 
Throughout this thesis (though more intensively in the second part of the data 
chapters), I aim to describe and analyse the processes, practices, discourses and 
spaces through which mental health “need” comes into being. I deliberately leave my 
conceptualisation of need open and do not attempt to answer the question of what 
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need really “is.” Instead, I investigate how need is articulated and enacted by 
different social actors, considering how it enables access to care. In other words, I am 
more interested in what need “does” than what it “is”  
 
The above aims and questions I have been posing throughout this chapter can in fact 
be pulled together to capture this dual focus on place and need, in order to reformulate 
and eventually respond to the “problem” of mental health care access. The 
overarching aim, then, is to investigate how “place” and “need” co-produce one another 
in voluntary sector mental health care, and how these insights might, in turn, help to 
produce a situated and critically engaged notion of the problem of “access.” 
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Chapter 3: Placing need—a methodology 
 
 
 “We” [the “knowers”] are not outside observers of the world. Nor are we simply 
located at particular places in the world; rather, we are part of the world in its 
ongoing intra-activity (Barad 2003, 828) 
 
 
Placing need/need in place: the structure for the chapters that follow could go either 
way, though I have chosen to let “placing” drive much of my methodological 
approach. And so “place and need” has emerged as a structure, but might better be 
re-formulated as a methodology, or a methodological sensibility. It is a way of 
coming to know the problem of “access,” which attends explicitly to the processual 
and practice-oriented, the non-linear, the relational, the material, and the vital. First, 
I give a brief rationalisation of these organising concepts, before introducing the main 
body of this chapter. 
 
I crafted my methodology to attend to the processual and practice-oriented, because I 
needed to direct my focus away from categories as fixed entities, particularly in care 
settings such as my field sites, where diagnostic and social categories abound but are 
also contentious and subject to discontent and change. In my research questions, I 
have therefore framed “need” as eligibility criteria, to be enacted and put to work by 
both users and providers of these services in particular situations; it was the job of my 
ethnographic methods to help me notice and understand how this work unfolds. I 
attend to the non-linear, because of the scepticism I had initially about pathways and 
“barriers and facilitators” models of access, and because (later on in the research 
process) when I tried to analyse people’s stories as continuous narratives or 
“journeys” I found much more fragmented data and few causal pathways to the 
events I observed. I see the world as relational, because how else does one study sites 
and populations that are defined by “difference”? (To think about “being different” 
as anything but relational simply makes no sense: different to what?). I have also 
found that relational thinking can be pushed further than simply making sense of 
points of sameness and difference: by seeing the world as it is produced by 
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relationships, I started to see the constant production of sameness and difference, and of 
universality and alterity. I looked to the material, because I was curious to understand 
how the ubiquitous spatial metaphors in discourse about access to care (gaps, bridges, 
doors, pathways, and so on) related to the material environment and a more 
grounded notion of being in (or out of) place. As such, I attend to the “liveliness” of 
places, in order to engage with ideas that foreground the non- or “more than” 
human. I do this not to divert from the humanness or immateriality of social and 
psychological need, but rather to locate this need, and potentially subvert linear logics 
of need as a pre-existing entity, to be determined diagnostically and then referred to 
particular inert places within a system of care. This speaks to a broader commitment 
to the vital, or a vitalist approach (introduced in the previous chapter), inspired by the 
philosophy of Canguilhem (Canguilhem 1952/2001; Canguilhem 1952/2008; 
Canguilhem 1943/1991), which attends to places, individuals and their needs in their 
unfolding and their absolute relationality (Fraser, Kember, and Lury 2005; Greco 
2005; Philo 2007).  
 
Together, these ways of thinking about and working in the social world have been 
productive, not just in producing knowledge about this world but by engaging with 
the productivity of practices themselves (Law and Lien 2013), by re-animating what 
may seem static or inert (Ingold 2010) and by developing methods that are in essence 
inventive (Wakeford and Lury 2012). To theorise “place and need” as assembled, co-
constituent, and in-the-making, I see it as necessary to participate and engage in this 
making. I start this chapter with a precursor to this making: a series of reflections on 
becoming interested in the field, which serves to say something about my positionality 
and ethical approaches to fieldwork. I go on to describe the explicitly “creative 
method” that I developed in order to embed this inventiveness and engagement with 
“place” into my formal interviews with users and providers of these services. In the 
final section, I focus on writing as a method to record, analyse and perform the social 
world throughout the ethnography, giving examples of how this helped me bring out 
my findings in the different parts of the thesis. 
Overview of the fieldwork: An ethnography of access 
I have used these practices of becoming interested, mapping and tracing, and writing as 
heuristic devices to bring out what I consider the most pertinent aspects of my 
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research practice, though of course, these can encompass only a fraction of the 
choices that I made, the modes of data gathering I adopted, and the ways in which I 
went about analysing this data. I therefore give some space here to provide a very 
broad brushstroke picture of what the fieldwork looked like.  
 
My methodology was ethnographic and employed a range of qualitative methods in 
order to generate different kinds of data. I engaged in participant observation 
(though as I describe below, my participation was inherently partial), based mainly in 
the three voluntary clinics I selected as field sites, throughout the fifteen months I was 
“in the field.”17 I went through the London School of Hygiene and Tropical 
Medicine ethics procedure, and, at the point of starting of my fieldwork, gained 
permission to gather data according to a specified protocol.18 As I detail below, 
however, I took a largely processual approach to my ethical practice, iteratively 
assessing and adjusting my work according to situations as they arose within the 
everyday application of my research methods.19 I spent approximately three cycles of 
six to eight weeks in each site (and any further places this lead me to in the 
community or other non-NHS services), with the first cycle focused on observing and 
establishing my role in each place; the second on recruiting and interviewing service 
users, whom I would usually meet once or twice before a main interview; and the 
third interviewing the service provider staff, whom by then I knew well, with various 
degrees of intimacy. In my writing about these encounters, I make every effort to 
protect the identities and privacy of my interlocutors; I use pseudonyms for people 
and places, sometimes using only an initial or changing small details where necessary.   
 
I selected the foci of my observations and interviews according to my topic and 
research questions, considering my material and conceptual area of interest to be 
situated around the doors to each service. This meant I was primarily interested in any 
practices and topics that related to processes of referring, accessing, waiting, 
 
17 This period is not clearly defined, as I was (and remain) based in London and in relatively close 
proximity to all of my field sites, meaning on-going scoping work took place before this time and I am 
able to remain in contact with the field even now. 
18 This included standard procedures for gaining written informed consent for interviews and written 
permission from clinical directors to conduct participant observation in the centres, informing other 
staff and clients of my presence through information posters, sheets and oral communications. 
19 I recorded ethical issues in my field notes and incorporated local (organisational) ethical guidelines 
as I encountered them and continued on-going contact with the ethics committee to build and amend 
my methods in response to the demands and possibilities encountered in the field.  
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assessing, allocating, and so on; right up until a client fully entered into a therapeutic 
space and relationship with their therapist. This meant my analyses “stopped” when 
it came to the therapeutic work itself. Conceptually there was no clear line about 
where this was (some therapists felt the therapeutic work started as soon as clients 
crossed the threshold, for example) but I never observed one-to-one therapy sessions, 
which I considered a methodological and an ethical choice, as much as a simple limit 
to my own “access.” Observational work took a wide range of forms, which I detail 
below, combining volunteering, shadowing and observing clinical meetings and other 
staff practices. Through this, I had countless conversations, discussions, debates, and 
so on, with staff members. I also conducted one or more formal interviews with 
fourteen of the therapists and staff members, most of which also involved the creative 
visual method I describe below in the mapping and tracing section.  
 
I had far less on-going contact with service-users, who flowed in and out of the 
centres in short cycles of therapy and spent only a fraction of their time in the centres 
outside the therapy rooms. Aside from the time I spent with service users in the 
waiting rooms, and through my recruitment of people to take part in my research, all 
of my data with service users was generated through interviews. I interviewed twenty-
five people in this way, sometimes more than once. On two occasions I held group 
interviews with members of a new therapeutic group. Usually these took place in the 
centres, in whichever quiet space we could find (which oddly often turned out to be a 
therapy room), though I also met people whom I already knew in cafes or their 
homes. I have tried to write all of these places in to the ethnographic material, 
foregrounding them as social spaces as well as clinics, research locations, and the 
broader, shape-shifting space of the much talked-about “community.” 
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I. Becoming interested 
 
The popular ideal of science is thus made of a mute disinterested scientist letting 
totally mute and un-interfered with entities run automatically through sequences of 
behaviour. But… The path to science requires, on the contrary, a passionately interested 
scientist Latour (2004a, 218) 
 
What did it mean for me, as an ethnographer to be interested in my field site and in the 
people I engaged with? How did I become interested? In the text I quote above, Latour is 
saying something about how good science should be done: arguing with others20 
against the canon of modern philosophy of science, he gives primacy to the 
“interests” of the researcher and the “interestingness” of the entities that she is 
researching. I want to dwell here on a double meaning of being interested, which I see 
coming out of this text, and which is pertinent to the way I was positioned in the 
field. I use the notion of becoming interested to refine and bring together this double 
meaning, and to talk about how I became sensitised and affected by the worlds I 
inhabited during my fieldwork. 
 
My selection of these three centres was made according to how they would make my 
research questions answerable, but crucially how these answers would be interesting, 
both in terms of the “matters of concern” that I highlight in my review of the 
literature, as well for as my own lines of inquiry. As I go on to show, this was an 
interest that I built up through engagement and the building of relationships: there 
was a reciprocity to it, which was important for accessing the field. My own access to 
the field was realised through first engaging with one of the centres, which I call 
Culture in Mind, volunteering with them over a period of time in which I was 
seeking out links with other third sector providers in the area. I eventually made the 
decision to work with the consortium of providers that had recently formed around 
Culture in Mind in a typically strategic move for small organisations to secure clinical 
commissioning contracts within a certain area. I came to this through a process of 
becoming embedded in this first organisation, building an understanding of how this 
 
20 Latour is referring to Isabelle Stengers and Vinciane Despret, who argue for an “alternative 
normative epistemological epistemology,” to that of Karl Popper’s falsification principle. 
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centre sat within formal and informal networks of care provision (that is, networks 
built on commissioning and other funding structures alongside those built on years of 
friendship and alliances). The consortium, the three separate organisations, and 
(later) individual encounters and moments, all made up different versions of what 
could be called “ethnographic cases.” Each kind of “case” was interesting for their 
own particular reasons but also in relation to a general interestingness: how a person fell 
into a general “client group,” or how each organisation was part of the broader 
consortium, for example.21 
 
It is important to say that I wasn’t the only one who found my field sites interesting. I 
learned quickly that the first centre I engaged with often captured the imagination of 
outsiders. The centre had been operating from various sites with the same inner-city 
area for over thirty years and its capacity for “interestingness” would at times exceed 
its physical capacity. I heard the “Scandinavian students” story several times as 
testament to this: a group of young clinicians came to visit the centre, having read 
about its alternative, cultural approach to psychotherapy on their training 
programme and wanting to set up their own centre for refugee mental health. 
Entering the small clinic space at the top of an office building, they had exclaimed 
how tiny it was, appalled at how insignificant it appeared compared to how far its 
ideas had spread. That was then—some fifteen years ago— but 2016 was the year I 
started my fieldwork and the year after the “refugee crisis” hit Europe. It was the 
peak of the contemporary “global matter of concern” around migration (as I 
described it in Chapter 2) and the centre seemed to be more interesting than ever. 
Over those months, several thinkers and writers came to ask the therapists about the 
psychological fallout of current migration politics that they encountered day-to-day.22 
This place, at least, was already interesting. The other sites had their own, connected 
versions of this—projects that went to the heart of contemporary understandings of 
 
21 Yates-Doerr and Labuski (2015) had recently reignited scholarly interest in the “ethnographic case,” 
inviting anthropologists to consider the “tensions between the general and the particular” it invokes 
through a series of 27 contributions to their Somatosphere blog project. A related set of reflections had 
also been compellingly articulated by Berlant in her more general commentary “On the Case” 
(Berlant 2007)  
22 There was the Cultural Studies professor, who came for the afternoon to investigate how 
psychoanalytic therapy reached poor migrants within contemporary megacities, avidly collecting case 
studies from the most senior therapists; and the young journalist who wanted to link clients’ 
experiences to her own story of being born in a refugee camp in Somalia and bearing witness to her 
mother’s struggle with the mental health system in the UK. 
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psychosocial suffering (migration, gender-based violence, bereavement, to name a 
few)23. Attached to this was another set of issues for me, when it came to being 
interested in the life-worlds of people who were being (in some projects) defined by 
their difference and minority status. Not sharing their minority status in the wider 
context we were inhabiting could attach my “interested-ness” to my whiteness, and 
the “interestingness” of particular field sites to the “otherness” of the people they 
were designed for. This is a dynamic that resonates with Cabot’s exploration of 
xenophilic responses to migrants in Germany and Greece as a kind of “consumption 
of the stranger” (2017, 143). This was a spectre that could never be entirely resolved 
through methodology, but can at least be unsettled and challenged in ways I go on to 
talk about. In the next section I reflect on what makes it worthwhile talking about 
“being interested,” in light of these uncomfortable associations. What makes it a 
precursor to this engaged and “inventive” approach I have been describing above? 
The interested volunteer 
One important way to broaden out this concept is to think about being interested not 
simply as finding something interesting, but as the opposite of being disinterested (a 
“mute disinterested scientist”24): of having vested interests in people and places. My 
interests formed, and sometimes changed throughout the time I spent with these 
organisations, largely through volunteering and investing in relationships with staff 
and other volunteers. This begins to answer the question of why this conception of 
interestingness requires methodological work to make it reciprocal: to make it into a 
quality that is co-constructed between researcher and researched. This goes against 
many enlightenment ideals of “good science” because it implies non-neutrality and a 
potential for “bias,” but these ideals are precisely what many people have railed 
against in their critiques of entrenched hierarchies of knowledge and modes of 
knowledge production (Haraway 1988; Latour 2004a). The politics of such 
methodological rebellion has perhaps been best articulated beyond science studies, 
for example in the postcolonial feminist maxim “the master’s tools will never dismantle the 
master’s house” (Lorde 1979/2003;  cited in Ahmed 2017), which similarly seeks to 
 
23 This is in contrast to the “interestingness” that Vincianne Despret (2006) talks about having to learn 
about, and rethink, when it came to studying sheep: a particular non-human group which is 
traditionally thought of as rather more uninteresting than people engaged in therapeutic practice. 
24 The “mute disinterested scientist” is in the words of Latour (2004a), quoted above, which cites the 
work of colleagues Stengers and Despret. 
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disrupt and subvert the canon of the tools of the academy. Through the following 
examples, I demonstrate how shedding the safeguard of the “disinterested scientist” 
label was a vital element of the kind of ethnography I was engaged with; how it also 
carried ethical implications and dilemmas, and how it provoked active shifts in my 
own subjectivity as I moved through different places and moments in the field. 
 
Throughout the time that I was engaged in my fieldwork, my interests as a 
researcher, there to “collect” data, became blurred with interests that emerged as a 
volunteer, as a friend to some, and as an advocate (and at times a critic) of the work 
that I was witnessing. This was of course part and parcel of the world I was a part of: 
interests were driven not by money, since there was so little to be invested or gained, 
but certainly by values, interests and the relationships that formed around them. This 
could be fraught: I saw the bitter disappointment of a senior therapist who took on a 
role, motivated by friendship and by a commitment to feminism, only to find herself 
feeling exploited and overwhelmed by the organisational pressures; volunteers 
operated on the assumption that they were working within the same value system as 
paid staff but this could go awry and their investment could be dropped in an instant. 
Next to (and with further blurring into) the shadowing and observational work I did, 
I too volunteered in all three sites, working more intensively in each for three cycles 
of several weeks at a time. I do not suggest that my volunteer work was subject to the 
same pressures or affective involvement as these long-term members of staff, though I 
do want to highlight here the ways in which my engagement nudged me closer to an 
“insider” perspective, sensitised to these dynamics, if always from the peripheries. 
 
I never conducted clinical work, not having been trained in psychotherapy, but my 
background in psychology helped take off the “outsider” edge to my role as 
ethnographer. I worked on community projects such as outreach events, helped 
organise and document conferences, created promotional material, represented the 
organisations at external events, gathered information and data for funding 
proposals; I worked on the reception and proof-read letters and legal statements from 
therapists for whom English was a second language; I helped set up a book club for 
critical reading and discussion at one of the centres, and developed the training 
material and inductions for the many new trainees that invested volunteer time. 
When one of the centres moved location, unable to keep up with the rising rent 
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prices in its area, I participated in the packing, unpacking and place-making of the 
clinic (in its fourth location to date), and helped clear the outside space of another 
centre when clients began to get disconcerted by the rubbish and abandoned cars 
that were dominating the small street it was located on. The role with the most blurry 
boundaries I took on was the setting up of a research team in the centre that was 
most discontented with the monitoring and evaluation systems they were subject to 
from their contractors.25 This work could be seen as a simple investment in these sites 
in return for “data” (the familiar gift exchange between ethnographer and her 
interlocutors) but of course this work not only became “the data,” but also, I became 
more and more invested in the work itself: our interests began to blend. In sum, the 
volunteer work was first and foremost a way for me to gain access to these sites but it 
also became valued by the people I was working with and (I like to think) had its own 
effects in their world. Having effects and being affected: more on this below, but first 
a note on interests and ethics. 
The ethics of being interested  
Where do interests and interestingness clash? Where does this reciprocity idea (where 
interestingness gets forged through the production of shared vested interests) fall 
down? Client stories were in themselves, of course, “interesting” but I came to find 
that this gift-exchange strategy of offering my time as a volunteer did not, on its own, 
provide an opportunity for me to become invested in the lives of service users. 
Neither did it allow me to really blend my interests with theirs like I did with the 
staff—my involvement was much less directly related to the service users, at least 
until I had already made contact with them to meet for an interview. I was 
confronted with this indirectness fairly early on in the fieldwork, when my main 
concern was with “gaining access”—the more the better, or so it felt. Here, I dwell 
on one ethical issue that arose during this process of gaining access and coming to 
terms with my own interests and stakes in the research in relation to others’. 
 
 
25 Together with non-clinical staff and volunteers, I set up a research team at the centre and devised 
an alternative qualitative monitoring system of client experiences, which became an on-going 
narrative research project. Several of the clients I piloted this with became part of my own research, 
and as well as being informed by what I found in the monitoring work, I went on to meet with them 
(sometimes outside of the clinic altogether) for my own research. 
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Because I settled into a trusted position relatively quickly in these small, un-
institutional settings, I was treated almost like a staff member, even before I came 
into contact with any clients.  When I did begin interviewing clients, I was shown, in 
two of the centres, to the filing cabinets where the clinical notes were kept. Once I 
had been referred to a client (usually through their therapist, but always in 
communication with them or the clinical manager), I was able to access their details 
through their clinical notes. This was to find out basic information like their country 
of origin, age, referrer and so on, but this was often followed directly by referrer notes 
about their previous assessments and life experiences. As well as this, many of the 
therapists were keen to discuss the person with me before I met them. There was an 
ethics to this: knowing what someone’s background is, their experiences, and other 
clinicians’ assessments of their need allowed me to think through how I could most 
sensitively relate to them in interviews.26 But it was also about being interested, 
curious to “know” what someone has been through, what their encounters with care 
providers have been like. Funders increasingly called for “human interest” stories to 
demonstrate the need for and impact of particular services. Therapists too were 
interested in these kinds of stories: one told me that discussions about clinical 
assessments were something akin to gossip, albeit “professional gossip,” as she 
showed me a new assessment form that was being introduced to that centre. She told 
me this as testament to how fascinating therapists found it to talk about people’s lives. 
In whose interest was this kind of curiosity and knowledge sharing? There is an 
implicit assumption (whether or not it is always fulfilled) that a therapist’s knowledge 
about a case is obtained and shared in the “best interests of the client,” given their 
role as a provider of care and healing. This is not the role of the researcher, 
however—a researcher must not harm, but they are not there to heal. 
 
I quickly became uncomfortable with entering into dialogue with someone for the 
first time, having had access to information they did not choose to share with me. It 
seemed to load yet more control on the researcher in (what can be) an already grossly 
imbalanced power dynamic between researcher and researched. Curiously, it was the 
 
26 A good example of the ethics of being told someone’s clinical history was when I was told that a 
young man I was about to interview had a form of autism and had come to the centre after being 
unable to access a therapy service especially for young people with special needs. Knowing this 
diagnosis influenced how I engaged with him during the interview in very simple ways-allowing me to 
let him take the lead when it came to physical proximity and shaking hands, for example. 
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expectation from clients that I would know all about their experiences, rather than any 
suspicion or withholding of information that amplified my discomfort about knowing 
this information. One interaction in particular springs to mind, where I had been 
uncomfortable knowing about a client’s deeply violent and traumatic pre-migration 
experiences, which she had only relatively recently shared with a professional for the 
first time. Her therapist had told me about these experiences but had not told the 
client that this information had been shared. I had been left in the yet more 
uncomfortable position of having to respond to the disclosure, unsure about whether 
I “should” know about her experiences or not. I came to think that perhaps her 
interests were less about “not being in distress” and more about having control over 
where her story travelled and with whom she wished to share it.  
 
Experiences like this moved me to refrain from looking at people’s clinical notes 
before I interviewed them, to develop ways to limit what therapists told me about 
clients to essential information about how vulnerable they were at that particular 
stage of the therapy, and to be up front with clients about the information that had 
and had not been shared. I did this, not to be “neutral” but rather to be honest about 
whose interests this information was serving, and think through where my interests—
to obtain data and maintain a sense of control and responsibility within the 
interviews—were in danger of superseding the interests of the person I was 
interviewing. And so the practice of sharing information—whether between 
therapists or, on occasion, between therapist and ethnographer—was only acceptable 
when it was “in the client’s best interests.” This was a judgement that had to be made 
with what Jeannette Pols has called “contextual reflexivity”: a moral sensitivity to 
specific persons and situations (Pols 2006). The judgement depended on my role in 
those particular (non-NHS, though still clinical) settings and the differences in vested 
interests between myself and the other actors involved.   
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Becoming affected 
A final way of becoming interested, which perhaps brings these different meanings—
of finding the world or subject under study, “out there” interesting, and developing 
one’s own vested interests in this world—is the idea of becoming affected by that 
world. Since in my work I do not engage with affect theory as such, and nor do I 
foreground affective or emotional processes in my methodology, I want to use this 
term in a fairly narrow sense: to talk about how over time, my interest in my field 
sites came to be about being moved by and sensitised to differences, discontinuities 
and unexpected aspects of the practices I observed and participated in. In the text I 
quoted above, this has been described as “being affected by differences” (Latour 
2004a, 210). Being involved in the everyday rhythm of organisations gave me a sense 
of their lived ordinary and sensitised me to moments that were out of the ordinary. I 
recorded these in my field notes to be read back in the context of my reflections on a 
much larger temporal scale.  
 
These moments often became central to my analysis and writing up of the 
ethnographic material, not just because they stood alone as being interesting, but 
because I felt that I had become affected by them in the much broader context of my 
fieldwork. Take the anecdote about dumping and tidying that comes up in Chapter 
4: the story was in a sense isolated, outside the doors of the service, and yet it 
illuminated something to me about the on-going practices around dumping and 
tidying that went on inside the service. Or the ruptures that were created by being 
forced to move building or having a clinical space encroached upon by having to sell 
or rent out rooms: these took place at particular moments in time (experienced by me 
either first hand or through hearing stories of these moments), but they were constant 
reference points. They cast light on the precarity of these organisations, which would 
otherwise remain abstract and knowable only through rumours or an understanding 
of the organisations’ (projected) financial situations. From these reference points, I 
was able to sense when things became more or less precarious, noticing people’s 
changing spatial and affective interactions with the “the outside” (be this mainstream 
services, potential clients, or the physical outside space) and the (dis)continuities in 
how people looked after the inside space. 
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This on-going process of becoming affected also helped me to work with absence and 
presence when it came to asking questions about how “need” was being enacted day-
to-day. In chapter 7, I describe how “diagnoses” are neither completely absent nor 
present, but an “absent presence” (Law and Mol 2001), constantly being made 
absent but always kept firmly in view. This analysis was possible only through 
observing many instances of therapists and clients grappling with diagnostic labels 
and pinpointing moments where the work of treating need non-diagnostically held 
particular risks or possibilities. In the process of making sense of how and why needs 
were enacted in different places (as opposed to what I have just described in terms of 
different moments), being affected involved an attunement to the kind of labour it took 
to treat and manage “need” as eligibility criteria for the service. As I bring out in 
Chapter 8 (and more implicitly throughout the thesis), this manifested in a kind of 
“labour of inclusion”27 which was common across my field sites: people were much 
more concerned with producing eligibility and inclusion than they were with 
exclusion. However, the way in which need and eligibility criteria was enacted played 
out in very different ways, and so this labour manifested itself differently across 
places. As such, becoming sensitive to difference required on-going movement and 
comparison across “cases,” which (as I have alluded to above) shifted between “the 
case” of the whole consortium of voluntary organisations, of each particular place, 
and of particular ethnographic encounters.  
 
II. Mapping and Tracing  
 
From very early on in the project, I was interested in spatial and material aspects of 
accessing and providing access to mental health care. Not in measuring distances 
from homes to services, or the geographical accessibility of places, but in studying 
“moments of access” (White, Hillman, and Latimer 2012), which were situated 
around, and on either side of, the “doors” to the service, and which could lead to 
insights into (particularly first-time) encounters with particular mental health services. 
During the fieldwork, I developed part of my methodology around mapping and 
tracing “place” within my three field sites. In particular, the thresholds, entrance 
 
27 This “labour of inclusion” could be seen as a kind of flip-side to, and mirroring of, Latimer’s “labour 
of division” in hospitals (Latimer 1998).  
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points, and first encounters with these sites, which I was getting my bearings of 
through the research process. I chose to analyse “place” as an “instantaneous 
configuration of positions” (as Michel de Certeau (1984) describes the concept), rather 
than the much-explored notion of “the therapeutic space” in the field of 
psychotherapy (for example, the work of Wilfred Bion, as explored in Bondi 2005b). I 
see place as a product of space and spatial practices, and therefore refer to “spatial” 
aspects of the accounts I describe gathering in this section. However, I came to 
understand place as constantly in production and never a fixed or stable product, as 
might be suggested by separating out space and place in this way. My argument 
echoes Ingold’s insistence that “life unfolds, not in places but along paths…places are 
then delineated by movement” (2009, 34). 
 
The mapping and tracing of place that I describe in this section can be seen as both a 
method and a methodology: a method, in that it was a device28 for map-making and 
analysis; and as a methodology in that it comprises the “placing” part of this “placing 
need” methodology I am building in this chapter. Before describing the “nuts and 
bolts” of what I did to develop and perform this device, I will briefly describe my 
rationale for developing it, with reference to both theoretical material and some early 
ethnographic experiences that led me to the notion of placing. 
Placing and “surfacing”  
What was it that impelled me to follow this analytical thread of placing? I will start 
with the data. Before I actively elicited spatial stories from the people I spoke to— 
quite literally making places visible through mapping techniques—I became attuned 
to the salience of place through more informal interactions. A common narrative 
when I would ask about what made these voluntary clinics special or different to the 
mainstream was that they were physically less municipal and institutional than NHS 
buildings. But this independence from statutory services was a double-edged sword: 
the following scene took place early on in my fieldwork, when I was familiarising 
 
28  I use this notion of method as “device” in the same way as Lury and Wakeford (2012), who locate 
their notion of device in relation to that of [Foucault’s] “apparatus,” which  helps make clear that a 
device or method is never able to operate in isolation. The authors contributing to the volume are said 
to “destabilize any sense that a device–even when it is a thing–is merely a tool, able to be used always 
and everywhere in the same way.”  
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myself with the first setting I became embedded in and had found myself a 
companion to do so with.  
 
It is the end of the working day and getting late; the therapists have mostly filtered 
out, and although there were no windows in the room we are working in, I can sense 
the evening closing in as the fluorescent lights continue to glare overhead. I am 
talking with a senior therapist who has also only recently started working at the 
centre. She has been working huge amounts of overtime to get to grips with the place 
and the many people who pass in and out of these small therapy rooms to receive or 
deliver therapy in their fifty-minute slots. We are exchanging notes on our first 
impressions of the centre. This new therapist is worried about the space they’re 
working in: the lack of windows and noise levels in the centre, which she feels gets in 
the way of it being a “therapeutic space”. In a way, she is shocked by the place, 
because it gives her the impression that the organisation mirrors the client group; 
“the poverty of the building seems to reflect the position of the minority groups it is 
supposed to serve”, she says. We talk about who this “client group” is: the different 
migration patterns that bring an ever-changing flow of cultures and nationalities into 
the centre, but also, the influence of other charities in the area, who they have 
partnered with, sharing the referrals and specialised responsibilities for one of the 
boroughs they serve. She suspects that they are all in “survival mode” too—not only 
following the need in the community, but also following the funding. As charities, 
she says, leaning in ever so slightly, they are all constantly responding to the context 
in which they work; this is what they all have to do to survive. 
 
I was interested in what this therapist said about the place reflecting the position of 
the people it served—an astute analysis, coming of course, from a trained analyst of 
associations and metaphors. But it did not feel adequate to take this as a given, or just 
analyse it as metaphor. In other contexts too, I became aware of ways in which these 
states of survival or precarity, as I go on to talk about in Chapter 6, could become 
metaphors for the centres themselves, or vice verse—perhaps the centres are 
metaphors for the conditions of the people. Either way, I wanted to explore how 
these metaphors and materialities were coming into being and how they related to 
spatial practices of accessing, entering, gatekeeping and so on. In other words, how 
were places coming into being? 
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My gravitation towards analysing people’s interactions with thresholds and 
boundaries of the centres did more than just tell me about people’s first impressions 
of the buildings, or the kind of literal or spatial obstacles they may have had 
“accessing” services. It was telling me something about how these places were coming 
into being, in a process that echoes the way Janelle Taylor (2005, 745) talks about  
bodies being “made and remade through practice” in her work on “surfacing the 
body interior.” Surfacing is a framing device that Taylor develops in order to push 
back against an anthropological tendency to study “objects” that pre-exist the 
ethnography, and instead to explore how bodily surfaces materialise. She is influenced 
here by Butler’s ideas about “matter” as a process of materialisation over time “to 
produce the effect of boundary, fixity, and surface we call matter” (Butler 2011, 9) 
and her work resonates with others who have theorised the processual becoming of 
bodies and matter (Barad 2003; Ahmed 2004). My methodology extends this idea to 
services, and the surfaces or thresholds that make them materialise into places to 
access, and to be included or excluded from.29 Surfacing, in Taylor’s generous 
exploration of the term, is also about making visible: of bringing to the surface what 
had been submerged. The following section explains how I developed a method for 
generating visual data, in order to bring practices and experiences of place to light, 
but also to allow the making and remaking of surfaces, thresholds, and boundaries to 
continue, through the image-making and my analysis of this unfolding. 
Place-making  
Interviewing service users and providers about how they accessed or facilitated access 
to care was central to the way I gathered data in the field (details of which I expand 
on below). However, fairly quickly it became clear that the verbal or textual data they 
generated would only take me so far. In order to orient the interviews to practices and 
places (what they “make and remake”, in the words of Taylor (2005)), it was necessary 
to develop a means for me, as an ethnographer, to (re)engage people with their past 
interactions and practices within these particular places. I employed a creative 
interview method of visual mapping, which has been framed as a device to help 
research participants to communicate and discuss experiences that are difficult to 
articulate in words (Gauntlett and Holzwarth 2006; Literat 2013; Bagnoli 2009), and 
 
29 This speaks to a broader theoretical approach to “ontological politics” in which all realities are 
“made and remade” (Law 2004). 
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specifically, experiences of a spatial and material nature (Powell 2010; McGrath and 
Reavey 2013; Knowles and Sweetman 2004). In the context of my project, I used 
visual mapping to generate data about the process of accessing each psychotherapy 
centre (for clients)30 and for facilitating this process (for staff). More broadly, the 
creative interviews offered an alternative “way in” to specific fragments of narratives 
around accessing care, which some people (mainly clients who were new migrants) 
were tired of articulating and repeating for various professionals and authorities in 
terms of clinical pathways, or in order to demonstrate their eligibility for free services.   
In contrast to many of the scholars who use mapping or creative methods to 
understand experiences in a phenomenological sense (Seamon 2000), or to more fully 
understand people’s whole narratives or perspectives (Literat 2013), I wanted to treat 
access as a set of practices or a “happening,” part of a narrative fragment capturing 
the encounter between person and place. So, rather than asking clients about what 
they “felt” or “how they experienced” their first encounter with the services, I’d 
asked them to draw a map of the centre focusing on first impressions and memories 
what happened when they accessed the service as a new client.  For staff, this was less 
straightforward, because I quickly noticed that they witnessed and participated in the 
process of clients entering the service (sometimes for the first time) multiple times 
each week, or even day, allowing the material aspects of place and its surfaces to 
“disappear from view” (as Ahmed (2004) has talked about in terms of the surfaces of 
the body). But I nevertheless strived to elicit accounts of “what happens when you 
encounter a new client who is entering this space.” 
 
 I developed McGrath and Reavey’s (2013) method of asking people to draw a map 
of a mental health setting as a means to “elicit space-focussed accounts from 
participants” (ibid., p.125). The function of mapping, then, was a means to elicit and 
analyse live accounts of encounters with place, rather than fixed “representations” of 
a setting. This speaks to a commitment (discussed above) to consider both places and 
ways of being as constantly in the making. As such, the isolated sections of the maps I 
reproduce in my data chapters serve only to be illustrative of the images being 
 
30 It also worked well in interviews conducted in English with people for whom this was not their first 
language; all of the people I conducted these creative interviews were comfortable enough to speak to 
me in English, but several had opted to speak in a different language for therapy, suggesting the 
inevitable limits of language would be further amplified in these encounters. 
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generated during the mapping and should not in themselves be viewed as fixed 
“products”. The “product” (if you can call it that), is multiple and on-going: a series 
of spatial accounts made and re-made in the world I was studying, and of course, 
inhabiting alongside the service users and providers I was working with.  
Tracing and re-tracing 
Representation, as my argument so far has echoed, “is not a neutral tool” (Law and 
Singleton 2003, 5). I kept this maxim close as I gathered, recorded and analysed all 
the different accounts of place, thinking through the assumptions and the limits of 
each way of telling or showing. For example, when someone would draw themselves 
entering the clinic, rather than describe it in words, I would not assume that this is 
any closer to their “real” experience. I would however note that this medium has 
different possibilities and limitations, and expects a different kind of account. As I 
describe below, the most interesting data was generated when these visual mediums 
failed and people had to switch, giving up on drawing, or even on talking. I also 
treated my own recordings and analyses of these accounts as non-representational, 
and rather, as a way of co-producing the places that I write about in this thesis. 
Tracing31 became a useful way to think about these accounts, and of being 
accountable for them. The first “tracing” took place when people re-traced their own 
movements through space and provided commentary in their various ways. I would 
keep the original maps (or “tracings”) in tact, making use of tracing paper to lay over 
the images and annotate them, charting (literally by number) how they were 
produced moment-by-moment. This tracing produced a new story, which I was then 
accountable for and used to analyse and then write my own ethnographic accounts of 
the image-making. These in turn fed into my broader analyses of emergent themes 
from my ethnographic work. I attend to this below, when I outline my analytical 
approach. Here, however, I would like to dwell on some of the “productive failures” 
of this method of working to generate visual data.32 
 
 
31 I try not to theorise this notion of tracing too much, as it comes with much baggage, for example, 
Deleuze and Guattari’s insistence that rhizomatic, non-representational thinking must be “a map and 
not a tracing” (Deleuze and Guattari 1988, 12). Instead I use it as a fairly pragmatic tool, embedded in 
my own conceptual framing that I have been building throughout this chapter. 
32 These instances demonstrate of Wakeford and Lury’s (2012, 4) claim that inventive method can 
“enable research to follow forked directions, to trace processes that are in disequilibrium or uncertain, 
to acknowledge and refract complex combinations of human and non-human agencies”  
 75 
Often some of the most interesting material would be invisible in the image itself. 
This “material” could be made manifest only through ethnographic accounts of their 
making. The process would oftentimes involve moments where the medium of visual 
representation broke down completely or became inadequate. I bring this out 
explicitly in Chapter 6, where the woman I was interviewing allowed her 
commentary of the map to surpass the making of it, abandoning the drawing of the 
waiting room she had been doing but remaining in the spatial plane, and 
dynamically playing out the interactions she was having with both people and things. 
This performance was overlaid on the tracing paper in numbered notes, written 
directly after the interview and then later analysed, and written up in prose (see 
Chapter 6 for this ethnographic description, embedded within a broader analysis). I 
saw this more embodied telling of spatial experiences with others, too. A therapist, 
whom I had known for many months before interviewing her, was somehow 
bemused and impatient with the mapping—she had lots to tell me about the routine 
of creating a sense of welcome and calm for her clients but the mapping offered little 
more than a prompt. “Soon, her pen leaves the paper,” I wrote in my field notes, 
“and she starts to physically show me how she wants to present herself to the client.” 
What I want to highlight here is that there was nothing intrinsic or special about the 
“visual-ness” of the maps, which made the data they produced interesting and 
generative. It was that they offered a way out of purely lingual, linear lines of 
question and answering, inviting people to think spontaneously about moments of 
access in terms of their spatial, embodied or material features. 
 
Another person, who happened to be an actor and writer by trade, hesitantly 
sketched what looked like a very chaotic spatial story of the centre, but his on-going 
commentary was full of carefully crafted metaphors (“a cascade of images, 
associations and memories that his hand couldn’t keep up with, and I end up simply 
listening to,” as I reproduce in Chapter 4). Others found the maps brought up blanks 
in their memories, leaving them unable to depict specific things, or much at all. A 
young woman who had experienced extreme violence before accessing the Women’s 
Centre had little attention or memory for her surroundings:  
“Yeah it [my body] feels dead when I’m sitting in that chair, I don’t mind who’s 
there [she gestures to the chair next to her— one of the big pistachio ones next to 
her so she can kind of act it out, looking away from the empty chair and gesturing 
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with her hands either side of her eyes like blinkers...] I could even be waiting there 
with someone, but I don’t even see them.” 
 
It was these “failures” of representation that helped me think productively about the 
myriad of ways places are produced and “things” and “surfaces” get made present or 
absent. Doubts, blanks and inaccuracies (my own as well as my interlocutors’) pushed 
this yet further, in way that speaks to Micheal Taussig’s fascination with drawing as 
“more than the result of seeing. It is a seeing that doubts itself, and beyond that, 
doubts the world of man” (2011, 2).  
 
III. Writing: recording, analysing and performing  
 
I have been describing different elements of my ethnographic methodology, 
exploring aspects of my “being there” in the field, and specifically, in terms of 
becoming interested. I have also attended to the first of two broad aspects of my 
methodological approach: mapping and tracing place, which can be understood in terms 
of the conceptual idea I have been developing in the thesis of placing need. The final 
part of this chapter deals with my ethnographic approach to recording and analysing 
and producing knowledge about the practices I observed, primarily in answer to my 
questions about how “need” is enacted in these settings. This is where I describe the 
bulk of methods that enabled me to produce this piece of “ethnography,” which, Tim 
Ingold reminds us, “quite literally, means writing about the people” (Ingold 2014, 385). In 
reference to this, I structure my descriptions of all the rest of my methodological 
practices around writing practices: practices of textually recording my observations, 
interviews and other forms of data gathering; practices of analysing this data (as well as 
the data I have described in the sections above) through coding, creating analytical 
frameworks and generating ideas; and finally, practices of forming and performing ideas 
through writing ethnographic scenes, writing experimentally, and writing 
analytically. This is not intended to separate the writing from the other practices I 
have been describing in this chapter, but rather, to frame it as an adjunct practice, 
which was going on alongside them, iteratively, but ultimately the medium through 
which all of these practices were transformed into knowledge. 
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Writing to record 
As I have described above, a large part of my “being” in my field sites was enabled 
through volunteering and participating in the work and social lives of the centres. 
Some of these interactions would find their way into written field notes, typed in 
Word documents after the event, in the strange process of transforming what had 
been informal and shared into private analytical notes. But I also spent countless 
hours as a not-so-participatory observer of the more professional practices located in 
the centres and connected spaces in the community: observing meetings; recruiting 
clients (which involved a huge amount of waiting, hanging around and missing 
people, as well as interacting with staff and clients as a researcher); shadowing clinical 
managers, community development therapists and link workers in and out of the 
centres; being in the background of organisational events such as AGMs, 
conferences, presentations, trainings; observing reflective therapeutic sessions with 
staff members; observing the induction of new trainee therapists; and, of course, the 
kind of “hanging out” that involved working in the administrative spaces and 
observing all the bureaucratic, day-to-day work of the permanent staff, and the 
comings and goings of all the many volunteer, honorary and part-time staff. Perhaps 
the richest source of data (and certainly the most consistent) on clinical practices was 
the referral, assessment and allocation meetings, for which in one centre (and, more 
sporadically, in a second) I was tasked with the role of minute-taker, formalising my 
practice of constantly hand-writing notes in meetings. All of these notes could be 
taken in a much more continuous, live way than the typed ones—often as they 
unfolded in real time—in what Emerson, Fretz, and Shaw (2011) call “scratch 
notes.”  
 
I would later type these handwritten scratch notes into more coherent narratives, 
with a column down the side for analytical notes, and later, for coding. Similarly, I 
transcribed the formal interviews that were audio-recorded and typed up those which 
weren’t from notes written during or directly after the interview. But the half-dozen 
or more notebooks I filled with handwritten notes from observations and interviews 
ended up being my most vital source for ethnographic writing. I would often bypass 
the typed, analysed documents, marvelling at the immediacy of the handwriting: how 
they bore the temporality of moments unfolding—sometimes rushed, almost illegible, 
other times visibly drawn out and adorned with signs of boredom. Then of course 
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there were the direct quotes, scribbled down urgently, parts emphatically underlined. 
Seeing the shape of these notes and how they were arranged across the page 
transported me back to the space and I could attach bodily movements or voices to 
these words in a way that I was utterly unable to do from the typed notes.  
 
I later made sense of this through reading Ingold’s reflections on “taking a line for a 
walk”: the way that “knowledge is integrated along a path of movement” in 
handwritten text, just like a line of walking (2006, 31). I found this particularly acute 
when I was tracing (in the method I have described above) parts of the interview 
maps that contained words, written as annotations by the interviewee. I wrote the 
following memo (about the analysis of the mapping that I talk about in Chapter 4) 
about the perspective of a client, whom I call Claire, on what was emerging as one of 
many iterations of the “dump” metaphor: 
 
I noticed that there was a big difference between tracing over someone’s lines that 
represent objects and space, and tracing over someone’s handwriting, particularly 
when those words are direct memories as they are articulated about the experience. 
There is something more removed about the lines of the map, as they are an 
imagined picture of something that is far away from where we are and external to 
the person (re)creating them. And so, strangely, words have an immediacy to them 
that the images don’t. I find as I trace over the small, rounded but sometimes loopy 
handwriting of C, I feel uncomfortably close to the emotion she was feeling. It was 
much more sensory to simultaneously read and overlay the words: “little ally, dank, 
dirty, smelly, small, empty, no idea if someone was waiting in bins/bushes, no one 
would see you”… than it was to see the visual representation of cartoony bins and 
bushes and barbed wire fence in a wobbly criss-cross in pencil. It seems to me like it 
is coming directly out of their head and onto the page. 
 
I am now less interested in how directly I was able to access people’s “inner 
experiences,” or even my own inner thoughts at those moments of revisiting 
handwritten text. Rather, I take from this the possibility of recognising the embodied 
movements captured in the handwritten responses from different actors at these 
moments. Attending to text as traces of movement transformed events into ways of 
knowing people and their surroundings. This reflects how ethnographic ways of 
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knowing develop by participating in, and moving through the world (Ingold 2006; de 
Certeau 1984). 
Writing to analyse 
My aim with each method of analysis was to make it as generative as possible, across 
the fieldwork and writing process. In order to form more overarching themes and 
arguments, I worked mainly from the typed field notes and transcripts I have been 
describing. I moved through these texts, open coding33 and writing memos in the 
margins to bring out and generate broader themes for possible development. 
Although I did not follow a process of open, axial and theoretical coding of grounded 
theory, I call this initial process “coding” to demonstrate how it generated themes 
and ideas that could span or travel across cases. I also used the “gerund” approach 
advocated by Charmaz (2012) which builds practices and action into codes, assuming 
that these codes are made rather than found. I developed the more inductive, 
overarching, “horizontal” ideas by building “outwards” from key questions or ideas 
(e.g. “assessing need”) or spatial locations (e.g. “the waiting room” or individual 
centres). I would do this by mind-mapping key practices and themes that I had been 
developing, and building more detail and connections from across data sources, 
noting from whom and where they arose.34 
 
If this coding and mind-mapping worked as a kind of “horizontal” working across 
places and people, I also created narrative summaries at the end of each interview, 
starting several sentences with “this is a story about…,” in order to think “vertically” 
through people’s stories, maintaining them as whole events. As I worked through 
different forms of data, these vertical and horizontal ways of thinking became useful 
for different things. Because I encountered client stories in discrete one-to-one 
encounters, each with their own particular context and background, I found it useful 
to keep a record of these whole interactions and come back to them once I had 
 
33 I did not use NVivo software for coding (preferring to mark the typed notes and create post-it notes 
of key themes for indexing), however, I did use the software as a data management tool to save and 
organise all of my textual data according to site and type of informant (service user or provider) and to 
enable word searches and other queries. As such, I “borrowed” tools and techniques I had developed 
previously in more formulaic qualitative analysis methods. 
34 This is similar to the One Sheet of Paper approach (Ziebland and McPherson 2006; Pope, 
Ziebland, and Mays 2000), but departs from these authors in that it does not aim for 
comprehensiveness (noting “all the different issues”), and rather for building connections or 
imaginative leaps between moments and data sources around places and themes. 
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developed more fully formed themes and arguments from the rest of the data, which 
was more embedded in the shared clinical contexts of my field sites. I would then 
consider individual stories in relation to key analytical ideas to interrogate how they 
might manifest themselves differently for different people, and why. An example can 
be seen in Chapter 7 where I had taken the broad theme of “making diagnoses 
absent” and thought through the exact risks and possibilities of this in one particular 
client story. Similarly, I pushed my analysis forward by re-visiting the fragments of 
these narratives that were produced through visual mapping by developing a set of 
analytical questions to “ask” the visual data (Mason 2010), creating textual accounts 
based on theoretical ideas and my own themes as they developed (see appendix 1 for 
the questions I developed for this analytical technique). It was this dynamic 
movement between different types of data and analytical ideas that helped me 
generate and make choices about the broad concepts that I build my chapters 
around. 
Writing to form and perform 
I write this section, on the practice of writing to form and perform knowledge, as a 
conclusion to this chapter. Yet paradoxically, I want to make the point that my 
methodology, based around this concept of placing need, is characterised by unfinished-
ness, and makes space for indeterminacy. In this way, I echo the voice of the “paper 
boat collective”35 when they argue that ethnographic writing is in a sense something 
to be cast away, something which may not always return us to the world that 
occasioned it, and that may not have the last word on what everything means or how 
it should be acted on (Pandian and McLean 2017). My writing about place, as I have 
been describing, has been all about capturing entities in-the making: for example, 
describing processes rather than products of place-making or mapping.  But this 
conceptual unfinished-ness is also evident in my chapters on “need,” where I used the 
writing to make sense of the ways that different forms of need were made absent or 
present across sites. Although we anthropologists are trained to always ask “how” 
rather than “what” questions, I became fixated on what need is and how individual 
needs were determined in my field sites. This remained frustratingly difficult to 
 
35This collective comprises the writers of a text on literary anthropology, arising from a weeklong 
seminar hosted by the School for Advanced Research, in the same location that the Clifford and 
Marcus’ (1986) writing culture text was conceived of 30 years previously.  
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understand from interviews and observations, where as I describe in Chapters 7 and 
8, I could glean so much more about what therapists and clients were resisting or 
making absent, than how they did choose to articulate and enact need. It was through 
my writing of ethnographic scenes of tension or debate in clinical decision-making 
that I began to develop my findings on how need was negotiated and the indeterminacies 
of need.  
 
This process of writing, then, was generative and illuminating, but it never provided 
me with clear answers to questions such as “if not diagnosis, then what?” in 
assessment practices for needs and eligibility. This example is testament to Kirin 
Narayan’s assurance that “the process of writing inevitably brings discoveries,” even 
when (particularly in ethnographic writing) it refuses to bring answers or conclusions 
(Narayan 2012, 2). Throughout the process of writing, I experimented with different 
forms and devices to push forward my thinking and analysis, and to think about ways 
of analysing the data “otherwise.” For example, I wrote and re-wrote text in the form 
of blog posts, then as short stories, and anecdotes, which I then embedded into much 
broader arguments. The anecdote is an example of how stories can become 
generative, contributing to how the social world is both understood and produced 
(Micheal 2014). In these ways, and many more, my ethnographic writing worked to 
perform my analyses of, and in, the social world I inhabited. The performativity of 
the writing itself helped to bring my key concepts, place and need, and the relations 
between the two, into being.   
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PART ONE: PLACE 
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Introduction to Part One 
 
In this part of the thesis, my ethnographic material unfolds at three bounded but 
institutionally connected places. In each chapter, I explore socio-material aspects of 
accessing and providing access to a particular psychotherapeutic space, visiting each 
centre in turn. Although the centres are geographically close (a walk or a bus ride 
between them), I treat them discretely; as organisational entities and, crucially, 
products of the spatial practices and place-making that I observed in each one. I 
explore “place” mainly at the level of the building, though I also talk of these care 
providers as positioned or “placed” in the landscape of the city and the health and 
social care system. And so, the spatial practices of service users and providers also 
play out at different scales. A theme running through of all of the sites was the 
instability and insecurity of material places in the voluntary sector, where funding 
only ever covered contracts for the day-to-day delivery of short-term talking therapy. 
I chart the implications of this frustrating set-up, which seemed to assume that 
voluntary sector services like these somehow floated in space, without the need for 
shelter, electricity, heating, let alone the kind of furnishing and other items that most 
people agreed was necessary for a “therapeutic space.” 
   
Place is of course also significant in the context of migration, which I have talked 
about being intimately connected to issues of access to care. For example, 
immigration status can be the criteria for inclusion or exclusion to certain institutions 
or services. These experiences and a specific concern for the exclusion of non-citizens 
in mainstream care emerged strongly in the data, in part because it featured in the 
personal narratives of many of the service users and providers I encountered, but also 
because this concern was increasingly becoming a point of mobilisation of support 
and resources in public health narratives about “unmet need.” This pattern unfolds 
in the course of the chapters through it is not immediately visible, deliberately 
complicating the notion that this “unmet need” pre-exists “out there” and can be 
unproblematically attached to a specific social group. I have been guided by 
provocations (described in the literature review) to look at the ways in which identity, 
subjectivity and belonging to certain social categories can be a question of where you 
are, as well as what you do, rather than simply “being” a certain “kind” of person or 
 84 
service user. As such, my starting point is place and practices of place-making, and I 
do not do not come to the topic of migration until about half way through these three 
chapters. Themes of movement, inclusion, exclusion, bordering and belonging, and 
out-of-placeness, run through all the way through them, but do not immediately 
concern the large-scale mobility that I have covered in the literature above, or speak 
to larger ideas in this thesis about the migration as a global “matter of concern.”  
 
I start with Chapter 4 to talk about place and access in terms of the making and 
managing of exteriority through the talk and work of “dumping” in the everyday life 
of the Stepping Stones service. Then, in Chapter 5, I move on to talking about the 
similarly on-going, processual set of practices around the maintenance of interiority: of 
places of sanctuary in therapy, particularly in the Pankhurst Women’s Centre. It is 
here, through the deliberate practices of “reaching out” to an expanding potential 
client group and more dispersed and potentially fluid notions of sanctuary, that I land 
on the theme of migrant lives and the categories and conditions associated with this. 
Finally, in Chapter 6, I follow this theme to the final site, Culture in Mind, where 
migration and migrant lives become more central to the argument I make about the 
enactment of place and precarity.  
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Chapter 4: No dumping! 
 
“No Dumping!” says the makeshift sign, imploringly hand-painted directly onto the 
wall of the cul-de-sac, where the Stepping Stones counselling service is based. The 
sign is much needed here, as there are no rubbish collections. The land is privately 
owned and everyone rents off one man, who rarely sees the place, and certainly 
doesn’t carry out the day-to-day work that is needed to maintain areas that the 
public infrastructure doesn’t reach. But, despite its size and hefty underline, the sign 
can’t do all the work either: full bin bags regularly appear outside the service and 
along the narrow street, which staff normally pick up and take to the road’s end, past 
the threshold for the bin men. There are also abandoned cars that line the street, 
rusting, and—resting on soft tires—threaten to sink into the tarmac below. Although 
we’ve all stopped seeing them ages ago, they press into the already narrow space 
outside the doors of the service, making it feel crowded. And so I notice, as I haul a 
black plastic bag past the cars and round the bend of the narrow street, how much 
happens in the absence of a usually invisible infrastructure of public space; what 
grows, encroaches and accumulates in a street like this. 
 
I am joining at the tail end of a big clear up of the cul-de-sac, the result of some 
feedback that had come up in my interviews with new clients at the service. My 
reports of people’s misgivings about the place as they had first approached it had 
impelled the staff at the centre, headed by Sian and her partner, Alex, to spend a few 
days doing more than their usual tidying up around the edges of the centre, and get 
the place looking really welcoming for their clients. Apparently, once they had 
started doing some of the more visible bits, lots of the neighbours had chipped in 
with cleaning up some of the detritus that had built up over the years. They had 
been pleased with what they had achieved and now there was talk of how they would 
maintain the work they had done together. Sian said that she and Alex were toying 
with the idea of erecting some gates down at the entrance to the cul-de-sac, where it 
meets the high street, to try and keep people who weren’t residents or clients from 
coming in to the space.  
 
The bin bag I am carrying is full of old painting materials and cut back weeds that 
had crept along the length of the wall.  The sign has been redone and the blue and 
white board looks crisp and colourful. The wall, too, has been painted. It used to be 
red brick like the house, but Alex did it white a few days ago. I think it looks quite 
good, but as we walk past Sian points to it, commenting that it’s already really dirty. 
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There is quite a lot of black creeping up from the ground, which I guess is inevitable 
with cars coming in and out, churning up the grime from the uneven cobblestones. 
As we wander back, I notice that they have rigged up a plastic creeper all the way 
along the silver fencing on the side of the alleyway. The leaves are a dull green 
colour, a little too blue, too uniformly shaped, to be convincing, but it does the job. 
Although it never really disturbed me, the metal fencing in itself had been a bit grim, 
especially with the uneven wire extending the height at the top. It shields us from the 
back-end of the police station, and, behind that, the multi-story grey building, which 
now stands derelict. Now, the plastic ivy covers the fence for about two meters and 
then stops, so although you can see through to the other side if you want to, your 
attention is drawn to the foreground and towards the sign that points you to the 
centre.  
 
Back in the office of the centre, I strike up conversation with Sian about how the 
community had got involved in the clear-up. The most important thing someone did 
was clear up this ‘corner’ that everyone had been refusing to go anywhere near. She 
told me this whilst carrying on with her emails, only taking her eyes off the screen to 
glance at me to gauge my reaction, or to squeeze her eyes shut and grimace as she 
described the nasty bits. In the slight enclave next to the police-station fencing, she 
says, was a corner which someone had basically been using as a toilet. There was a 
huge pile of excrement there and no one had had the courage to tackle it. Shocked at 
her assumption that it was a human ‘someone,’ I ask her why she didn’t think it was 
just a dog or a fox. She reminds me of a story I’d heard before about the homeless 
people that used to sleep and hang around in the cul-de-sac, saying that she suspects 
they might be coming back now that summer is approaching and the nights are 
warmer. In the end, Sian said, she thought it was the neighbour from over the back 
wall who had tackled the worst of it and that all that was left to do now was sluice 
some bleachy water through it and hope it stays clean. I peek sideways at “the 
corner” as I leave later; there’s not much to see now, save four plastic ivy “leaves” 
that have blown off the fence and are stuck there, intact. 
 
This scene took place outside the Stepping Stones counselling service; the place I 
have described as being for anyone struggling to cope with the pain of bereavement, 
rather than for a specific population, or for a particular diagnosable condition. The 
“anyone” is important here, as it starts this story with a care provider that is both 
specialised and “counter” to the mainstream model of mental health care, and yet— 
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unlike my other two field sites—serves the needs of no specific “client group.” The 
flexibility and inclusivity that the Stepping Stones model embraced both defined the 
service and took constant and careful work to maintain. Maintenance and tidying up 
were, then, themes that sat easily within this narrative. But, as the scene above 
unfolded, some time into my fieldwork at this site, I noticed that several stories and 
ethnographic moments had begun to coalesce around a somewhat unexpected and 
more uncomfortable theme of dumping. The scene illuminates several components of 
dumping practices and spaces, which both speak for themselves and to a broad 
metaphor that was evoked within several of my field sites. This, I discovered, had to 
do with the challenges of working in the centres, and of managing the incoming flows 
of people from various iterations of “the outside.” In this chapter, I explore how 
interiority and exteriority (as well as inclusion and exclusion; the mainstream and the 
marginal) are enacted and reinforced by the talk and work of dumping. 
 
What were these components of dumping spaces and dumping practices that I allude 
to above? In this very material iteration of “the outside,” some of the objects in that 
street weren’t necessarily waste, but rather, a kind of overflow from the city around it. 
Without knowing the abandoned cars had been there for the past six months or so, 
they would simply blend in with the other cars, squashed in and lining the areas they 
could fit, hiding from the expensive inner-city parking costs and overcrowded 
roadsides. There was also an element of concealment in the way that the cars and other 
objects tended to be somewhat surreptitiously placed and left there; it was a place 
where unsightly or prohibited things could be kept out of sight of most of the public 
and those authorities that might take issue with them. There was also the displacement, 
which had caused the homeless people that Sian described come to the site in the first 
place; they too were a prohibited presence in many of the publicly owned and 
patrolled spaces around the centre. Finally, and most starkly reminiscent of the waste 
and contamination of the dump, was the corner of excrement that was presumed to 
come from these elusive homeless men and had to be managed with buckets of 
bleach and, if possible, not approached at all. 
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Chapter overview 
 
In the section below, I will use these different components and associations with 
dumping (dumping grounds, overflow, concealment, displacement, and even waste 
and contamination) as a way into exploring how the metaphor was used in one field 
site. I focus first on the inside space before coming back to the outside scene above, 
narrating the events leading up to it. What these events amount to is a slightly odd 
story that does not (on its own) represent the normal happenings within this centre, 
or indeed the other sites I conducted fieldwork in. However, it introduces a particular 
happening—a story of matter out of place (Douglas 1966/2013) and people out of 
place (Ahmed 2000) that tells us something important about how dumping and 
dumping grounds get enacted, both metaphorically and materially, in the landscape 
of mental health services in this context. It could be described in the words of Lauren 
Berlant (referencing Susan Leigh Star’s ethnographies of infrastructure) as a “glitch of 
the present”: a unique happening that serves as “a revelation of what had been the 
lived ordinary” (Berlant 2015, 403).  In other words, it was a happening that 
occurred in isolation to all of the ordinary dilemmas of access and belonging, but 
nevertheless can be seen within a wider assemblage of comings and goings that give a 
different perspective on how these therapeutic places are made and re-made, and for 
whom.   
 
Throughout the chapter, I seek to demonstrate how multiple relations are central to 
the material and discursive practices of boundary making, and of clearing and 
displacing. Following the section on metaphors of dumping inside the service, I turn to 
the material traces of dumping that could be found outside the doors of the service, 
using the pile of excrement I describe in the vignette above as a starting point. I trace 
this object back to a story, which, in its telling and retelling by various actors 
(including myself), became what Mike Michael has called “anecdotalized” (2014). 
That is, it became generative of how the social world is both understood and 
produced. I will then I seek to disrupt and find chips in the inside/ outside logic (of the 
metaphors of dumping inside, next to the materialities of dumping outside) by taking 
a closer look at the ethnographic moments that unfold at, or move the threshold 
between, inside and outside; belonging and non-belonging. Ultimately, I make the 
case that the “dump” is characterised not by the “waste” that fills it, but what the 
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“dump” is exterior to and the relations that define this. This has important 
implications for how we understand the paradox these service providers found 
themselves facing: that the “tidying up,” of both matter out-of-place and people out-of-
place was a constant enactment of the organisation’s position in the health and social 
care system: of being always, almost on the outside. 
 
Metaphors of the dump: Inside  
 
Of all the spatial metaphors that arose in the day-to-day talk about providing access 
to care across the sites I was working in (bridges, sanctuaries, holding spaces, safe 
places, etcetera), this one carried with it the most varied, and often troubled, 
meanings and associations. The metaphor of voluntary organisations as “dumping 
grounds,” and referral practices as “dumping,” spoke broadly to the fear that these 
services will become (or are becoming) unfairly overburdened in a climate of 
overcrowded or non-existent services in the statutory mental health care system. But 
the imagery of the dumping ground and its associations with dumping, overflow, 
concealment, displacement, and even waste and contamination, holds together a 
complex picture of how providers of care understand this problem to be playing out, 
and how they are constantly managing and responding to it. 
 
These metaphors must then be handled carefully, not least because of their strong 
connotations with carelessness and stigma— both highly charged terms in the world 
of mental health services, and terms that in many ways would be unhelpful and 
unfair to bring too centrally into the narratives of these particular spaces. And yet it is 
the peripheral that I am interested in: what remains on the threshold, or is only just 
kept at bay; that which perhaps came about by accident, outside of the intended 
function of these spaces. Throughout this section, I will focus on the ways in which 
this set of issues is articulated, often through peripheral conversations or small talk 
from the sidelines. This is not to overemphasise problems that may be secondary to 
more pressing concerns for the providers of these services, but rather to think with 
them about these peripheral but persistent ideas, which they often raised but would 
not usually have the time or space to dwell on.  Using elements from the scene above, 
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I will break down this unwieldy metaphor into the more tangible themes, outlined 
above, of dumping grounds, overflow, concealment, displacement, and waste. 
Dumping ground, displacement, overflow, concealment and waste 
Dumping ground: The first time I had heard the phrase “dumping ground” was in fact 
in a different centre, when the politics of referral patterns were being explained to 
me. I was told that “the voluntary sector is being seen as a ‘dumping ground’”: 
somewhere to “put” people with nowhere else to go, rather than a resource or provider 
of specialised services. The phrase was met with a quiet wince from the director of 
that organisation, who tried to more carefully rephrase the narrative, without 
disagreeing with it. It came up several times more, often also followed by a reflection 
or caveat, but with a similar sense of unguarded, spontaneous anger at this ugly new 
development:  
 
Back at the Stepping Stones centre, inside the building now: Sara is standing in the 
doorway of the office before her client arrives for their therapy session. She is telling 
me how people who get referred by mainstream services always seem to be more 
likely to miss appointments than those who self-refer. But there’s something else she 
wants to get off her chest. She hesitates, then: “these people who get sent here from 
other services, it’s the people they can’t deal with, or they don’t know what to do 
with. They’re so difficult, they are cases that are not meant for here; this one woman 
I see, she’s totally psychotic! Well we’re finishing now, but I have another and she’s 
also very paranoid, very skittish, it’s so hard to work with her. People give them to 
me because I’m ‘more experienced’- well some of them have been working for 20-30 
years!”  
“I guess you’re more qualified than most of the volunteers though, no?” I say, trying 
to put her predicament in a slightly better light for her, perhaps in order to placate 
her obvious anger about it.  
“OK yeah, but just because I’m accredited and all that. I can’t deal with it any better 
than the rest. They’ve been really tricky.” She turns to leave finally, but lingers, 
saying after a pause: “You know, this place is a dumping ground, I’m telling you. It’s 
a dumping ground for these other services…  
 
Displacement: No longer able to work solely with people that she was sure had made an 
informed decision to refer themselves to the service, Sara’s discomfort seemed 
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broadly to be about how little control she had over who she would be seeing and 
when. She was charging other services with irresponsibly placing (“dumping”) people 
with Stepping Stones, when they would be better helped somewhere else. Often, I 
would learn later, these very tricky cases would come from crisis houses: short term 
residential settings for people suffering from acute mental distress at a given time. 
Like the IAPT services, they were also oversubscribed, with the added pressure of 
widespread closure and cuts, which the longer-running members of staff talked about 
seeing over the years. People would come after being discharged from the crisis 
houses, having received a period of support but often still very vulnerable. Others 
seemed to have been referred to the service in the absence of much needed longer-
term health and social care. One woman came in for an assessment, without really 
being sure what she was there for, because—I was told afterwards—she had learning 
difficulties as well as the mental distress she was experiencing from a recent loss. This 
hadn’t been on her referral notes and she had come to the centre alone. The 
receptionist recounted how she had been able to see the woman’s discomfort and 
confusion as soon as she came in, and that she was uncomfortable that they had even 
gone ahead with the assessment as she had lost control of her bladder in the therapy 
room. The receptionist told me with an apologetic look in her eyes that “she just 
didn’t belong here.”  
 
Overflow: As I go on to show, staff at all the centres I worked with were all too aware 
of how full and overworked the NHS Improving Access to Psychological Therapies 
(IAPT) services were, and how much more stringent their inclusion criteria were than 
voluntary organisations. The IAPT remit to work with “common mental disorders,” 
restricted to particular “clusters” of low level mental health needs, meant that they 
needed to refer on many people with more severe or complex needs. Although 
voluntary organisations are also encouraged to adopt the same “clustering” system, 
the therapists I spent time with were often reticent to stick too strictly to the system, 
given the different commitments they had to ensuring that people from the 
communities they served weren’t left with “nowhere else to go”. These specific 
inclusion criteria of NHS IAPT services, coupled with high (and continually rising) 
demand for talking therapies in the general population, created a sense that these 
services were overflowing with people whose needs they were unable to meet.    
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Concealment: Dumping, particularly when associated with a specific out-of-the-way or 
unseen place, has a strong association with concealment: putting what should not be 
seen, out of sight. It was in the Stepping Stones service that I heard this aspect of the 
dumping metaphor the most, perhaps because its broad inclusion criteria created 
opportunities for referrers to slip people in when unable to find space elsewhere, or 
perhaps it was something to do with its physical location. I asked Gail, one of the 
long-standing administrators at the service, about the fact that I had heard people 
talking about clients being dumped here; was this something she recognised? She 
responded by playing out the following familiar scenario, showing me how she 
imagined these kinds of decisions get made behind the scenes at the doctors’ 
surgeries:  
“Well in the flurry before August they're all going on holiday” she says. “Oh it’ll 
be— ‘what on earth do I do with this one? I've been sitting on this client for weeks 
and weeks, I've got to do something,’ Then the client’ll go: ‘Errrr, my father died 
seven years ago,’ … ‘Right OK, we'll refer you to Stepping Stones for some 
bereavement counselling,’ they’ll say.” 
 
Gail said all of this with a knowing laugh, almost enjoying the fact that they could see 
through these professionals’ surreptitious, slightly sneaky tactics to move a client on 
to somewhere they could be both out of sight and out of mind. This low-level but 
continual influx of individuals coming in for the wrong reason framed the problem in 
more benign terms than I had been used to hearing, but it carried similarly 
uncomfortable connotations with disposal practices. If the influx through the IAPT 
channels conjured images of a large-scale dumping operation, these practices were 
those of fly-tippers: deliberate, opportunistic, furtively dodging the rules.  
 
Waste: As I became aware of the discourses associated with dumping, I started to 
think tentatively about what this said or implied about the objects of the 
metaphorical dump. Waste was a strong theme in the way that people talked about 
how ineffectual it was referring people who wouldn’t turn up, because they are 
unwilling or unable to make it to regular therapy sessions. Although staff were 
unsurprised and generally understanding about people who “DNA’ed” (Did Not 
Attend), there were strict rules in all three centres to try to minimise wasted time and 
resources on these people. It was a case of two DNA’s for an assessment, and you 
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would lose your place on the waiting list. Administrators were less tolerant of this 
wasted time than the volunteer counsellors, who were conscious of their clients’ 
chaotic lives and—a common trope in therapeutic practice— considered the time 
still “theirs” even if they could not be present. Gail and Julie were much more aware 
of the precious time wasted on these people that could have gone to others. Then 
there were the costs of processing each case, which could not be included in the 
targets for the funders so would not be covered by the contracts. Core resources of 
administrative time and costs of therapeutic assessments would therefore be 
transformed into waste. 
 
Materialities: Outside 
 
The everyday work and “tidying up” that staff engaged in to maintain the area 
outside the doors of the service reflected the inherently peripheral positioning of the 
organisation in the broader landscape of care. Alongside the ethos of volunteerism 
and independent, not-for-profit care, came an uneasy reliance on the mainstream for 
resources and financial survival. This had become particularly acute since their 
funding had been scaled back, and was now concentrated in a few contracts with the 
NHS. These contracts covered the costs of service provision but not core costs, such 
as rent. The service had not always been in the cul-de-sac; in fact, Stepping Stones 
had moved a few years before from a big Georgian house close by, which was 
subsequently sold off and renovated. They had moved to this space with the approval 
of some (mainly management and trustees) and to the dismay of others (mainly staff 
and therapists), who missed the homeliness of the old place and couldn’t shake the 
knowledge that the building had been designed for offices and not therapeutic 
activities. Those who were most upset about the move left because of it, and some 
who stayed talked of the old house being not just built on and repurposed but 
“demolished”. Occupying this privately owned, and always potentially transitory, 
site, made the service’s position as always almost-on-the-outside of this central institution 
particularly visible. 
 
Interestingly, when I came to investigate clients’ encounters with the place through 
visual mapping interviews, much of what was produced and talked about by service 
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users remained outside the doors of the centre. All of the clients I had interviewed at 
that point had focussed in on their vivid sensory memories of their approach to the 
service, with the cul-de-sac often dominating the maps they had produced. Like Alex, 
who had offered to erect a new set of gates at the entrance to the cul-de-sac, they 
were compelled to draw their own boundaries of the place, which reached beyond 
the front doors of the service into the small hinterland that joined the building to the 
busy high street. Several people emphasised, through their images and commentary 
on their movement through the space, the difference between the dark outside and 
light inside: emerging into a place characterised by plants, light and homeliness.  
 
Claire, a young woman I had met in the centre just after her initial assessment session 
was a good example of a person who distinctly did belong. Ralph, the therapist who 
assessed Claire, had introduced me to her, telling me afterwards that she was his first 
“loss” client—the first person he was taking on under the newly expanded inclusion 
criteria for the low-cost service. In addition to their contracted work, via the NHS, to 
provide therapy for people struggling with bereavement, they started charging what 
they described as an affordable rate for anyone who could be described as having 
experienced “loss” in their lives. Claire had been offered this, partly because her 
borough had recently cut their contract to deliver bereavement therapy to its 
residents, and partly because her story was not, in fact, about death. The brain injury 
Claire’s husband suffered had made him into a completely different entity— one that 
she said, “replaced his old self”— but he was still alive, having recently left an 
intensive care unit for a more long term care home. She had been waiting to see a 
counsellor on the NHS for almost two years after the accident that had left her 
shocked and mistrustful of healthcare settings. Beyond the new emergency 
departments that her husband was initially rushed into after the accident, she 
recalled, she’d been appalled by the conditions of the NHS hospital wards; she 
remembered with a shudder going into a treatment room and seeing the previous 
patient’s blood on the walls.  When I met up with her again, it was in a café closer to 
her home, where we chatted over herbal teas before starting the recorded interview.  
 
 
 
 95 
Mapping: Claire 
 
12th April 2017 
In a café close to Claire’s house  
 
For a short moment, Claire is hesitant with putting the pencil she is using to paper; 
she has only been to the service once before, and she is not sure which way the road 
bends around. Fairly quickly, however, she seems to stop being concerned with this, 
making it a simple right-angle and focussing instead on what she remembers sensing 
at this point. Silently, she makes a list of descriptors:  
“little ally 
dank 
dirty 
smelly 
small entry 
no exit.” 
Then she constructs the criss-cross of the wire fence along the last edge of the ally she 
has outlined, saying she remembers there being a fence somewhere (later, she will 
add barbed wire to this when she talks about thinking she might be in the wrong 
place and almost deciding to turn back). She layers the sign in front of the fencing, 
calling it “dodgy” and writing “clinic” on it. She starts to give it a label saying it was 
“falling down” but then puts a line through “falling” as she visualises it and 
remembers that it wasn’t actually broken. She writes, “dishevelled” next to it instead. 
Then she goes back to her list of sensory descriptions around the entry point to the 
street from the open space at the bottom of the page that she has labelled “main 
road”. She adds to the list, saying the words slowly as they appear in joined-up 
handwriting on the page: “no idea if someone was waiting in the bins/ bushes. No 
one would see you.” She returns to the space in which she had drawn the sign and 
fence, adding two cloud shapes, which she labels “bushes” and two equally sized 
squares with little circles for wheels, which are the “dumpsters” she feared could hide 
the ambusher.  I ask what time this all was, and she writes “11 am Saturday” 
underneath everything. Then, as she follows her pathway back through the ally, she 
reminisces about the smell, writing and commenting that it smelled like an “after 
party”, making us both laugh. Quickly, however, she moves back to the right angle 
bend, which reminds her how out of sight she would be from the main road; her 
tone sobers again as she reflects on what an easy spot it would be for someone to 
grab her with no one seeing or hearing anything from the main road. 
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Figure 1: Claire's map 
 
Even after the abysmal experiences she had had with the health and social care 
system before she even got to Stepping Stones (“Oh God, here we go, another brick 
wall”), coming to see the assessment here was the first time that Claire had really 
been able to communicate how her distress was affecting her. Although she had 
eventually been put at ease by the light, and cleanliness (and of course the 
interactions she had with the receptionist and then Ralph) inside the centre, her 
response had been particularly visceral to the outside space. It communicated to me 
something very real about the way her distress was interacting with the material 
environment she was entering into. Her fear of the dirty clinic was deeply connected 
to her past experiences of her partner’s care (or lack thereof) and she made clear she 
was not prepared to let herself be drawn into another place of disorder and neglect.  
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The trace of the human, in anecdotes 
 
Shortly after this interview with Claire took place, Sian wanted me to share some 
early findings in an upcoming board meeting. As I recounted this to the board of 
trustees and management of the service, amongst the tea and biscuits and homemade 
rock cakes, they listened intently, their faces tired and concerned. I knew they’d 
worked hard at making this a place of solace for their clients, so it felt important, 
although somewhat uncomfortable, to share these particular fragments of these 
clients’ narratives. I hoped it didn’t sound like I was trying to move the goalposts; to 
tell them they were now completely responsible, with their tiny budget, for their 
clients’ experiences in the spaces beyond the doors of their service. I described this to 
them as diplomatically as I could, alongside the positive experiences that everyone 
had as soon as they stepped inside the centre and emphasising how glad Claire had 
been just to be listened to by her assessor. Although she would have to pay a small fee 
for this new loss service, I relayed her relief at not having her needs scrutinised or 
challenged, or being put on another indefinite waiting list 
 
When I finished talking, however, it was the imaginary man in the bushes that 
seemed to have captured everyone’s attention. One of the board members informed 
me that in fact this wasn’t so far from the truth, that there had in fact, last year, been 
two men hanging around outside the service. There were sighs as they collectively 
reminisced about how difficult it had been to get rid of the men, and debated a little 
about where they ended up. The first version of the story, that “someone had given 
them a house,” didn’t seem to hold, but they couldn’t agree or remember what else 
could have done the trick. The main thing, the chair explained, was that they were 
no longer there to upset any vulnerable clients coming to the service. She made eye 
contact with me as she said the word “vulnerable,” signalling to me that Claire’s story 
had been taken seriously, that her vulnerability was something that they were 
accountable for. 
 
Although Claire’s fears had nothing to do with these particular men, there was no 
doubt that she was vulnerable and that the threat (real or imagined) of encountering 
strangers in this space was heightening the fears and anxieties that had brought her 
to the service in the first place. This was completely in line with what I had taken 
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away from our interview and was sharing in the meeting. In contrast to the board of 
trustees, the clinicians in the room were in fact just as interested in the fact that the 
man Claire was afraid of, and the bushes that he might jump out of, in fact weren’t 
real. The cul-de-sac she described had no bushes on the ground, and there was only 
one bin in the place of the two dumpsters she had mapped out from memory. Sian 
explained to us that Claire was projecting her fears about past and future healthcare 
experiences into her field of peripheral vision, and so could not bring herself to see 
what was really there; her map was one of her inner world. And so even if the man 
and the bushes were part of Claire’s imagination, there was something undoubtedly 
real about her vulnerability and its relation to the space she was describing and 
constructing. 
 
When the trustees brought up their memory of the two men (who became strangely 
synonymous with Claire’s imaginary man in the dumpster) I realised that they were 
part of a story that had been humming along in the background at the service since 
I’d arrived. Mostly it had been a vague jumble of anecdotes about some homeless 
people who had been sleeping in the doorway of the service long before I had started 
volunteering there: there was the mention from the receptionist that one of the pair 
had popped up in the Tesco’s car park a few streets away, astonished that she’d 
recognised him (“I think he thought he was invisible!”); then sometimes people would 
talk about the “night revellers” that used to leave glass bottles whose broken shards 
would shine in the gutters; and, of course, there were the traces of human presence 
that during the clear-up had stuck with everyone much more than the abandoned 
cars or rubbish bags had.  
 
From what I gathered, a member of the trustees had discovered the two figures with 
their sleeping bags and cans scattered around them, when she came in for a board 
meeting one morning. She had decided that without someone personally intervening, 
it was likely they would get settled there. There were concerns that they were being 
aggressive and would scare the clients, if not actually hurt them, if the two men were 
left to use the entrance area of the centre as a base for sleeping and hanging out in. It 
remained unclear from what the longer standing members of staff told me whether 
the fears about the homeless duo’s aggression ever actually played out. Jill described 
them in benign—although rather euphemistic— terms, saying several times that they 
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“weren’t lovable,” gently explaining how they had unhygienic habits of “making a 
mess” peeing outside, or sleeping with their dog lying between them. Others were 
more hostile. One of the volunteer counsellors, in a conversation in the corridor, 
wanted me to know that he didn’t believe they were homeless at all. He called them 
“street drinkers,” dropping a tone to tell me that they were also “Romanian folk,” as if 
that said enough. Julie, one of the administrators, said that despite not being very 
nice to look at, they never actually did anything to the centre or to any of the clients. 
 
In the end, these variations in the stories were fairly inconsequential, as the trustees 
and management quickly agreed that the men needed to go. Ironically, it was Julie 
(who was the most sympathetic and least intimidated by the men) that they enlisted to 
call the police in the hope that they would resolve the situation. Apparently, the 
police had been resistant to coming in and intervening, partly because (according to 
Julie) they just had better things to be doing, but also because it was not 
automatically their responsibility, as the street was privately owned land rather than 
public space.  She told me about this looking out sideways from behind her computer 
monitor, an elbow on the desk, looking defiant. She hadn’t wanted to call the police; 
her conviction was “either you help people with your whole heart, with generosity, or 
you just leave them be.” But they kept asking, and she didn’t think they would be 
interested in her opinion. So she kept calling, until they were gone. I never found out 
exactly how the men were removed, or persuaded to move on to, but they were not 
seen at the service again. Except, of course, for the matter in the corner that, 
according to Sian, meant they could be back for the summer. 
 
And so, like much of this story, the shit remained shrouded in mystery; I never 
discovered who or what it came from (there was no such trace of the men when I 
returned to visit some months later), or whether it would become a kind of warning 
signal that they would be back. Despite being something of an anomaly, it made 
quite an impression on us all, and it quickly got connected to other happenings in the 
space. Not only was it was unhygienic, it was assumed to come from a human: a 
human who—by virtue of them leaving such a trace— should not have been there. 
The taboo, it seemed, came from a very particular combination of the toxicity of 
waste, and the out-of-place person. 
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The relationality of the dump: A chip in the inside-outside logic  
 
What is becoming clear from the ethnographic material generated from both inside 
and outside of the centre is that dumping is relational and contingent on what has 
come to pass, and for whom, in particular sites. If I was becoming seduced by the 
idea that the relationality of dumping and waste was somehow a singular relation 
between centre and periphery—in this case, the mainstream and the voluntary 
sector—this was soon punctured by clients’ accounts of their travels in and out of a 
multitude of different care settings, each with their own means and shortcomings in 
keeping at bay the unmanageable and the uninvited. Neil, an astute and energetic 
man in his sixties, was in the throes of not only grieving his adult daughter’s death, 
but in fighting a legal battle against the mental health services that he believed were 
responsible for it. And so his was a story about someone else’s mental healthcare as 
much as it was about his own. It was in his journeys through the NHS, voluntary, 
and private spheres with his daughter, Leonie, that he felt he had found where the 
‘real’ waste and toxicity of the system ultimately lay.  
Mapping: Neil 
 
28th March 2017 
A therapy room at Stepping Stones  
 
We are looking down at the rough bird’s eye view plan of the space that Neil had 
produced, each line a chaotic rope of light pencil strokes where he had absent 
mindedly continued to reiterate sections as he looked up to explain in words what he 
could only begin to suggest on the paper. He is a storyteller (an actor and writer) by 
trade, and representing his immediate surroundings like this brings a cascade of 
images, associations and memories that his hand can’t keep up with, and I end up 
simply listening to. The set-up of the service reminds him somehow of a start-up 
business- “you come across them in a number of buildings, you know, down on 
canals and things where they’ve done them up…” He riffs off this idea, describing 
the slightly DIY, transitory feeling the space gives off, and comparing it to the 
different kinds of care settings he has encountered. Despite its lack of physical 
stature, he “quite likes” the feeling here; there is real warmth and fondness to these 
slightly unflattering descriptions of our surroundings. Although an ardent supporter 
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of the NHS, he struggles with the impersonal municipality of it, remembering being 
dwarfed by the gigantic hospital where he’d had to identify his daughter’s body. 
Considering where people would generally want to be when dealing with such 
devastation and “screwed up emotions,” he appreciates being somewhere smaller.  
 
And yet, it was the neatness and exclusivity of some of the other spaces he had 
encountered that Neil seems most alienated by. He rails against the consulting rooms 
and residential care settings of some of the private providers he had gone to with 
Leonie over the years. It was these places that evoked in him the deepest sense of 
mistrust, where he came to see the interiors as “crap around the place trying to make 
you feel as though you’re important” whilst in fact symbolising the money that they 
were taking from you for the privilege of being there. In the end, he had had little to 
do with his daughter’s decision to admit herself to a private clinic that provided 
residential care for people living with long term mental illness, but he can recall his 
misgivings about the place. The way they had done it up, he says, was trying to make 
it look as though everything was going smoothly, when really it wasn’t doing its job 
at all. Just “shine on the shit,” he calls it, looking back down at his feathered pencil 
strokes and saying resolutely, “yeah, I quite like the feeling here, actually.” 
 
 
Figure 2: A fragment of Neil's map 
 
I include this encounter as a reminder that, as Mary Douglas has told us in no 
uncertain terms: “there is no such thing as absolute dirt: it exists in the eye of the 
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beholder” (1966/2013, 2)36. Neil saw the centre as something he wanted to be part 
of, a place that was on the right side of what he knew to be a deeply politicised 
landscape of different kinds of care. Despite his deep ethical allegiance to the NHS, 
he could no longer feel quite at ease with vastness and impersonal nature of the 
places in which he’d experienced the worst of his emotional pain. But it was private 
clinics that were really the “wrong side of the tracks” for him. His distain for the 
politics of private healthcare had been amplified into a visceral sense of repulsion, 
after its failure to protect his daughter from her illness. Illuminating the function of 
dumping as concealment I touched on at the beginning of this chapter, Neil’s 
accusation of putting “shine on the shit,” tells us that this was a particularly insidious 
form of dirt and disorder, one that was obscured and covered up, in contrast to the 
diligent— if not always entirely effective— tidying up that went on at Stepping 
Stones.  The remaining untidiness was not nearly as worrisome as the false cleanliness 
he recalled from the private sector; in fact, it appeared somewhat friendly, and 
helped to produce the interiority and intimacy that made him feel cared for. 
The making and managing of exteriority 
Abstract dichotomies of “inside” and “outside” were beginning to collapse in on 
themselves around the doors of the Stepping Stones counselling service. The first, 
and seemingly most obvious, distinction between what goes on inside and outside of 
the organisation itself quickly got blurry, largely because of how implicated the 
outside space was in the client experiences of accessing the service. It emerged in the 
everyday work that staff engaged in to maintain broader space outside of the walls of 
the building, and the way that it reflected the broader financial and structural 
positioning of the organisation as a voluntary provider of care. This was something 
that came into focus in the scene I opened with: Alex’s aspiration to build another set 
of gates at the end of the cul-de-sac was a clear demonstration that the boundary 
between inside and outside could be redefined, and there was an impetus to do so in 
recognition of the impact the outdoor space had on how people experienced the 
organisation and the service itself. Indeed, most people in their mapping of the space 
 
36 Neil’s response complicates Douglas’s idea that “dirt is essentially disorder” (ibid.): in this instance 
he likes the seeming aesthetic disorder, as much as he hates the false neatness of the private sector. 
What others may see as ‘dirt/disorder’ Neil experiences as containing and orderly, whereas that which 
masquerades as order, he experiences as deeply untrustworthy. What is “in place” and “out of place” 
is constantly shifting according to different relational orders.  
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used the line where the un-even, partly cobbled and partly tarmacked street met the 
smooth pavement of the high street as the outermost point of their map. This 
extension of the physical boundary of the service was— although not part of the 
clinical work— very much a part of the practices around accepting bodies into the 
space or diverting them away from it.   
 
What all of these stories were illustrating was that whilst the voluntary space of the 
clinic never actually materialised as a literal dumping ground, it was true that its 
positioning outside of the main infrastructure of the city meant that this was always a 
possibility. Its tucked-away locale within a busy and rapidly changing urban milieu, 
with no public maintenance, made it vulnerable to the encroaching waste from fly-
tippers and lazy neighbours. With my descriptions of this, I have been trying to 
demonstrate that the making of interiority and exteriority is the result of many 
different relations, and not always under the control of any one actor: managing 
where the dump is, and what constitutes the “outside,” is not always as easy as 
moving the gate. 
 
And so indeed, the themes of ‘matter out of place’ outside the service, and ‘people out 
of place’ inside the service start to collapse somewhat. Some bodies carry with them, 
and leave traces of, more unwelcome physical waste than do other bodies.  This is 
more likely to be the homeless body than the one contained by a home (the home 
being key to accessing many public services); but it is also the more severely mentally 
unwell body. Take the instance described by Sara in the first section, of the woman 
who “just didn’t belong here”. Here, because of the learning difficulties that seemed 
to have gone unnoticed or uncared for, she had become visibly and viscerally out of 
place when she peed on herself in the therapy room. I had probably heard about this 
particular woman because of this visibility, and how narrate-able her story then 
became. The very rare decision not to take someone on for therapy once they had 
made it in for an assessment was made, was based not just on mental health status, 
but also someone’s embodied presence in the space.  
 
Considering the ways in which unwanted matter is deeply connected to bodies raises 
yet another question about where the dumping ground lies. The centre itself 
occasionally bears the marks of unsuitable guests— of people out of place— because of 
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the failures of other parts of the welfare or health and social care system. But, more 
often than not, it is these people that bear the marks of such failures; having mental 
illness that has been uncared for, or indeed being without a place to live and 
criminalised for sleeping rough, at some point becomes visible on the bodies of those 
who live out these realities. In a way, it is these people – as much as the built 
environment, organisational structures, or voluntary staff – that are being “dumped 
on.” Dirt was doing its work inside the service, and on bodies too: the inside/ outside, 
metaphor/ material, body/ place divides were emerging as something of a red 
herring. There was a recursivity to the making of exteriority through dumping, 
meaning it doesn’t just happen on one scale, or even between two scales (I have 
already spoken now about the complex relations between the body, the organisation, 
the mainstream health and social care system, and society at large). It would be better 
described as a practice that was both relational and that took place at multiple scales: 
between the NHS and voluntary organisations, between public and private space, 
between society and individual bodies, and so on. 
 
Conclusions: The lived ordinary, on the periphery  
 
So much of the work that I observed here, and in other voluntary settings, was 
defined by an exteriority to the mainstream. But, crucially, this exteriority is 
constantly produced or reproduced by spatial politics and relations— meaning it is 
never absolute. I have been trying to challenge a seemingly obvious distinction 
between the scenes on the intrusion of physical waste, and those on the discursive 
practice of using the dumping metaphor: that the former were focused on 
happenings “on the outside,” whilst the latter were about all about the normal 
organisational practices inside the service. Looked at another way, they are all 
peripheral happenings, taking place at various points along and increasingly blurry 
inside-outside continuum. 
 
As they unfolded, the ethnographic moments I have explored here—of the clear-up, 
Claire’s first encounter with the centre, and the storytelling about the homeless 
men— were brought together almost by accident: a triggered memory here, a 
suspicion there, often with many months in between. But for me, the linkages are 
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potentially more intimately connected and interesting than this. They revealed 
something of the lived ordinary of managing access to service, access that is in multiple 
ways on the periphery of a broader landscape of care. Juxtaposing Claire’s position as 
the kind of client who without a doubt belonged in the service, with the homeless 
men as imposters on the space, sets up an unusual comparison. The men were a 
strange kind of inversion of the normal practice, because they weren’t just an 
exception to the rule, they existed entirely outside of the rules. They weren’t being 
turned away due to clinical inclusion or exclusion criteria for counselling. They were, 
in Berlant’s words, “a glitch in the present”: a device, which made visible the on-going 
work it takes to make and maintain a certain kind of space for people to access the 
service with an ever-broadening spectrum of need. 
 
In a climate of scarcity and trade-offs in space, resources, and time in the health and 
social care system, it becomes all the more necessary to manage and protect the 
boundaries of small services like this one. This holds, even as (or perhaps particularly 
as) the therapeutic care is supposed to be open to “anybody.” This speaks to Taylor’s 
commentary on “surfaces,” which I touched upon earlier; on the “dynamic tension” 
between producing and performing surfaces whilst also breaching them (Taylor 
2005). Put differently, making outer boundaries more porous or “breach-able” can 
mean (and in this case, did mean) more work of fixing and re-making these 
boundaries and others. Staff and clients at Stepping Stones were occupied with this 
work in response to a multitude of possibilities and challenges associated with 
surviving whilst constantly being almost on the outside. This chapter, then, has been all 
about making and managing exteriority; in the next chapter, on “sanctuary,” I address 
related questions on the management of interiority. 
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Chapter 5: Sanctuary Under Siege  
 
Shortly after my starting to work with the Pankhurst Women’s Centre, clinical work 
is put on hold for the day and the therapy rooms are all vacated. A large conference 
has been organised to celebrate the “birthday” of the organisation and the decades 
of work that have passed since its opening. We are in an elegantly designed lecture 
theatre: red brick, clad with curved wooden panels and simple black lamps hanging 
in lines overhead, leading our gaze to the lectern and a large projector screen. We 
are being addressed by a tall woman with silver hair, and she is showing us her silk 
scarf; purple and white—the colours of women’s suffrage. She too is excited by the 
place we are gathered in, going on to tell us why it has a special “poetic significance” 
for all of us here. It is the former site of the Women’s Library, which had recently 
been at the centre of a bitter struggle that ended in its dislocation from this purpose-
built space. Many of the women in the room, she tells us, were involved in this 
struggle. She doesn’t dwell on this further, swiftly moving on to her forthcoming 
book and the line-up for the day’s events, but I am interested in this story, and later 
look up what exactly had happened. 
 
Online newspaper articles from 2014 tell me that a historical archive of books, 
magazines, letters and documentation of feminist activism had been brought to this 
site twelve years ago, after a precarious existence; first in a converted pub, and later 
(after that was bombed during WW2) in what was then known as City of London 
Polytechnic. It had found its new home in the old washrooms of London’s East End, 
which the Lottery Heritage Fund had transformed into this sanctuary for both 
advocates of the women’s movement and its material artefacts. The library was run 
by what became London Metropolitan University, until the lottery money ran out 
and the university found itself financially overstretched and struggling to maintain it. 
Eventually, they declared it untenable to keep running the library in the space and 
another wealthier university won the rights to be the collection’s new guardians. 
Notwithstanding the outrage of academics and campaigners who lamented the 
inaccessible, overly academic nature of the new space, it was announced that the 
collection had been “saved” and the converted washrooms became a flexible event 
space, rented out for occasions like this. In one interview I came across online, a 
campaigner (an architect) described the now redundant custom-made shelves and 
lighting system as a body without its insides. 
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It is hard to shake the frustrating combination of nostalgia and disappointment that 
hangs in the air of this event space; it emanates not just from the spectre of the 
failed library campaign, but from the gulf that lies between the ideals set out by some 
of these women all those years ago, and the reality of what they are seeing play out 
today. We have just witnessed Donald Trump come into power in the U.S., and the 
second wave feminism that was the driving force behind the centre at its inception 
has bafflingly disappeared from sight for the generation of women who fill the room 
today. The founders of the centre, both eminent academics who have long since 
moved on from their roles as grass-roots feminist psychotherapists, are initially 
faithful to the organisers’ hope that today will be about celebration. They tell us of 
how they came together all those years ago to change women’s lives and to change 
the world. Very soon, however, they are also forced to be candid about the state of 
this ambition, at a time when many of the women helping to realise it are now 
volunteers, working in the face of dwindling resources. 
 
“Look, here’s the thing: we failed,” one of them says with dramatic sincerity in 
response to the dissatisfaction being voiced in the final panel. She is talking in the 
broadest sense about the original project of second-wave feminism, of changing the 
world unequivocally. But she is also talking of her own project, of their own project, 
which has (successfully or not) shape-shifted into something recognisable but smaller 
and less clearly defined than it had once been. She goes on to make an analogy 
about mothers and grandmothers and their (often difficult) relationships with their 
daughters; her eloquence softens the collective disquiet—faint hostility, even—that 
still hangs in the room. And yet I would discover later the very specific ways in which 
her words speak to the experiences of the new generation of women I went on to 
work with. They have not been protected and supported in this new, hostile 
environment where they have been forced to “scrabble around” for funding and 
resources. In another sense, they are not concerned with the preservation of records 
and work-gone-by, as many of the women who had formerly been involved with the 
centre were; they are too busy making it work, day-to-day. I would soon learn that 
the conference had told me little about this everyday practice, but lots about these 
layers of previous lives that had unfolded over the recent past, not to mention the 
bitter tensions this had brought with it. 
 
This chapter focuses on the provision and protection of safe therapeutic places for 
women, and the changing priorities and debates about whom (which women) they 
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should include, contain, and reach. As such, it will also pay close attention to 
particular moments of tension, failure or fragmentation— echoing those described 
above— which threaten the ongoing project of the Women’s Centre. It will be about 
the constant tension between the desire to preserve and contain, and the need to 
shape-shift and reach beyond the bounds of an increasingly precarious therapeutic 
space at this particular centre. Drawing on the discursive ways in which the centre 
has been described historically, as well as more immediate spatial observations and 
accounts from my own fieldwork, I use the concept of sanctuary to pull together 
themes of safety, protection, preservation, and (at times) orthodoxy, which seemed to 
be at the heart of many of these struggles to establish and continue the work of this 
particular charity. 
 
I ground the ethnographic material in the (loss of) physical space of the centre, as well 
as extensions of this space that came about through the outreach work that was set 
up to reach more marginal and mobile groups of women. About halfway through this 
chapter, the turn from specific outreach work to migrant, refugee and asylum seeking 
women becomes central, as does the need to create a place of sanctuary in different 
ways for these groups. But throughout the chapter, I also draw on a different kind of 
spatiality, to help analyse why the work of these women was so plagued with 
controversy, and understand the feelings of failure articulated in the scene described 
above. This alternative spatiality is grounded in topological ideas of fluidity versus 
immutability (Law and Mol 2001, 1995; Law 2003): the idea that as well as 
Euclidean space, there is a network space, in which complex sets of relations hold 
objects together or, indeed, let them fall apart. Whilst sometimes these networks 
remain immutable and fixed, others are fluid, opening up the possibility of gradual 
movement and adaptation (Redfield 2016; De Laet and Mol 2000). In this chapter, I 
enquire about the nature of sanctuary as an object in this context: how it is shaped, 
both in Euclidean space (the literal changing borders and boundaries around the 
centre as a place of sanctuary) and the topological space of more fixed or more fluid 
relations that make up different versions of sanctuary.   
 
My argument rests on the idea that objects are shaped by processes (Stenner 2014), 
and that the processes I observed throughout my time at the centre were not just 
about holding together a coherent and safe space; they were also about processes of 
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shrinkage, fragmentation, dilution and mobility. These processes were often 
considered to be threats to what the centre should be, or once had been, which is 
why I have used the phrase “sanctuary under siege” as a descriptor for how those 
invested in the centre perceived the (spatial) politics that took place around it. What I 
aim to bring out in the ethnographic data is that these processes of change—
threatening failure and articulated as “being under siege”— are paradoxically what define 
sanctuary in this context. To take a very different example of how this might happen, 
one might think about the function and symbolism of a lifeboat: it represents safety 
and preservation of life far more than a cruise ship, despite the fact that one is more 
likely to drown, fall overboard, or get immersed by water if you are on a lifeboat. It is 
the processes of disaster and rescue that define it as safe. I am interested in the ways 
in which processes of dilution and fragmentation, as well as more obvious processes 
of containment and protection, might work together to define “sanctuary” as a 
surprisingly nebulous object in this setting.  
 
Chapter overview 
 
I start with sketching a picture of the small therapy space that is valued by service 
users and providers alike as a fairly fixed and bounded set of rooms, which lives up to 
an aesthetic and sensory ideal of sanctuary. However, by attending to the recent 
history of the place (focusing on moments of its making and unmaking), I draw out 
the first of several ways this ideal of sanctuary has been seen to be under threat: 
through the encroachment of more dominant mainstream or private psychotherapy 
services, which have been buying up and occupying the spaces around them. I then 
explore a very different, community based approach to providing places of safety for 
vulnerable and excluded women— one that in recent years has become central to the 
centre’s strategy for improving the accessibility of their service, but not without 
contestation. The historical but still lingering pushback against taking psychotherapy 
out of the consulting room and into “the community” will bring me to a second set of 
processes in which a traditional mode of sanctuary has been threatened: through its 
dilution and fragmentation. Central to all of these processes, it is the concern for 
imminent falling apart or failure of the project to make and preserve this sanctuary 
(harking back the talk of failure that had troubled the conference I described above, 
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and which troubled me deeply in the writing about these processes). In a closing 
section, I talk about an alternative process I observed, which by no means solves the 
problems I described above, but which offers a more mobile and fluid version of the 
work of inclusion.  
 
Sensing sanctuary 
 
When Siobhan, one of the volunteer therapists, needed to come to the centre briefly 
one afternoon over the school holidays, she brought her son and daughter in with 
her. Peeking into one of the empty therapy rooms, they had fallen silent, taking in the 
stillness and the carefully placed furniture.  
“It’s very holy,” her son had whispered, making Siobhan smile. She knew what he’d 
meant: not exactly churchlike, but calm, and safe. I did too. I rarely spent time in the 
one-to-one therapy rooms, but when I did use them for interviews, I was always 
struck upon entering the space by something you might call holiness. Most had 
windows facing west so that, in the afternoons, low sun would stream in and 
illuminate the very particular configuration of low-set chairs, table (tissues and clock 
positioned on top) and lamp. For me, there was something untouchable about this 
space; if I cleared the table to make space for a Dictaphone or paper to draw on, I 
would feel as though I may be disrupting something irrevocably. Perhaps I was 
fearful that if I wasn’t able to place it back exactly, the ritual that had been and was 
about to come to pass would be somehow disturbed. 
 
Siobhan recalled this memory when I asked her about the centre as a space and what 
she thought people felt about it. Apart from the amusement this naïve insight 
brought with it, she used it to animate the point she was making: that people tended 
to feel the centre to be a place of safety.  Compared to some of the places that her 
clients talked about having sought help from in the past, it seemed particularly lovely: 
“they all say ‘oh you’ve got such a nice place!’” Siobhan echoed back to me, from her 
clients’ reactions. I had also found that certain women, whom I knew had 
experienced particularly unwelcoming or frightening mental health settings, seemed 
impressed with the softly coloured decor, the paintings, the patterned rugs covering 
the more municipal-style carpet. This was of course all deliberate; Abiola, the office 
 111 
manager, laughed sheepishly to me as she described to me how she had learned what 
was fitting to this style and what was not. Soon after she started the role, she’d been 
asked to buy some new furnishings for the rooms and had gone out and bought red 
cushions and a red love heart carpet, because (though looking back on it she could 
not think why) she thought the women would like that.  
“Well,” she said, “the therapist hooted with laughter, it was so— because 
obviously, you know, they were telling me that it would remind somebody 
who’s been sex trafficked for instance of a hotel, or you know, I don’t know 
what you call it, like a brothel?”  
To me, it didn’t seem as blindingly obvious as she now thought it was; I could see the 
logic, but I could also understand her original thinking that the red hearts might have 
made the women “feel loved”. In any case, the rug and cushions ended up in her 
house instead, and she purchased some more suitable alternatives for the office. The 
important thing was that they looked neutral, by which she meant categorically not 
red, whilst anything pastel would be okay. 
 
It was partly these tacit assumptions from staff about what kind of safety the clinic 
space should offer— performed through such specific engagements with light, space 
and colour—that carried associations with the notion of “sanctuary.” But sanctuary 
was also an important theme in the way women described the centre. Yinka, a young 
woman I spoke to after her group therapy had finished, used the word to describe her 
first impression of the centre, and specifically to distinguish this from her prior 
experience in a hospital setting where she had been admitted with post-natal 
depression after the birth of her son. When I met her, she was in good spirits as she 
told me, with a huge smile on her face, that she had just come from signing the 
tenancy agreement on a council flat, which she will be able to stay in for at least a 
year. Seven months prior to that, she and her son had been housed in temporary 
accommodation when she found herself facing homelessness. It had been a horrible 
experience and she likened the block of flats to an old mental asylum: 
Yinka: it looks like, a bit like a mental home, a little bit, it had that vibe to it, 
like it was really dingy and it's just depressing. And it's, well, it's just, yeah, I 
don’t know it's just like, almost like, it's the same sort of place they put people 
that leave prison, basically.  
NB: And what was the mental home thing, what made you think of that? 
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Yinka: Because when you see films and you see when they kind of treat 
people with mental illness like animals, so that was like that place, it was like, 
it just wasn't suitable for a child at all, so, yeah, and it was just horrible, like 
there was damp as well, it was really cold, the heating never came on, so, 
yeah. 
Mapping: Yinka 
 
Yinka takes a pencil and confidently retraces her steps from the street, down the 
corridor, and to the women’s centre area. She races through this route, sketching bits 
and bobs of furniture either side of the corridor—a water dispenser here, a table, a 
fan, this and that door. When she gets to the door that marks the area she was 
looking for on that first day, she slows down a little. She gestures towards the other 
side of the closed door of the therapy room we are sitting in, saying that she got 
through into that reception area: the big space in the middle, surrounded by all the 
doors to the therapy rooms. She draws what she saw there: a stick figure hovers 
above the shape of a reception desk, with nothing but a big smile on its perfectly 
circular head. She recalls the therapist who assessed her coming to meet her and 
bringing her to the room. It was room 4. She draws a small box and labels it with the 
number. Putting her pencil down and leaning back in a low comfy chair, she raises 
her eyes to the ceiling and remembers noticing the clean, white paint on the walls—
not magnolia, she emphasises, with a small shudder. Oh, and then there were the 
paintings, she says; she liked their soft pastel colours, nothing too aggressive. What 
about the people? The fact it was all women? Yinka looks back down at the map, 
casting her mind back to the times she was describing. She had hardly noticed it at 
the time (she was so nervous, so concerned what people were thinking about her), 
but looking back, she thinks it was good that there weren’t any men around. Back 
then, she has real thing against all the men in her life but it was her son that would 
make sure they stayed away—crying and crying and crying if a man came into the 
room.  
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Figure 3: Yinka's map  
 
Perhaps even more than the human interactions she had on that first encounter with 
the service, it was the light and softness (in contrast to the dinginess that she 
associated with substandard statutory settings) that had brought Yinka to the term 
sanctuary. She evocatively sealed off the women’s centre from psychiatric settings, 
prison, and sheltered housing that she drew from a combination of personal 
experiences and cultural references. Reflecting on what it was that made it feel safe, 
she also acknowledged the abjection she had felt against men when she was starting 
the therapy, and recalled that it had been meaningful to be in a women-only space. 
Others (particularly young women with precarious or unsafe living conditions) shared 
this sense of relief to be in a place of privacy or refuge, although this was also coupled 
with qualities of it being unfamiliar and sometimes uncomfortably intense. Both 
service users and staff valued the interiority of the clinic space and considered it to be 
(ideally) a site of protection from the outside.  In this sense, the material aspects of the 
clinical space, so carefully put together and maintained, did what they were intended 
to do – they were neutral, clean, safe. The centre itself created a different kind of 
(non-clinical) space from other services: a break with the mainstream and “the 
outside.” But, as the previous chapter demonstrated, this “outside” is often not as 
easily sealed-off as the metaphors make it sound. And in this case in particular, the 
institutional “outside” was not just an abstract concept or memory from elsewhere. 
As I describe below, they shared a building with mainstream services, which had 
been encroaching on their clinical space for some time. 
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Encroachment  
 
In this section, I describe a different, more troublesome aspect of looking after the 
interiority and safety of the place. The series of events that saw the therapy centre 
become a professional clinic, expanding fast, then being forced to shrink down, was 
one that I heard narrated many times during my time there. It was during the build-
up to the conference that I learned the rather romantic story of how the centre had 
started out. Stories were circulating about how the two founders had been great 
friends, fresh out of their training in psychotherapy and social work, and determined 
to start the first psychotherapy centre run exclusively by women, for women. They 
had started up the centre in the basement of one of their houses and promoted the 
service with handmade leaflets. I wasn’t surprised that this story had been preserved 
and passed on with attention to these small details, within the grander narratives of 
women’s liberation and radical movements in mental health. It spoke to values of 
self-sufficiency and taking ownership, of creating space for something different.   
 
Several decades on, and they had long since moved out of the basement, into a 
complex of sturdy, nineteenth century red brick buildings that accommodate a 
cluster of well-established charities. A small, paperback book devoted to the history of 
the site of this charitable trust (handed to me at a community event nearby) tells me 
that charitable healthcare services have been delivered here since 1913. About six 
years before I started my fieldwork there, however, they’d stopped being able to 
afford the rent and sold off about two thirds of the floor space they had previously 
occupied. The space went to the NHS IAPT (Improving Access to Psychological 
Therapies) services that were being rapidly rolled out across the country at the time. 
The IAPT programme was in need of space to carry out their newly developed, 
evidence-based cognitive behavioural therapy practice. Despite the diversity of the 
women who worked or volunteered at the women’s centre– both in term of cultural 
background and therapeutic approach– their feelings towards cognitive behavioural 
therapy was something that united them all. For them, the therapy practiced down 
the hallway felt shallow and bureaucratic compared to the psychodynamic methods 
they used. They felt that the women they saw needed much more in-depth work that 
took into account their biographies, their gender, and their different social and 
psychic vulnerabilities.  
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Even after downsizing, it was a constant struggle to keep the centre running 
financially, given that (as is normal for voluntary service providers) none of the core 
costs for rent, or other material resources, were covered by the project-based funding 
they received. To raise some extra money, they rented out rooms to various private 
practitioners, or the neighbouring NHS providers who were in constant need to 
more space. When I introduced myself to the receptionist for the IAPT service that 
sat at the desk outside of the new entrance to the women’s centre, she nodded to the 
space around her: “you used to have all this space and we have gradually been taking 
it,” she told me brightly, before adding that they also use the “beautiful” therapy 
rooms for crisis care when they had the chance to. Despite working within metres of 
each other (and shifting clients and services between their rooms), the two services 
had virtually no contact; the door in the central corridor sealed them off from each 
other completely. We couldn’t see or hear the NHS counterparts, save for the 
occasional chatter and giggles of trainee wellbeing practitioners all piling into the 
meeting room next to the waiting area; comparing notes on assignments, managers 
and their clinical workload. I was told the NHS staff were “funny” with the them, 
and that I shouldn’t take this shortcut to the toilets because it meant walking through 
their reception space.  
 
To make things more complicated, the Women’s Centre was jointly commissioned to 
do some of the service delivery in conjunction with IAPT, but the referral pathways 
between services weren’t accompanied by much direct communication and were a 
source of tension. When cases were too complex for the six-session cognitive 
behavioural therapy course they offered, they would be referred down the hall 
through an electronic referral system—sometimes too thick and fast for the Women’s 
Centre to manage. I was told they were being “bombarded” with referrals: their 
already shrinking clinic was under siege. There were instances where the inside/ 
outside logic at the internal threshold of the centre felt strong for the women using the 
service too. The concern here was less about professional boundary work and more 
about wanting to feel separate from the cool, municipal healthcare setting on the 
outside of the door, and remain a part of something alterative and less clinical on the 
other. The internal threshold between these services was salient in the way most 
women visually mapped their entrance to the space. One woman, Kamila, whom I 
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spoke to several months after she started therapy, based her map on a stark “bad”/ 
“good” divide between the IAPT service and the women’s centre, as she recalled 
essentially being forgotten about on the IAPT waiting list after finishing more 
intensive therapy in hospital, following a suicide attempt. She was angry that 
somehow the communication with mainstream services had suddenly broken down 
meaning she’d never been allocated to the service she was promised, but her distress 
also revolved around a relationship that had been plagued by domestic violence. 
Then, since accessing mental health services, some close friends from the community 
had been openly hostile to her; being outside of the formal mental health system was 
central what Kamila wanted from the Women’s Centre. So the spatial division 
between the services was not just a performance, but rather was constantly defined 
and reproduced by relations between clients, services, and their broader experiences 
of the health system. Whatever was sanctuary-like about this alternative space was 
deeply bound up with what staff, and some service users, felt was wrong with the 
mental health system at large, starting with the IAPT service down the hallway. 
 
Dilution and Fragmentation  
 
The centre had not just been shrinking in the years leading up to my fieldwork. They 
had been reaching out to a changing “client group”: all the women on the front line 
(that is, delivering therapy and running the centre on a day to day basis) agreed that 
a vital change for the organisation had come with their turn to improving access for 
refugee and asylum seeking women. And so in many respects it was also expanding, 
albeit in a less visible way than the simple process of downsizing in space, described 
above. I now look to the changing the locus of work, which reached beyond the 
groups and settings associated with traditional psychotherapy—a change that, 
particularly in the beginning, had been met with scepticism. It brought different 
kinds of threat to sanctuary, which women described in terms of processes that I call 
“dilution” (of their practice into diverse spaces and places) and “fragmentation” (of 
the sanctuary, and whom it was for). In this way, the work of making the Women’s 
Centre more accessible paradoxically made it more and more difficult to maintain 
and hold together. 
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A potential alternative to this impasse, however, emerged out of the work of a 
woman I call Jehona: instead of working to protect the spatial and professional 
boundaries that gave shape to this particular notion of safe therapeutic space, she 
actively worked to shape-shift it and move it to ever more “hard to reach” places for 
the psychotherapist. Jehona was a community therapist and outreach worker, with 
whom I spent a lot of time, both in and out of the centre, working on (often 
overlapping) projects aimed at improving access for young mothers, and for refugee 
asylum seeking, and trafficked women. This was her specialism in part because of her 
own refugee status, which she gained many years ago but still strongly identified with. 
Despite having me tagging along with her, and another volunteer who would later 
take over her outreach role, she would often call herself a “one-man-band,” not 
reliant on anyone or anywhere to carry out her clinical work. In the pages that 
follow, I place Jehona in the role of antagonist or agitator to the traditional model of 
psychotherapy that provides safety and containment solely within the consulting 
room.  
Dilution: the politics of moving therapy “out there” 
One visible break with the established traditions of psychotherapy, which had taken 
place over the past ten years, was visible in changing demographics of the staff. The 
range of nationalities, cultures and languages spoken in the centre extended far 
beyond what it had been before (or indeed what you might expect to see in other 
services, largely due to the increasing levels of diversity both in the borough and 
within mental health professions in London). I was told this process of change 
happened in tandem with (and partly because of) the rapidly changing “client group” 
of the service. Over time, this client group began to represent a radical break from 
the typical (white, European, middle class) recipients of psychoanalytic 
psychotherapy. There were more and more women of colour and new migrants 
accessing the service, as well as those with low incomes that had already been coming 
to the women’s centre because of its provision of free services. It was impossible to 
determine a clear causation between the increased diversity of the service users and 
providers—most people gave a kind of “chicken or egg” answer when I asked—but 
the following account came from one woman who was able to share a distinct 
narrative of the events that unfolded over this period. 
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“In the end, some people had to leave because they couldn’t manage to work with 
the client group we had. You see, historically, this centre only worked with white 
middle class lesbian women with eating disorders.” Melek sits opposite me in her 
office, telling me this with a flash of impish glee in her eye, as she moves quickly 
through relaying what she knows of the history of the centre. I get the sense it is a 
story she has told before, and is happy to tell “on the record” (my audio recorder sits 
blinking between us). She has worked in the area for decades (weaving in and out of 
various voluntary organisations and her own private practice) and has been at the 
women’s centre for some years now. Crucially, she played a pivotal role in shifting 
the focus away from this “traditional” client group. She strongly identifies as a 
political refugee and foregrounds her identification as a cultural minority in her 
clinical work, fervently rejecting orthodox notions that a therapist must, or can, be 
entirely “neutral.” She tells me that when she arrived at the service in the newly 
created role of ‘community development therapist,’ she encouraged more diversity, 
focusing on migrant and refugee women in particular. She recounts how successful 
her work had been: how quickly they were “overwhelmed with refugees” and how 
much funding she brought in as a result. At first, Melek had no clinical 
responsibilities—the role was to go out to the community and help clients access the 
centre—but that changed as she began to push for more opportunities to carry out 
clinical work along with the job. She would give taster sessions, psychoeducation 
groups and, eventually, therapeutic work that would take place in various 
community settings.  It hadn’t been easy; she recalls how many of the existing 
therapists had been very sceptical about taking the work out of the consulting room, 
telling her they didn’t believe she could be analytical in the community because she 
wasn’t neutral enough. Not only this, they would undermine the whole project of 
making therapy accessible to refugees: “oh refugees can’t use therapy, they don’t 
understand anything,” Melek says, mimicking the general attitude she remembers 
from this time. She reminds me that of course these more orthodox psychotherapists 
were all middle class white women themselves, and tells me proudly how, initially, 
people “on the outside” were surprised that she was able to work at the women’s 
centre as a foreigner. “Well anyway,” she says, “then things started to change.” 
 
Melek’s account was part of a wider narrative shared by the “new generation” of 
diverse women who worked there. Without attributing quite such clear personal 
responsibility for the changes, most of the women would say the project to reach out 
to migrants and refugees is now a defining feature of what they do. The resistance to 
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it from the previous generation of therapists and trustees was referenced almost as a 
tale from a shameful chapter of their past; I never heard such cynicism or resistance 
first-hand.37 And yet, the sense of protectionism— both of the psychoanalytical 
method and the clinic space itself— was, apparently, still felt by some, particularly 
with regards to the community-based work.  
 
After some years, the organisation took on someone else to share the responsibility of 
the community work and expand it. This person was Jehona. One chilly February 
morning, I met her at a community centre where we were organising outreach event. 
As we trudged through a vast frosty playing field, outside of the quiet confines of the 
clinic, she recounted an experience that had confirmed her sense that the role was 
still not taken seriously as ‘real’ psychotherapy. She’d had an appraisal the day before 
and, faced with confusion from the board of trustees about what exactly it was she 
did, she told them again that she was a therapist. She was dismayed at the reaction 
they had given, of: “Oh I thought you were doing something ‘out there,’” Jehona 
waved her arm vaguely out towards an imaginary window to show me how 
dismissive the comment and gesture had felt. Apparently the “out there” aspect of 
her work remained synonymous with something ancillary or less serious than the 
clinical work done in the safety of the consulting room. Ironically, this narrative 
echoes the way the centre was described historically (in publications and oral histories 
about the centre), in that it had always been a space for doing psychotherapy in less 
orthodox ways, for people less represented in traditional client groups. 
Fragmentation: whose sanctuary? 
If Jehona was able to enact a form of sanctuary in far corners of the city, then what 
exactly did it look like, and how did it travel back to the original physical space of the 
sanctuary at the centre? What impact did this have on established ideas about what a 
therapeutic space looked like, where it was, and whom it was for? In a clinical 
presentation meeting, Jehona talked about her work in an Albanian community 
centre. Here, she had gone beyond delivering her usual information (or “taster”) 
 
37 The politics surrounding the idea that the diversity of people and therapeutic practice was somehow 
diluting the established psychotherapeutic tradition at the centre was a complicated one. It is important 
to say that I never heard anyone say this first hand. Rather, it was the way that therapists who felt 
marginalised within the centre narrativised the changing priorities about whom the centre was for.  
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sessions and psycho-education groups, working individually with some of the women 
who were newer migrants in the community centre itself.  
 
The room is full. Jehona sits in the circle waiting for people to settle; she is quiet, but 
somehow exudes an air of defiance just in the way she sits (very still, hands on lap, 
head held high). She presents an in-depth case study with one woman who had 
responded well to the therapy, describing how she had had to adapt to the non-
clinical space—a storeroom from which she’d cleared rails of traditional dresses and 
other old pieces of furniture to make space for the two chairs they would place facing 
each other for their sessions. The novelty of the work strikes a chord with the women 
and, following Jehona’s talk, they respond with positivity. Some even express their 
envy at her freedom to work like this.  
 
Alannah, who had expressed her commitments to bringing classic psychoanalytic 
insights into all of the women’s centre’s work, sits thoughtfully for a while before 
sharing her response. What she took from hearing about this work that foregrounded 
the migration experience, was that really the distress and pathology all comes down to 
trauma. Moreover, she says, once you distilled it down to this, you could consider 
parallels with many other women’s experiences, even a “rich woman from Belsize 
Park [an affluent neighbourhood] with her own kind of trauma.” Some of the others 
nod in agreement, others look to Jehona for her response; a prickle of disagreement 
punctures the atmosphere. Jehona crosses her legs, takes a deep breath and nods, 
saying she understands the point but has to disagree. I worry about this comment, 
knowing from previous conversations how much she takes judgements on her work 
with migrants and refugees as a “direct hit” on her personally, as a refugee herself. 
There isn’t much time to resolve the debate, but Jehona quickly defends her point 
that these women’s experience of trafficking, or of escaping from conflict settings, is 
different to the problems of middle-class white women. The mood has changed 
quickly from a few minutes ago when we had been transported by Jehona’s vivid 
descriptions of her work in the community, and we are faced once again by the 
many competing voices contained in this small room. 
 
The work that was being put into making the service more accessible, to invite a 
bigger and more diverse group of women into the sanctuary they had created, was 
making it more and more difficult to maintain and hold together. Although the 
outreach work and community development therapy was firmly embedded into the 
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organisation’s model, the splits and controversies it originally caused in the centre 
seemed to have remarkable endurance. Occasionally, in fact, it appeared that 
concerted efforts were made to keep these tensions alive. Those who worked 
specifically with refugees would tussle over who would narrate this particular struggle 
and critique the prejudice they felt (and sometimes still feel) in the resistance to it. 
Countless conversations revolved around how to protect this “radical edge” to their 
work. Others, in a parallel, would rail against the various corruptions of the original 
psychoanalytic method in all spheres of mental health care (“if only they would read 
the texts!” one particular therapist would exclaim, raising her eyes to the ceiling in 
exasperation at the absence of a Freudian basis in the new NICE-approved Dynamic 
Integrative Therapy model).  Despite efforts to simplify the chronological 
development of “then and now,” tensions continued to arise around what should be 
preserved, what should be left behind, and whether it was even possible to contain all 
the changes that were necessary and desirable in one unified professional and 
physical space. 
 
These accounts of dilution and fragmentation reveal a paradox about the work it 
takes to make the service into a sanctuary for excluded women: enacting qualities of 
safety, interiority and inclusion seemed to make external threats and pressures all the 
more present. Striving to make this sanctuary accessible and inclusive made the 
contested and shifting boundaries of their work a constant source of tension. This 
shows a kind of flip-side to the tension I brought up in the conclusion of the last 
section:  boundaries, of course, are necessary to protect and maintain a place of safety 
but they also make exclusion, contamination, and the breaching of boundaries all the 
more present, meaning that failure for the women providing this service was always 
imminent.  
 
Fluidity  
 
There is, however, a different way of approaching the work of inclusion, and of 
understanding what makes (and unmakes) sanctuary. Jehona’s work was less about 
bringing diverse groups together in one space, and more about making the 
therapeutic work, and the safe spaces it created for women, more fluid and mobile. 
 122 
Jehona would go to particular sites–community centres, libraries, advice services, and 
cultural centres–to target specific categories of women such as refugees, asylum-
seekers, or disadvantaged young mothers. But the practice of visiting these various 
community groups introduced Jehona to all sorts of women; what she called 
“different layers of people.” She even set up WhatsApp groups of women after their 
group psychoeducation sessions ended, in order to maintain a digital space for 
support, and (she argued) enabling its own kind of therapeutic work between the 
women as peers. After several months of working alongside her and occasionally 
shadowing her outreach work, I interviewed Jehona. We met in café a few miles 
north of the women’s centre, close to one the community groups that she would be 
providing “taster sessions” for therapy to later on. I knew she relished being out of 
the centre, particularly when she was on her regular stomping ground, where she had 
a deep network of community groups, activists and service providers that she kept in 
regular contact with. Occasionally, though, her work would take her to unfamiliar 
places that heightened her sense of being a “foreigner” herself, and made her nervous 
about her own safety. This was what she communicated visually through her 
mapping; the only one that depicted a location outside and removed from any of the 
psychotherapy centres.  
Mapping: Jehona  
 
Jehona fills the middle of the page with a “huge long road,” on which she’d “landed” 
after a lengthy bus ride to the other side of London, across the river, to an area she 
had never been to before. It’s one of the many, many places her job has taken her, 
she tells me; she tries to put herself everywhere. She had been asked to come and talk 
to a community group representing women with disabilities, at an event on the 
accessibility of health and wellbeing services. She says she’s using a nice, navy blue 
coloured felt-tip, because at the time it had been so depressing that she wants to 
make it look a bit nicer. The road is empty: no people, no houses, until she 
approached an estate. She draws the outline of a block of flats with rows of empty 
windows and remembers passing this huge estate that had been really dark. She tells 
me that she knew she was in a part of Peckham but jokes that it wasn’t anything like 
the TV show “Only Fools and Horses…” Another line takes us from the right to the 
far left of the page: another bus journey. This second bus went on and on until she 
got to the stop she’d been directed to in the email she’d received from the 
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community group. Describing yet more unfamiliar streets, she tells me how anxious 
she can get in unknown places. A single arched line suggests a strange eighteenth 
century gateway that she remembers having to pass through to get to her 
destination— “oh my God it was so weird, I didn’t know where I was going!” The 
memory sets off a peel of laughter, perhaps at herself, or perhaps at the absurdity of 
where her work was taking her: the mish-mash of English clichés, and her feelings of 
fear at being a stranger in a strange place. 
 
 
Figure 4: A fragment of Jehona's map 
 
The mapping reminds me of another story Jehona told me about danger and 
laughter, about a memorable bus ride, and about the mutability of (imagined) safe 
places. She was telling me about the first time she went to Albania, after a news 
report came out about human traffickers there. It was several years after she had left 
Kosovo, where she was from, to come to England during the war in the 1990s. 
Growing up, she told me, she and her siblings had imagined Albania to be “some 
kind of paradise,” beyond the border that had always been closed off to them. She 
described, with some irony, a pastiche of green fields and prosperity that they had 
held in mind all those years. After the war, she and her brother had to go to Albania 
to identify a family member who had escaped there, only to be tortured and killed 
because he was suspected of being a spy. They had flown to Albania, taking a bus 
that went overland all the way to Kosovo, where they would visit home for the first 
time (at least for Jehona) since they’d left. It was the bus ride that stuck in her mind. 
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As they drove, she looked out of the window to find a very different place to the 
paradise she had imagined. They made a stop at a roadside café, which looked so 
bleak they didn’t want to leave the bus, but it turned out to be a stop for everyone’s 
passports to be checked. When they got out, Jehona saw a group of men holding 
Kalashnikovs— jumping out of her skin, she was about to run when her brother told 
her that these were the police. That these macho men, barely in any recognisable 
uniform, were the police here made Jehona burst out laughing, which she couldn’t 
stop even as the police talked directly to them, hearing their Kosovar accents. “It was 
the fear”, she said. “Trauma is like that sometimes, its ridiculous, it comes out in odd 
ways.” In the end, there was no real trouble and they boarded the bus, impatient to 
get out of there and across the border to Kosovo. When they did, she said, the irony 
was of course that it was Kosovo that looked like paradise to her.   
 
Perhaps safe places take on a less fixed, immutable shape, when one’s own 
experience of safety has been so fluid and changeable. Jehona’s anecdote suggests 
that sanctuary (or paradise for that matter) is made and un-made by people, things, 
invisible borders and imagined places “over there” or “back then.” That places of 
safety (one’s own home, an imagined elsewhere) can switch unexpectedly disrupts the 
notion that sanctuary is static or fixed. The irony that the place she thought would be 
idyllic turned out to be somewhere dangerous and bleak, and vice versa, takes on a 
fable-like quality if you take the point of the story to be a moral about ‘valuing home’ 
or wishing to be elsewhere. But, knowing Jehona well by this point, I didn’t take it to 
be driven by a rigid moral code, but rather, by an acknowledgement of the absurd 
and the unexpected—echoed also in her affective response to danger, somewhere 
between fear, laughter and a certain kind of contempt for having to go through it. 
Crucially, it was not so much about what “home” was to her, as it was about what it 
became in relation to the unfamiliarity and lawlessness she had seen across the 
boarder. Jehona’s intimate knowledge of what it is to find oneself disillusioned and 
fearful in the very place that one was supposed to escape to clearly shaped the way 
she related to refugee women. It added legitimacy to how and why she wanted to 
make psychotherapy available to refugees and other migrant communities. But it was 
also what made her the “one-man-band” she always spoke about, creating a certain 
level of detachment from the centre, and the containment and safety that it 
promised.  
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Conclusions: An ongoing paradox 
 
In this chapter, I have described the making and re-making of “sanctuary” through 
different processes and spatial practices in the context of one of my field sites. I 
describe this being enacted through deeply political processes, which are concerned 
with, on the one hand, inclusion and diversity, and on the other, safety and 
preservation. All of these qualities could be said to “define” sanctuary, but my 
analysis has been informed by the idea that objects are defined by processes (Stenner 
2014). As such, I have presented ethnographic material that animates three different 
processes, all of which have threatened the centre as a place of sanctuary: 
encroachment, dilution and fragmentation. Taken together, these processes create a 
story of constant gathering and dispersal: an inevitability, perhaps, but one which I 
saw as creating ongoing tensions and a painful sense of imminent failure. I have 
identified this as a paradox in the enactment of sanctuary—at least in this particular 
case. Enacting qualities of safety, interiority and inclusion made the external threats 
and pressures of the outside (mainstream psychotherapy services, financial pressure, 
compromised professional practice, and even particular groups of clients themselves) 
all the more present. This harks back to the metaphor I invoked in the introduction 
to this chapter, that of a lifeboat always being defined by processes of disaster and 
rescue.  
 
Throughout the chapter, I used the somewhat antagonistic figure of Jehona to 
explore some of these tensions. In the last section, however, I used her story to 
suggest an alternative to the other processes I make visible here. Concepts of fluidity 
and mutability (De Laet and Mol 2000; Law and Mol 1995) helped me to analyse 
different, potentially radical approaches at play in this setting, although they never 
quite provide a solution to the paradox previously described. I also introduce the 
possibility of a more relational understanding of place, which emerges as an 
important theme in the rest of this thesis. But, crucially, I want to leave this problem 
unresolved, to pay due attention to the paradoxes that ran through the creation of 
sanctuary in this context, as well as the challenging (near impossible) nature of the 
task. Finally, I want to point to the inherently precarious nature of these places and the 
practices of inclusion that define them, which will be my focus for the next chapter. 
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Chapter 6: Placing Precarity 
Migration  
As it stands now, early on in my fieldwork, the therapy centre I call Culture in Mind 
operates from a tiny, solid building, squashed in between an express supermarket 
and a Lebanese café, whose tables and chairs spill onto the pavement outside. It is so 
close to the bus, train and underground station that you can hear the tannoy 
announcements from behind the frosted glass that separates the inside of the centre 
from the street. Today, unusually, I stand amongst the fumes of the buses with Miles, 
the director of the organisation and two more of its staff members. It is a peculiarly 
hot September day and although the air is soupy and close, it is good to take a break 
from the windowless therapy centre. We have had the fire escape propped open at 
the back of the building but there’s no through draught because the front door must 
only be opened to let clients in via the security buzzer (as the sign makes clear: “By 
appointment only, please use the bell to enter”). We will be catching the bus about a 
mile and a half west from where we are now, to the site that is soon to become the 
new home of the centre. We want to see how the building work is going and “get a 
feel for the journey”: K, who is the clinical manager and Semret, a community 
therapist, will be responsible for much of the relocating of staff and volunteers, and, 
crucially, ensuring that service users who may be half-way through therapy courses 
when the move takes place do not get lost and put off coming to the new site. The 
number 477 rumbles up next to us and we traipse up the stairs. We sit in two pairs of 
seats at the front of the bus and I read out the time on my phone so we can time the 
journey; it’s twenty-six minutes past two. 
 
As the double-decker rattles along from one side of the borough to the other, the 
conversation turns to what the clients might make of the new centre. Miles, in 
particular, has high hopes for this, although everyone is apprehensive about how the 
clients and staff will cope with the move itself. They have known for some time now 
that they would not be able to stay in the current building for long; the rent is being 
hiked to almost double what it is now, and everyone agrees that—even if they had 
raised the money to keep up with the higher rent—it wouldn’t have been worth it to 
stay. For one thing, the lack of windows doesn’t just mean the centre gets stuffy on 
hot days; the therapists have been saying for years that the windowless rooms are 
unacceptable, given that it is not unusual for their clients to have been incarcerated, 
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interrogated, or even tortured at some point in their past. The two therapists talk 
about their excitement at seeing the light and space of the new site, and Miles 
reminds them once more that they will find a window in every therapy room there.  
 
The bus climbs the slight incline of a hill and we imagine what the journey would be 
like for clients who may want to walk to the centre from the main bus station or 
neighbourhood we would be leaving (and where many of the clients live). Then K 
steers the conversation onto a particular concern that had been circulating amongst 
the staff earlier that morning: she is worried about the doors to each of the therapy 
rooms. Some time ago, Miles had passed on her message to the builders that on no 
account should the doors be completely solid with no way of seeing in and out. It is a 
safeguarding issue, she had explained to him. When you work with vulnerable 
people in closed-off spaces, a third party needs to be able to sensitively look in to 
what is happening, without disturbing the client’s sense of safety or privacy. 
Everyone had understood this: so far, so good. But the solution that builders 
proposed over the phone just before we left today made her certain she needed to 
come and talk to them herself: “We can’t have spyholes!” K reiterates to Miles, hand 
on the metal bar on the seat in front of her, looking fierce. “People will feel as though 
they are in an interrogation room—it will remind them of surveillance, it’ll create an 
atmosphere of suspicion.” Miles responds with a fervent combination of nodding and 
shaking his head, “Yes, no, no we won’t let that happen. We’ll talk to them today. K 
is reassured that the builders will be put off the easier option of inserting small 
peepholes in each door and commit to building in a window panel in each one 
instead. Nevertheless, she continues to remind him that many people in their client 
group have lived through political situations characterised by suspicion and paranoia. 
The space must be a therapeutic one; she cannot have it making them feel unsafe. 
 
The bus stops in leafier, more residential environs than we have just come from and 
we disembark onto a quiet street, following Miles up the hill and into a small mews. 
He explains that you can also walk a different way up to the mews and we all note 
that both routes could easily be missed— we would need a sign. We walk into a car 
park surrounded by a small complex of non-residential 70s-style buildings with big 
semi-circular windows and lots of beige brick. We enter a lobby area and stairwell 
with thick black bannisters and curved door handles. There is lots of building 
equipment being stored in here now but we are told that, happily, the people from 
the offices upstairs are going to let us use this lobby area as a waiting room, even 
though the space is not officially on the lease. Opening a second set of doors, into 
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what will become the clinic space, we are hit by a wall of deliciously cool air-
conditioning, and a strong smell of gloss paint. Before I shake the hand of the site 
manager, who will show us the newly partitioned therapy rooms and their famous 
windows, I check the time on my phone again: it is a quarter to three. 
 
In both the doing and writing-up of this short journey, I had a strong sense that there 
were several transition stories operating at different scales, all collapsing in on this 20-
minute period of movement. We were moving through the city ourselves, the bus 
taking us outside of the centre and our usual day-to-day work. But we were also 
simulating the journey that the clients might make to the new therapy centre, trying 
to get a sense of what it might be like doing this for the first time (an experience we 
knew would quickly become obscured by our own routines of coming to work—or 
fieldwork). Then there were the logistics (and the politics) of the organisational move, 
which was occupying our minds and most of the conversation; and finally, the spectre 
of transnational migration, of seeking refuge from anonymous interrogation rooms or 
institutional settings in faraway places, as well as those of authorities in the UK.  
 
Unlike the centre I described in the previous chapter, which went through a 
particular transformation to reach out to minorities, through their work with migrant 
women, this psychotherapy service has always been aimed specifically towards ethnic 
and cultural minorities. Many of this “client group” had lived in the communities the 
centre serves for their whole lives (for some, their parents and grandparents too). But 
then there were the newer migrants and immigrants, many of whom were refugees or 
seeking asylum in the UK. This heterogeneity spoke to the lives and the work of my 
bus companions, all of whom had their own (very different) migration stories, and 
had spent much of their working lives listening to those of others. As I have described 
in chapter 2 of this thesis, vulnerable migrants have become a great mobiliser of 
resources (particularly in non-state sectors), and the notion of precarity has become a 
key part of the vernacular to describe conditions of uncertainty, instability and 
placeless-ness. Having difficult, limited or non-existent access to health and mental 
health services is now often associated with these precarious lives. And so, what with 
the organisation having to move (itself being threatened with placeless-ness), there 
seemed to be a strange, and unfair mirroring of precarious lives, in these precarious places. 
This was articulated in the conversation I had with K, which I describe in chapter 3, 
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about how when she first stepped into the centre, she felt the building was reflecting 
the lives of the people it served. It is also something that has been noted in the 
literature on voluntary provision of care in the UK: associating “marginalised 
services… for socially marginalised people” (Johnsen, Cloke, and May 2005, 334).   
 
Chapter overview 
 
In this chapter, I seek to problematise the idea that precarious lives and precarious 
places are pre-existent entities that echo one another in voluntary sector mental 
health care. Instead I ask how practices of inclusion and access may, paradoxically, 
enact precarious places, and equally, how places might participate in the making of 
precarious lives. And so, even as resources are mobilised to create places specifically 
aimed towards creating access to care, there is a reproduction of uncertainty, 
instability and the transitory nature of events. Broadly speaking, the first part of the 
chapter deals with the process and practices of place-making (how are places made, 
for whom, and according to what values) and the second part focuses on how places 
enact a particular kind of “precarious belonging.” I will do this through drawing on 
events, practices and moments of (service user) access that unfolded after the physical 
dislocation of the centre. Ultimately, I argue that precarity is (re)produced, not only 
by being out-of-place but by being in and a part of certain places at the margins of 
mental health care. I raise questions on what this means for logics of including the 
excluded, and how needs become legitimate in voluntary settings. 
 
Belonging, in-between 
 
Well, historically working with refugees, you know, a refugee comes from many 
places you know, it changes. I think our place is in-between—you know, the place in 
between–not really belonging to one or other but actually bringing together from 
one and other to make it as whole. 
 
Here, one of the longest-standing members of staff at Culture in Mind, was 
explaining to me why she thought that the organisation was “like a home” for the 
therapists as well as the clients. For her, it was not a place for any particular group, 
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but rather for accommodating difference and non-belonging. And so it seemed that 
the conditions for belonging here were not what you might expect, centring less 
around singularity, familiarity and static-ness; and more on difference, mobility, and 
“between-ness.” In this section, I chart the background to this particular approach to 
inclusion, and its relevance to improving access to care, as well as some of the 
material practices that went into performing these values in the process of place-
making after the move I started to describe in the vignette above. 
 
Part of what underpinned these values of belonging and being “in-between” was the 
fact that the service users and service providers could not be clearly delineated 
according to defining features such as cultural background, migration history or 
immigration status. The therapists, staff and volunteers all identified as coming from 
different ethnic or cultural minorities, and many were first generation migrants or 
refugees.38 Indeed, the reason that K had been so appalled by the idea of installing 
spyholes to the therapy room doors, was that she had first-hand experience of living 
through an oppressive and heavily policed society; one in which she eventually fled as 
a political refugee. And as the service provided specialised care to migrants and 
refugees, values of safety, belonging and being welcome were given primacy. 
Crucially, however, “belonging” has not historically been something associated with 
psychotherapy settings (or mental health care more broadly) especially for those who 
do not fit the traditional moneyed, white, middle class, and (in the UK) English-
speaking archetype. Exclusion and unequal access to such services had always been a 
driver of the work in this centre. And so these were dynamics that I had been told 
about as historically important to the establishment of the centre and in the 
biographical contexts of therapists’ lives, but I was also interested in the ways these 
 
38 What this meant in mainstream healthcare contexts came out through anecdotes I was told from 
therapists who had in the past, for example, been daunted by beginning their psychotherapy careers 
working in an exclusively white working class area with supervision from older white men and no one 
to talk to about “difference,” or another who had been appalled at the racism of fellow students in a 
clinical psychology training course (“oh you’re from Iran— that’s where everyone has sex with goats, 
isn’t it?”), or simply the experience of feeling pressure to work in the NHS to feel like “more of a 
citizen” instead of a refugee. 
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values played out in the spatial practices and arrangements of everyday life at the 
centre, and particularly during the unfolding of the move. 
 
It is the first working day in the new centre: boxes of files and books are being 
emptied onto shelves, the smell of paint lingers in the air. Fabeha, the office 
manager, has been here all weekend; she has her head down, sorting through clinical 
notes, and K is project managing. I am quickly enlisted to join her upstairs where she 
has learned that there is a whole floor of office furniture, which no one seems to be 
using. Apparently the service can use it, at least for the time being, which is handy as 
the existing furniture suddenly seems smaller here, and there is a lot more space to 
fill. I join her upstairs and we size up some bookshelves and various sized chairs. As 
we carry the bookcase down, bit-by-bit, I ask her about what, in her experience, 
makes a place ‘therapeutic.’ 
 “Well,” she starts, “if you were to follow strict Freudian approach, you’d have 
everything very neutral, so people can have their own fantasies, not get distracted, 
you know? So just the chair and a lamp. No pictures. But the clients we have, they 
have had traumatic experiences, and so we always make it look more colourful, you 
know, with pictures and bits and bobs.”  
The bookshelves are going to be good for storing some of the trinkets and statues I 
remember blurrily from the last place (the kinds of things that quickly fade from 
memory once they are moved off the shelf they have been on forever), and of course 
the many books on psychology, sociology, psychotherapy, counselling and 
anthropology. 
 
I realise when we come back into the clinic space that we have all been whispering to 
each other. Everyone is shocked about how the sound of our voices echoes through 
the space, and soon we figure out it is because there are no soft furnishings and we 
have nothing on the walls yet. The walls are indeed very white and very bare right 
now, and so after the team meeting that afternoon K asks which of us is “artistic.” 
She wants someone to hang the pictures and wall hangings that have come with us 
from the old place, to make it all look “a bit less clinical.” I volunteer, and start 
unpacking the boxes of framed paintings and prints. I prop up the collection of 
framed images against one of the glass partition walls, dusting them off and 
wondering where they all came from. They loosely represent different cultures from 
around the world, and the only instruction I have is that I must not put all the art 
from one place in a single room (we can’t have a room that looks like “The African 
Room,” for example, because people might feel pigeon-holed). Earnestly, I follow 
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her guidance, making sure I mix and match the images: the African milkmaids here, 
the Indian silkscreen there, the colourful abstract canvases in the meeting room… 
 
Slowly (and true to their commitment to cultivating a sense of belonging), the staff 
worked to make the place as homely as they could with effectively no budget; 
everyone brought in pot plants, for example, and we built up the kitchen supplies as 
every week a different pair would cook for everyone (bowls, seasonings, and a healthy 
supply of leftovers quickly accumulated over time). In those early weeks, when 
everything was so new and our surroundings so present and visible, there was much 
talk about which images should go where, which parts of the clinic should be open or 
closed, and in this way, questions of inclusion and difference came to be discussed 
through these mundane material practices. Crucially, values of accessibility, inclusion 
and belonging were not givens; they had to be made and re-made, partly through the 
creation of this “place in between.”  
 
Precarious places 
 
The irony of all of this is that all this place-making was going on in the context of 
great threat to the organisation and their “not belonging” in the rapidly gentrifying 
area they had previously occupied. I have been describing how the move itself, and 
the events that unfolded in the weeks thereafter, made visible certain values held by 
staff members about making people feel they belong, “against the odds.” But as well 
as being a genuine enactment of these values, the move also made visible the 
precarious status of the places from which this service and others like it were being 
provided. It was something I would go on to see play out in various ways across 
small, community based services in rapidly changing urban areas like this one; a 
feature of the transitory, unstable nature of voluntary sector providers, which 
increasingly must be movable and ‘adaptable’ to changes in what they can afford and 
are expected to do. In the current system of commissioning clinical services in the 
UK, charities only get funding for providing the care (in this case, short courses of 
psychotherapy) and not for what are called “core costs,” such as the rent and energy 
costs needed to maintain a physical building. These were the politics and processes 
that formed the backdrop to the move and all the hard work that was going into it. 
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They also put serious constraints on the extent to which values of accessibility, 
inclusion and belonging could be brought into being, particularly in moments when 
clients encountered the centre for the first time. 
 
Eve was one of the clients who moved with the service as she was part-way through 
her six-session course of therapy when the move took place. She had decided not to 
take up the full twelve sessions her therapist offered her, partly because the new site 
was that bit further from her place of work, and she’d already had to leave an hour 
and a half early in order to make it to her sessions at the end of the day. It was in this 
place of work that we met for our second interview. Eve had self-referred to the 
service, she told me, to give therapy another go: she had tried somewhere once 
before but stopped going because (as she put it), it had opened up a lot of doors to 
places in herself that she had not been prepared to go to at the time. She sought help 
this time because of a certain kind of “burden” she had started to feel in her body; a 
heaviness, which brought with it several bodily symptoms that she recognised as her 
body trying to process a particular violent event from her past, which her mind had 
not been able to. She had liked the centre, and particularly her therapist, when she 
first accessed the service, but when I asked her to think about the new place, her 
reaction was visceral:   
“As soon as I got there, the first thing I said to [my therapist] was, I don’t like this. 
First of all, why is it so white? I was like, I don’t understand. It’s huge! The rooms are 
huge, everything echoes and I was like, I don’t like it.” Much of Eve’s mapping did 
the work of retracing and retelling this sense of exposure. 
Mapping: Eve  
 
24th January 2017 
In an administrative office at the hospital where Eve works 
   
With hasty, feathered pencil marks on the far left-hand side of the page, Eve draws 
the driveway she remembers having to walk up before she encountered the outside of 
the building. Moving from left to right, she draws a quick wiggle for the steps you go 
up and then the set of glass doors: breaking with her birds-eye view perspective, 
these are drawn as she would have seen them face-on, oblong and divided with a 
severe line down the middle. Although she wasn’t in any way secretive about being 
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there, she tells me, she can’t help but notice how exposed you are, even when you 
are supposedly inside.  “Even a stranger walking by could see you in the waiting 
room”.  The waiting room itself is less of a bounded area than an empty space  (“just 
this huge… BIT”) with sketches of furniture dotted around, such as a small sofa and 
the table with all of the leaflets on it. The door to the clinical area is drawn as one 
might mark on a floor-plan, or a symbolise a switch on an electrical circuit: it can be 
open or closed. Eve remembers how the receptionist comes to get you once you’ve 
buzzed, but then shuts the door again so you have to wait in the waiting area.  Once 
you do get in, Eve recalls, there is no front desk, just more open space. Her gestures 
become increasingly animated and large as she sweeps the pencil across the page in 
annoyance. She depicts the open plan-style work space and the therapy rooms 
opening up at the edges; at first there is a faint line dividing up the area where the 
staff work at the computers, and the entrances to the therapy rooms, but she hastily 
rubs it out with the eraser on the end of her pencil. She says she doesn’t want a line 
there, to show that it doesn’t feel like there is any separation between her and the rest 
of the centre, “a lot of people don’t like open spaces when they’re talking about 
something that’s quite personal to them” she explains, “and when something’s quite 
big and quite noisy and echoey you kind of feel like you’re being overshadowed.” 
Figure 5: A fragment of Eve's map 
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So much of what Eve conveyed through the making of this image, and her oral 
narration, related to her embodied sense of the space and how sounds filled and 
travelled through the building and rooms. Her feeling of being dwarfed, exposed and 
overshadowed in the more public spaces of the new centre was strangely inverted 
later on, when she got into the therapy room, where she was more concerned about 
how loud and big she might be in the minimal room with thin walls. If she could hear 
the people outside, she thought they would certainly be able to hear her whole story, 
especially given her loud voice. Thinking about how voices so easily spill out into the 
rest of the centre, unbounded by the glass partitions, had made her yearn for the 
solidness of the old place.  
 
Eve’s account produced a version of the place that contained many traces of the wider 
constraints and conditions of the move: the underlying precarity of it all. It was by no 
means representative of a generalised “service user experience” (some were equally 
disconcerted by the new place, others actually liked the whiter, lighter space, and still 
others hardly commented on it) but it did perform a very different kind of place than 
the staff had been making, or hoping to make, through the practices I have been 
describing above. Eve’s version of the place did not come as a surprise to me, and nor 
do I think it would have been a surprise to the therapists: there were many moments 
when the constraints to their work became painfully obvious. Recall the worries 
about the white walls, the lack of furniture and the way in which the voices travelled 
through the flimsy partition walls separating the therapy rooms from the communal 
space. But crucially, these problems and constraints were most visible immediately 
after the move and, for the staff, soon started to disappear from view. A white-noise 
machine was installed to mask the seeping voices, and although nobody found it to 
be completely effective, the worries and frustrated whispering between staff seemed 
to subside with time.  Similarly, concerns that the open-plan work-space would make 
them feel too exposed was temporarily solved with the low bookcase borrowed from 
the offices upstairs. The place wasn’t always precarious, or inherently precarious but 
became that way at moments of transition and newness, and the practices that unfolded 
in these moments. 
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The waiting room 
 
It is a quarter to three. As the time creeps closer to the hour, people will filter into 
the waiting room and—if they know how it works—ring the small electronic buzzer 
to tell the person on reception they are there. The door will open, they will be 
greeted and told to sit down, and then the door will close again. Then they have to 
wait for their therapist to fetch them and bring them to their room. Right now, there 
is just one man sitting in the room, opposite me. He is on the set of sky blue chairs, 
which are new additions to the space (last time I was here, there were only the two 
rows of upright metal-framed chairs with minimal padding on the seats and backs, 
clad in yellow plastic). He holds his phone loosely in his hand, half-heartedly 
scrolling and scrolling; he has the other arm’s elbow resting on the arm of the chair, 
leaning back with one leg out straighter in front of him than the other. I am in here 
to observe how people are responding to the new TV screen that has been wheeled 
in here, set on a slide-show. The text, that changes once every minute or so, is a 
series of poems in different languages, with translations into English, or vice versa. 
The man has his back to the screen. I glance up at it and start reading one of them, 
and at some point he notices, giving a small start and abruptly craning round to look 
at the screen. Tentatively, I ask him what he thinks. He apologises unnecessarily and 
turns his whole body to face the screen, attending to the poem earnestly. It is in 
Arabic and the man, who tells me he is Iraqi, reads it swiftly alongside the English 
translation. In unfaltering English, he tells me it is a good translation and we chat a 
while about the next one—an Urdu poem of which he can only pick up the odd 
word. By now, another person has joined us: a man, a little older than the one I am 
talking to. He perches on one of the yellow chairs with his elbows on his knees, and 
glances up at the clock and down again. It’s only a few minutes to the hour so he 
won’t be here for long. At one minute past the hour, a third person pushes the door 
open. She is a big woman, and is breathing hard as she pulls open the glass door and 
takes a laboured step up onto the doormat. She presses the bell immediately but as 
the receptionist goes to fetch the woman’s therapist, she stands back and watches the 
screen from across the room. There is just enough time for her to skim the poem—
an English one with a Hindi translation—and catch her breath. Her therapist opens 
the door and greets her warmly; they disappear inside. One by one, they all filter out 
of the lobby and into the clinic. 
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I had been interested in this waiting room space from the first time we came to the 
site, when Miles had told me with relief that they had been able to secure what had 
been the lobby for their floor of the building and the one above as a waiting area, for 
no extra rent. It meant that they could have more clinical and office space and gave 
the clients somewhere informal to sit before they came in for their sessions. Because 
the organisation did not own the space, it remained undecorated, keeping its 
seventies-style brown carpet, and brown wooden doors. As the cliché of liminal 
spaces goes, it did indeed resemble something of a hotel lobby.39  
 
The strange thing was, this place had surprisingly little to do with waiting. Clients 
had their appointments of fifty minutes, which never overran, meaning that (unlike in 
a hospital or doctor’s surgery) their therapists were always waiting for them, if and 
when they turned up, on the hour. It wasn’t until I had a particular encounter did I 
come to realise this: a woman who didn’t filter into the clinic space when everyone 
else did. Sitting with her hands in her lap, in an embroidered black dress with a 
sequin pattern down the front, and a hijab, she wasn’t holding a phone—as people 
normally seem to for distraction if they’re not filling in forms—or any other reading 
material. We started talking and I learned her husband took her to the centre over an 
hour and a half before her session every week, because a gunshot wound to her leg 
(sustained some twenty-five years ago) made it too hard for her to walk or take public 
transport to the centre. She would also have to wait until he finished work for him to 
collect her. Amidst all that I gleaned about this woman’s dramatic life story in 
Somalia, what made her exceptional was something much more mundane: that here, 
in this small waiting room in London, she was the only one who was really waiting. 
The gathering and filtering out of people every hour, just before the hour, was much 
more of a spatial gathering of people than a matter of temporal stuck-ness. All of that 
kind of waiting happened off site (and out of sight), when people were stuck on 
waiting lists until contracts were renewed and an appropriate therapist became 
available. The waiting room was a place to momentarily hold clients on the threshold 
of the main clinical space, more than it was where people would experience long 
 
39 Places designed only for waiting have captured the attention of those interested in healthcare spaces 
(Buse and Twigg 2014, for example) and the cultural archetype of the hotel lobby has been drawn 
upon to highlight the strange liminality of these sites (Tallack 2002, cited in Buse and Twigg, 2014). 
 138 
waiting times. The quietly patient Somali woman I met was the only one who was 
there throughout the gathering and dispersal on each hour. 
 
So the waiting room was a threshold, a place to get “stuck” in, if only briefly. 
Crucially, though, it was a place where only service users got stuck; the staff (and 
myself) held a four-digit code in our memories, which we could punch into the 
keypad and then pass through the door into the clinic space whenever we pleased. 
And so being stuck at this threshold, in a microcosm of “waiting for access,” echoed 
the migration experience, but it did so only for some people (the clients) who were indeed 
accessing the service for psychotherapeutic care. Pushing this idea yet further, you 
could say that the service providers, who had to move location and set up shop 
elsewhere, were “migrant” only for one moment, whereas the service users, who have 
to move through and get stuck in this space every week, are made “migrant” every time 
anew.  In the remainder of this chapter, I visit the waiting rooms of two women, 
whom I call Mariam and Dayo, both of whom produced visual maps that focused 
intensely on the material and spatial elements of this part of the centre in their 
moments of access, and whose experiences of being made migrant contrasted 
significantly.  
 
Precarious belonging  
 
I met up with Mariam, a client I had met some weeks before, to talk to her more 
about when she first accessed the service. Because she lived a long way from the 
centre, I’d offered to travel to her for an interview, but she’d quickly refused, saying 
she did not want me to visit her home. Although she had moved out of the temporary 
accommodation she’d been in when I first met her, the house that the council offered 
her had a severe damp problem and leaked from the roof. Despite all of this, 
Mariam—originally from Eritrea—was glad she came to the UK, where she claimed 
asylum status two years ago. She had been trafficked across the Middle East by her 
ex-husband’s family after leaving Ethiopia where she grew up, believing she was 
going abroad for the opportunity to study. This time had been intensely violent, 
leaving her with complicated health problems. She was often unable to sleep and at 
times she was overwhelmed with sadness, though she didn’t want to take medication 
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for either of these things, which was one of the reasons she was referred to this centre 
for talking therapy. In the end, we met back in the centre, in one of the therapy 
rooms, under a tall plastic lamp, separated by a low table, from which I’d cleared the 
customary box of tissues and ticking Ikea clock.  
Mapping: Mariam (‘imprisoned’ on the threshold) 
 
18th January 2017 
The meeting room at the centre 
 
Mariam has finished drawing her map and we are talking about some of the things it 
has brought up. She is pointing to the part with her birds-eye view of the waiting 
room: four walls, a table, a chair standing on its own and a big cross in the middle, 
which shows that here, “you don’t have nothing”. She has drawn the place swiftly, 
impatiently, with on-going commentary about her discomfort at its sparseness. The 
last part she drew was the inside door, the “secretive” one, leading into the reception 
and clinical part of the centre, with an oversized blob next to it: the buzzer, which 
acted like a security guard, stopping one from leaving the waiting room until called. 
It was this that made the waiting room feel like a prison for Mariam. She tells me 
that she can never relax whilst she is waiting to be called in. She had drawn this area 
in yellow, because “yellow means emergency.” 
Having set out a particular place within the centre, Mariam now begins to bring 
herself into the scene in real time.  
“Here, it is…” She looks sideways suspiciously as though at other clients in the 
waiting room. Again, she points to the map—to the wall where the rest of the seating 
is—setting the scene of two other people sitting there looking at her. Then she takes 
on the role of one of these women, looking back suspiciously whispering 
incoherently: “sschp sschp sschp!” and then, “she’s… I think she’s—” Mariam does 
the face of the suspicious woman, suddenly shocked, scared of something, and then 
bursts into laugher at the thought of this before going back into role. Now, the 
suspicious woman is looking across the waiting room at Mariam again murmuring: 
“is she working here? No? Then why is she coming here? What’s her problem?” 
There is a comical back-and-forth of Mariam playing the two women trying to suss 
each other out by looking at the other, then quickly turning their heads away. Then 
she does the suspicious woman saying louder, “Why are you looking at me? Are you 
going to beat me?!” and then, with a sharp intake of breath, Mariam is herself again, 
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telling me with a laugh that this goes on until suddenly the door opens and she is 
called in. Only then she can finally leave this strange, tense encounter.  
 
Figure 6: A fragment of Mariam's map (the waiting room) 
This one-woman role-play that sprung up out of the mapping showed vividly the 
interactions between Mariam, the other clients and material aspects of the waiting 
room itself. She had made the comparison between the waiting room and a prison to 
me before, but her mapping out of the experience of waiting here enlivened the 
otherwise fairly generic metaphor, showing how specific ‘things’ (and a lack of things) 
had participated in this experience and evoked such a powerful and enduring 
association. She didn’t blame the other women who had seen her and been 
suspicious of her invisible but potentially frightening, or even dangerous, 
psychological issues. In fact, she later tells me that they are “just like her, and [she is] 
just like them”. But it is not just that the women were performing these subjectivities 
in a shared social space, the place itself—the waiting room—was entangled in the 
experience.  It was the door with the buzzer that trapped them in there together (there 
was no ‘real’ security guard in its place) and the big open space in front of them failed 
to provide distraction or a buffer from the suspicious looks shooting between the 
chairs backed up against the walls. The lack of social cues and activities to occupy 
oneself with (making it unclear even who is a client and who works here) are 
characteristic of liminal places, designed only to wait in. It was also of course down to 
the fact that the centre had only recently relocated (a transition in itself) and there 
simply was not very much to soften or fill this empty area between the clinical space 
and the outside. Indeed, Mariam’s sense of uncertainty and vulnerability was bound 
up with this particular liminal place, as she described an entirely different feeling when 
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she was buzzed into the main space and joined her therapist, with whom she felt 
extremely safe and at ease.  
 
Multiple and sometimes contradictory forms and metaphors emerged through the 
mapping of places, objects and spatial practices within one centre. Where Mariam 
conjured the up the image of a prison, Dayo, another young woman who accessed 
the service, talked of the centre as being a kind of sanctuary. This of course echoes 
the notion that was valued, though problematized in several ways, by both service 
users and providers in the previous chapter. Dayo’s problem, in this setting, was that 
she didn’t feel like it was her sanctuary. When I first met her, whilst she was still 
coming to the centre for sessions, she had been angry and frustrated with her whole 
experience of accessing psychotherapy, for lots of reasons but particularly because of 
the excruciatingly long wait and multiple assessments she had had to go through 
(mainly with her local IAPT service) between presenting at her GP and even getting 
through the doors of this particular centre. After the months she spent waiting for 
support—a period she called “being in a black hole”—she had found it hard to feel 
like anyone was on her side, even once she had started her sessions.  
 
When we met again for another interview some weeks later, she was still resentful of 
what she had been through, but the anger had dissipated. She took me to a café in a 
corporate hotel near her house, with a plug socket next to every table for laptops, and 
a station for adding extra cinnamon or soya milk to your coffee. Reflecting on how 
the centre had appeared to her, she talked of it being a kind of sanctuary for people 
from different backgrounds and cultures. But Dayo, originally from Nigeria but 
completely at home in the UK, had always had a strong sense of being in the wrong 
place here in this ‘intercultural’ therapy centre. Her migration story was one of 
regular international travel with her father’s company when she was growing up 
between Africa, Europe and America, before settling in the UK for a career in 
investment banking, which she’d recently been signed off from with chronic illness 
and severe depression. Was this the life of a vulnerable migrant? How vulnerable 
even was she, really? These were questions that Dayo herself was constantly 
preoccupied with during her time at the centre.  
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Mapping: Dayo (being in the wrong place)  
 
24th January,  2017 
A Holiday Inn cafe close to Dayo’s flat   
 
Dayo draws out three sections in broad felt-tip strokes, before choosing the middle 
section to work in. This is her waiting room. The space rapidly fills with illustrations 
of objects and spatial features of the room, which she narrates as she goes. On top of 
the outline of the table appears a box of tissues, a jug and a cup. She says hollowly 
that this had been hilarious to her: “the classic waiting room, with the water and the 
tissues. ‘Get crying’”…the objects seemed to have been saying to her. Apparently, 
these items had appeared cartoonish to her even in ‘real life,’ before she had 
transformed them into two-dimensional motifs on the page. She had produced an 
image of them as stereotypes as soon as she walked into the room, and, quick off the 
mark, mocked them rather than fall into role as another stereotype: the vulnerable 
patient. But the pressure was on, because they weren’t just there to be looked at, or 
even used if needed. They were interacting with her, expecting (demanding?) 
something of her: to be vulnerable, to “get crying.” She moves on quickly to drawing 
the posters that she had seen on the walls, placing them full frontally towards us in 
the middle of the page. One has squiggles on that could be writing but we can’t read 
it because, she tells me, it’s supposed to represent a language she doesn’t understand. 
The multi-lingual signage, which the centre is careful to display in order to 
communicate with as many of their client group as possible, had made her think the 
centre must be for women who were in the UK but dealing with issues from their 
own culture, a different culture. For the first time of many, Dayo quotes the line that 
had been going round and round her head: “Why am I here??” The other poster has 
a big ‘CALL 999’ on it and a picture of a telephone, which she later colours in red to 
explain the sense of alarm it had given off. How vulnerable was she, really? She felt 
sure that her therapist would think: “what have you got to worry about? Get out of 
here!”  
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Figure 7: A fragment of Dayo's map (the waiting room) 
Paradoxically, then, Dayo did feel she occupied a precarious position here; her not 
being vulnerable enough made her undeserving of care here—or so she felt. Whilst she 
believed the place was supposed to be a “sanctuary,” she felt like an outsider and an 
imposter. Not only did she feel like she didn’t really belong, or want to belong there, 
she almost felt she would be expected to leave. Her vulnerabilities were hidden under 
a layer of perceived un-neediness and un-deservedness compared to the imagined 
group the service was really for. No one had told her this, but it was what she had 
taken from her surroundings. The things in the room were making her aware of her 
feeling of being in the wrong place. This is not to say that the tissues and water were to 
blame for Dayo’s insecurities about belonging and deserving care, but in the 
moments of physically accessing of the service, these objects were enlivened by the 
dynamics at play between a particular person entering into a particular space. 
Although very different to Mariam’s story, I see parallels in the way that this waiting 
room space became an active medium in producing their experiences of accessing 
care. What characterised such experiences was not straightforward belonging or 
exclusion but a sense of precarious belonging, experienced in place.   
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Conclusions: Precarious places, precarious lives 
 
This chapter has exploited a moment of transition (the displacement of the service 
from one location to another) to explore themes of precarity and displacement 
operating at different scales. I charted an uncomfortable sense, amongst some of the 
providers, that the service itself reflected the problems of the people it was serving. 
However, my analysis has suggested that the relationship between places and 
precarious lives is much more than a metaphor, or an unfortunate coincidence. I 
showed how a sense of precarity comes into being through encounters with place: in 
particular during moments of access and moments of transition. Attention to the 
entanglements of small moves and big moves, and to the stories of client-service 
encounters at particular moments of access has added detail and texture to how places 
are made, and how they make up experiences.  
 
My argument, then, has disrupted the idea that precarious lives and places are pre-
existent entities. Place-making practices were all centred on values of accessibility, 
inclusion and belonging, but these were constrained by the material conditions and 
politics of being a third sector organisation, itself excluded in lots of ways (from 
orthodox psychotherapy; from the security of state-funded services; or from the 
neighbourhood whose rent prices were too high). For some people, and especially at 
particular moments of access and transition, this made the centre a precarious place. 
Secondly, material and spatial aspects of the centre played into the transitory, 
uncertain, vulnerable experiences of people who encountered it. I saw people 
become more and less aware of the “surfaces” (doors, spyholes, flimsy/ leaky walls) of 
places, depending on the level of newness, (in)stability or (un)certainty of moments or 
encounters.40 This enacted what I described as precarious belonging. This analysis of 
place and precarity is one of co-production of the social and the material world, 
which I will carry through into the next part of this thesis.  
 
 
40 This can be thought of in a similar way to how Ahmed (2004) has written about pain and awareness 
of the body. Bodies, she argues, cannot simply appear or disappear, but rather, we can be more or less 
aware of their surfaces, depending on the intensity of our bodily experiences.  
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PART TWO: NEED 
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Interlude: “We need to talk”  
 
Following the previous three place-based chapters, this interlude seeks to help me 
push the boundaries of my analysis beyond discrete spatial locations. I look to a more 
dynamic and multiple understanding of the places and spaces in which I situate my 
next two chapters on mental health “need.” In making this shift, at the juncture 
between the two ethnographic parts of the thesis, I perform the idea that I introduced 
towards the end of Chapter 2: of moving from place to milieu. Without repeating all 
the theoretical motivations for such a move, I do want to come back to the central 
ideas I revitalise from previous work on the milieu and talk about how they will shape 
my ethnographic exploration of need. First, and perhaps most importantly, a vitalist 
notion of milieu is consistent with what I have spoken about in Part One (for 
example, the social practices of making and re-making of place) but it tackles the 
problem of individual need within this. This is important because the mental health 
needs of individual person are pivotal to the questions and concerns I go on to 
explore in the second part of the thesis. Secondly, I move from ideas about relations 
between inside and outside to a much more contingent and distributed way of 
thinking about centres and peripheries, which allows me to shift to different scales of 
the care system. Finally, I think about milieu not as geographical space but a 
relational space through which need emerges, both as it is lived and felt, and as it 
comes to be known.  
 
True to the vitalist commitment to putting the living being at the centre of its own 
milieu, I also seek to briefly place myself in the psychotherapeutic space in this 
Interlude. In doing so, I give an account of a self-reflexive endeavour, which was, in 
one sense at least, something of a failure. Through my description of this failure to 
make my own need known in a private psychotherapeutic assessment, I hope to 
provide a starting point for thinking through how need comes into being, how it 
comes to be known, and what it does across different psychotherapeutic settings and 
moments in time. Inspired by questions that arose during this episode, I go on to 
chart recent historical developments that tell us something about the changing 
constructions of “need” in UK mental health care. Whilst I do not claim to provide a 
genealogy of need (in the way that we have one of the milieu), this is a nod towards 
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Canguilhem’s fascination with historical of attempts (and failures) to know aspects life 
(Canguilhem 1952/2008). As such, this interlude should be read as an introduction 
to and justification for the questions that will drive the second half of this thesis (and 
in no way a comprehensive “historical context”). In sum, I hope to tell a personal, 
but historically situated story, which provides some backdrop to the questions I 
address in Part Two of this thesis. 
 
Being assessed, somewhere else  
 
Following an ethnographic commitment to incorporating myself in the experiences 
and analysis of my field sites, there came a point in my fieldwork where I became 
increasingly conflicted about how I might come to know at least something of the 
needs assessment process, which always took place behind closed doors. The decision 
to avoid the therapeutic spaces in my field sites in was in many ways made for me; it 
is well known that what goes on in the consulting room can only really be knowable 
to any outsider by “hearsay” (Freud, 1915/1966). More importantly, I had no 
interest in intruding on private sessions of assessments, or worse, therapy. Early on in 
the fieldwork, the therapists and I had decided that the therapy room (which I have 
described in a previous chapter as a central space in what you might call sanctuary) 
would remain off-limits to me. And yet, as my research questions took me closer to 
the spaces where need is articulated and negotiated, particularly within the access 
experiences of service users, I felt I was missing something. I wondered if there was a 
way to put myself in one of those forty-five degree angle chairs and get a sense of the 
process of being assessed for therapeutic eligibility. What would it feel like to have 
my own “need” put under scrutiny? 
 
Spending time with the trainee therapists that flowed through the organisations on 
six-month or one-year placements, I was reminded that they too faced the 
impossibility of “knowing” the client experience in the centres in which they were 
both working and learning. The solution for them, at eye-watering extra cost on top 
of their study fees and voluntary placements, was to organise regular private therapy. 
This, I was told, was about gaining some experience of “being” the client; of feeling, 
if never fully knowing, what it is to the be the vulnerable party in the power-laden 
relationship between client and professional. This could not, of course, take place in 
their own professional environment where the therapists were colleagues and 
 148 
supervisors, or in my case, research collaborators and participants. And so I realised, 
that in order to take seriously the method of “being there” to produce “truth” out of 
the fieldwork encounter41, I too should take myself somewhere else. Buoyed by my 
therapist friends, who mostly felt therapy was for everyone at least at some point in 
their lives, I called the number on the website one of them had recommended to me 
for low-cost private therapy. 
 
The Centre for Freudian Analysis and Research offered psychotherapy at very low 
cost to students or people on a low income and would be provided by one of a pool 
of therapists in training, much like the volunteers I was working with. I would be 
allocated to one of them once I had attended an assessment meeting with a senior 
therapist. After the phone call, I was given an address to come to for the assessment. 
Weirdly, it was within half a mile of my university office in central London. A small 
mews, clad with sandstone and dripping with ivy and hanging baskets, took me off 
the roaring traffic of the Euston Road to a large blond wooden door. Then I came to 
a buzzer, accompanied by the typed acronym “CFAR,” answered by a middle-aged 
man with a heavy French accent. A strangely evasive greeting followed, typical of 
psychotherapists trained in the Freudian tradition of avoiding any relationship 
outside of the therapy room. Ushered in after a brief corroboration that he was 
expecting me, I was told to wait up some stairs in a living room-cum-library.  It took 
me some moments to realise that this was a waiting room. Looking around at the 
densely packed bookshelves, Persian rugs and African masks mounted on the free 
wall space, I realised how far removed my field sites were from this traditional, 
almost anachronistic setup. And yet I was very attached to my idea that the 
experience would in some way echo the basic experience of the help-seeking client, 
ready to demonstrate eligibility for therapy. Running through how I might present 
my own psychological state and economic status, I was preparing to demonstrate 
appropriate level of need; to demonstrate that— although I was here in part because 
of my research— I had reason to be here and willingness to do the psychological 
work involved in the therapy on offer here. 
 
The experience in the waiting room brought on an unpleasant sense of fraudulence 
or illegitimacy, particularly when I thought about the “real” needs of the men and 
women I was encountering in my fieldwork. (And here it is again, even in writing 
 
41 This refers to Borneman and Hammoudi’s (2009, 10) edited text, Being There, which seeks to 
demonstrate what “anthropology can and does do through experience-based fieldwork.”   
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this: the sense of indulgence, of uncalled-for self-reflection from the worried well, or 
worse, the self-absorbed auto-ethnographer.) I resolved to “come clean” about my 
ulterior motive as a researcher (voyeur?) at some point in the assessment that was to 
follow and almost hoped that would put an end to the whole thing.  
 
In the therapy room itself, sitting in the wicker and brown leather chair, facing the 
French man (who was now looking at me intently), I waited to hear his response to 
my confession about why I was “really” there; that my presence there was explained 
more by research interests than it was by a genuine neediness. The man barely 
responded, gesturing for me to go on, to tell him more about myself; what had 
moved me to do the work I do, my personal background etcetera, etcetera. Towards 
the end, there came the time to discuss money. Again, he was relatively uninterested 
in how little money I had, and wanted only to know that I would be able to maintain 
the payments for an open-ended period of time, which at the Foundation they 
tended to think was necessary in order to engage with the psychotherapeutic process. 
The presence of demonstrable or meet-able need—psychologically, economically or 
otherwise—was not driving the inclusion criteria here. Whatever the criteria by 
which I was being assessed, I seemed to have met them, as I was told to wait for an 
email with a therapist who would see me for a trial session.  
 
Some weeks later, after receiving the email and making an appointment, I would 
find myself on the twenty-ninth floor of an enormous skyscraper, looking over a slick 
corporate Plaza in Canary Wharf. I would marvel at the pink marble in the lobby 
and the gorgeous grey woollen trouser suit of the therapist, and then baulk at 
another evasive greeting followed by an inscrutable set of exchanges. It would dawn 
on me that I could not be further from where I had started off – trying to get closer 
to my interlocutors “on the ground” in community-based care. A failure, then, in my 
attempt to extrapolate the client experience “there” to elsewhere; but generative for 
a different set of questions about both place and need: How was it that this relic of the 
past had, in one sense, ossified and contained in upstairs rooms clad with Persian 
rugs, yet in another, re-emerged in countless bastardised forms—in community 
health care settings, feminist basements, as well as in normal GP surgeries? How had 
this particularly orthodox iteration of the “talking cure” become so removed from 
the public provision of mental health care, in which treatment is so intimately linked 
to “need,” and services organised according to ideals of “supply and demand”?  
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Decoupling talk from cure  
 
This account brings out my sense of alienation and distance from these anachronistic 
sites of psychotherapeutic care, compared to the publicly accessible psychotherapy 
services I was used to. This can be traced back to a growing distance between 
psychoanalysis and medicine: an increasing privatisation of a profession that did not 
engage with the kind of scientific scrutiny and critique which occupied most medical 
fields during the 1980s. Perhaps most visible was the sharp fallout42 of psychoanalytic 
understandings of mental ill health during the so called “revolution” in Psychiatry 
with the third edition of the Diagnostic Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 
(DSM-III) in the United States in 1980 (Mayes and Horwitz 2005). Without 
becoming drawn into this vast transatlantic history of the rise and fall of 
psychoanalysis43, I do want to sketch this as the backdrop to a key shift in the way 
“need” came to be defined in mental health service provision; namely in relation to 
how it could be “met” and (importantly) how this could be evidenced. In brushing up 
against this grand narrative in the history of psychiatry, I hope to set the scene for the 
smaller, more localised projects that I go on to describe, which tell a different story to 
one of “psychiatric dominance” or psychological “therapy wars”44 when it comes to 
the current definitions and constructions of mental health need. 
 
The story of the DSM III is very much a national story in American psychiatry, 
which gets projected—both in academic discourse and through clinical practice—
across global contexts. It is nevertheless, at least partially connected to the ways in 
which talking therapy has moved in and out of the UK mental health system in 
various guises. The UK does not actually use the DSM clinically (using instead the 
International Classification of Diseases or “ICD-11” as the most recent edition is 
called) though it is used for research purposes. The shift from the earlier, much 
slimmer volume of the DSM (based upon psychoanalytical clinical judgement) to a 
 
42 The growing suspicion of the psychoanalytic tradition was articulated by Nobel Peace Prize winner, 
Sir Peter Medawar when he described the practice as “the most stupendous intellectual confidence 
trick of the 20th century” (Medawar, cited in Wilcocks 1994: 15). 
43 For this “rise and fall” story, see Hale (1995). 
44 The phrase “therapy wars” appeared in a 2016 Guardian Long Read article by Oliver Burkeman 
on the “revenge of Freud” in an age of cost-effective but increasingly unpopular Cognitive 
Behavioural Therapy, but had also been the title of Saltzman and Norcross’s (1990)  book, charting 
existing “Contention and convergence in differing clinical approaches”.  
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far more extensive symptom-based system, certainly shifted thinking about both 
mental illness and its treatment in the UK. The mistrust in clinical judgement of 
individual pathology, in part fuelled by the anti-psychiatry movement of the 1960s, 
meant that the UK was also receptive to a more “neutral” and generalisable system, 
removed from individual aetiologies of distress. Diagnostic categories would then 
become an index of illness, which made clinical practice amenable to codifying and 
evaluating (Strand 2011: 296).  
 
Though not universally favoured amongst mental health professions in the UK, this 
model of mental ill health— as definable and treatable like other diseases— was the 
one that would became “hardwired” into the logic of national clinical guidelines such 
as NICE (Turner et al. 2015). This generated a set of expectations for treatment for 
mental ill health to be evidenced-based, demonstrably removing or improving the 
symptoms that now defined mental health problems. This was a project that the 
academically— but not so scientifically— driven psychoanalysts had little interest in. 
The practice retreated instead into the private clinics and academic centres I 
described above and, of course, into the kinds of community projects that would 
become the services I describe in my ethnography. The resulting dispersal of 
psychotherapy out of this centralised project meant that it became profoundly 
decoupled from its previous role as a psychiatric “cure,” in mainstream mental health 
care.  
 
Emerging languages of need 
 
This somewhat grand narrative of the incorporation of psychiatric nosology into 
evidence-based medicine provides only one version of the archetypal “mainstream,” 
which my field sites positioned themselves in opposition to. To contextualise the way 
psychological need was being formulated in the wider health system, we have to look 
sideways from both the highly medicalised sites of psychiatry and the lofty private 
spaces of the psychoanalysts. This requires a much more localised reading of events; 
in part, because there is only so far the transatlantic parallels go in terms of that 
particular universalist project in mental health. In the United States, psychoanalysis 
was historically much more embedded in medicine. Analysts were required to be 
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medically trained, unlike in the UK where the discipline was more autonomous, and 
which explains why psychotherapy became much more obviously eclipsed by 
psychiatry.  
 
The UK saw more of a proliferation of surviving and new psychotherapeutic 
techniques in the 1980s and 90s, some of which, as I have mentioned, receded into 
private academic cliques. Others continued to be provided in the NHS, in an albeit 
“patchy” system of coverage (Haddock 1999). “Psychological therapies” were 
embedded in the NHS, described in terms of tending to individual psychological 
“needs,” which were assessed through a clinical “formulation” rather than a medical 
diagnosis. In the period following the 1980s, the organising principle of “needs” 
became increasingly central to mental health care provision, working in 
correspondence with other new but enduring concepts such as “costs,” “values” and 
“risks” (Turner et al. 2015)45. And so, in parallel to the hardening of categories in the 
psychiatric system, a different language of responsiveness and adaptation to 
individual needs was emerging. It was a language that the new eclectic range of 
psychotherapeutic approaches and health policies highlighting “treatment choice”46 
spoke well to. Although the UK has been well known for its bipartisan struggles in 
the anti-psychiatry movement, the “mainstream” of psychotherapeutic care in the 
NHS should be understood as much more diverse than these narratives suggest. In 
fact, would argue that this “mainstream” has become porous to and shaped by these 
very critiques. 
 
The rise of IAPT 
 
The “mainstream,” in the context of my fieldwork, reflected the shifting landscape of 
dominant service models that I have been tracing; whilst psychiatric classification and 
 
45 Turner and colleagues provide a detailed account of the changing relationship between mental 
health services, illness and need: “what is especially important for the historiography of mental health 
services, is the changing understanding of the definition of mental health or the scope of mental illness, 
and thus the ‘need’ for services… Understanding service development therefore depends on an 
historical understanding of the debate between formulation and diagnosis… far beyond the ideological 
struggle around classical anti-psychiatry.” (Turner et al. 2015) 
46 Treatment Choice in Psychological Therapies and Counselling: Evidence Based Clinical Practice 
Guideline (Department of Health 2001) 
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diagnosis would often serve as a kind of index of the mainstream mental health that 
these centres defined themselves in opposition to, the therapists rarely actually came 
into contact, or conflict, with psychiatrists in their everyday practice or through the 
referral mechanisms that linked them to other services. In the spirit of Freud’s 
“narcissism of small differences,” I could see that it was in fact another kind of talking 
therapy that aroused the most critique and concern from the clinicians I was working 
with. Talking therapy had existed for many years alongside the more dominant field 
of (now biomedically oriented) psychiatry, deemed useful for some but lacking an 
“evidence base.” Then, talking therapy made a comeback in the form of cognitive 
behavioural therapy (CBT), which had its roots in behaviourist clinical psychology. 
Its roll out under the NHS was an intrinsically empirical project; by the early 2000s, 
the evidence base for CBT was growing exponentially and formed the basis for the 
national programme for Improving Access to Psychological Therapies (IAPT). The 
plan, led by “happiness economist” Lord Layard, was to solve what he saw as the 
dual problem of an unhappy population and a suffering economy: to “provide 
equitable access to [evidence based talking therapy] to all sections of the community on 
the basis of clinical need” (my emphasis).47 Here, economic principles of supply and 
demand (not to mention profit and productivity) were explicitly used alongside the 
language of need. 
 
Without delving too far into the debates and critique that followed the rollout of 
IAPT (I leave that to my interlocutors in the pages that follow), this new wave of 
standardised mental health service provision reignited some of the discontents from 
what I referred to above as the “therapy wars.” Despite (or perhaps because of) the 
deluge of data and evidence that “proved” the efficacy of this treatment, questions 
about what people really needed, and how we were to define that need seemed to 
proliferate. “Clinical need,” in the language of IAPT, refers to what are known as 
“common mental disorders”, namely anxiety and depression, which are further 
defined by their low levels of severity. This level and type of need makes anyone— 
“regardless of ethnic group, age, socio-economic status, geographical location”50— 
eligible for this short term CBT. It was these universalist principles, shoe-horned into 
what had been a therapeutic practice grounded in relationships and individual need, 
 
47 “Realising the benefits: IAPT at full roll-out” (Department of Health 2010) 
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that upset so many mental health professionals on the other “side” of the therapy 
wars. This was the opposition expressed by many of the therapists I worked with, 
who were committed to other forms of relational, psychodynamic or even traditional 
psychoanalytic psychotherapy, and who recognised “need” with explicit attention to 
difference, specificity and diversity of experience. But crucially, the logic of IAPT was 
less about ideologies of what precise therapy was being delivered or whom it was for, 
so long as it could be shown to “work.” It didn’t matter what the therapy looked like, 
if the data on recovery said that the clinical need was disappearing. Need, in other 
words, was there to be met.  
 
“We need to talk” 
 
“We need to talk” is a slogan lifted directly from a manifesto led by the UK mental 
health charity MIND, the year before I started this project. When I came to read it, I 
was interested in the assortment of organisational logos on the front page, 
representing a coalition of “mental health charities, professional organisations, Royal 
Colleges and service providers who campaign for better access to psychological 
therapies for people with mental health problems” (MIND 2014, 2013, 2010). The 
“about the coalition” section, in its jaunty sans serif typeface, pleasingly transcended 
the stern, combative language of the “therapy wars” that I have been describing. The 
line itself seemed to work, not only because of its catchy word play (combining an 
advocacy message of de-stigmatisation and a serious call for services) but also from 
the simple definitiveness of the statement - enabled perhaps, by the plural pronoun 
“we” and its collectivising effect (let’s talk, it’s good to talk, we all need to talk). The job of 
these campaigners was to provide a call to action, in order to make these therapies 
universally available, and frame this as a public right. But in this interlude, I have 
taken a moment to dwell on the fact that even in the very recent history talking 
therapy has called into question each of the components of this seductively clear 
phrase; of what or who constitutes the “we”, the “need”, and the “talk” when it 
comes to delivering psychotherapeutic care.  
 
My own personal concerns about “need” and “talk” hummed on, even after I had 
decided that the woman with the beautifully minimal trouser suit and equally 
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minimal Lacanian-style talking therapy at the top of the skyscraper wasn’t for me. I 
found my way to a private therapist, in a plain converted townhouse in a terrace just 
around the corner from one of my field sites, who was also prepared to provide 
therapy at a student rate. I continued to go every week for the remaining months of 
my fieldwork. I had plenty to talk about in these sessions but the sensitivity to the 
indulgence of individual psychotherapy never left me. Interestingly, it was also 
something I would hear many times from the clients I encountered in the next stages 
of my fieldwork, regardless of how clearly they met the criteria for that service or how 
obviously “in need” they might appear to be. This was particularly (almost 
exclusively in fact) a feature of the conversations I had with the women who accessed 
the services. Relating their own need to others, and being concerned with whether 
they were needy enough or deserving enough was much more common than talk of 
whether their needs would be “met” with this certain kind of therapy.  
 
Echoing these observations, I do not attempt to answer the questions wrestled with 
by practitioners, evaluators, and social scientists over the years, to join the debate 
about what people really need or to evaluate whether their needs are being met. Instead, 
I ask a rather different set of questions that can also be drawn from the same short 
slogan of “we need to talk”. Who are the “we” that these therapies are meant to serve? 
Who are the “we” that gets to talk about or define “need”? And finally, how is “need” 
articulated, operationalized and enacted when it comes to negotiations of who gets what 
care in the field of mental health? It is these questions, and in particular the final 
question, that will shape the final two data chapters within this thesis, and that the 
ethnographic and conceptual work in these chapters will go at least some way in 
answering. 
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Chapter 7: Making diagnoses absent: Proximity, risk and 
possibility in “doing things differently” 
 
“The cultural issues we deal with here cannot be dealt with in the NHS clinical 
frame.” K is addressing the senior therapists and one of the administrators in the 
small, windowless meeting room at the back of the therapy centre. It is the first of the 
weekly Referral, Screening, Assessment, and Allocation team meetings I am present 
for, and everyone in the room is still reeling from a visit from the head of one of their 
local IAPT teams the previous week. He had come bearing unpopular news about 
the way their service must assess new clients in order to comply with the role that the 
commissioner wants the service to take in relation to its mainstream NHS 
counterparts. The team refer to their visitor as “him,” referring only to his 
organisational position to describe him, giving him a somewhat faceless, detached 
persona. As head of the “hub” of different mental health services that people would 
be referred to in this particular London Borough, he is responsible for making sure 
people are triaged appropriately across the different services. The therapists are 
recounting his demands—who should be “sent back” to the hub for reallocation, and 
according to what criteria—making it very clear that they are unhappy about what 
they have been asked to do. They ask rhetorically how they were supposed to make 
their own professional decisions under these instructions.  “Well,” the administrator 
in the room pipes up, “he said that we need to ‘ask the right diagnostic questions so 
we can decide how best to help’” she says, quoting what she remembers from the 
previous meeting. K shakes her head and seizes on this, insisting that: “The 
diagnostic, NHS model is not how we work. We are a small organisation up against a 
big NHS; it is simply not true what he says— that ‘we are all the same in the eyes of 
the commissioner’—we are not the same, we do things differently here.” 
 
Doing things differently was, perhaps paradoxically, a common theme across all three 
sites of my fieldwork: differently from the mainstream, and differently from each other, 
but through practices that I aim to draw parallels between. In this chapter, I focus on 
a common resistance towards using diagnostic systems to assess need and sort clients 
into categories. As such, my data speaks much less to the inherent (lack of) value of 
these diagnostic systems than it does to their function: what do they do in relation to 
the services I was working with? I treat diagnoses as an index of a more medically 
driven “mainstream.” This particular break from the mainstream spoke directly to 
my research questions about how mental health needs are enacted in voluntary 
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settings, and provided me with a starting point to thinking through what I would be 
able to surmise from my ethnographic material across three sites and at least two 
different sets of actors (clients and therapists). In all three sites, engaging with difference 
was a big part of their work to make therapy accessible to their respective client 
groups; both in terms of practicing different, non-orthodox kinds of therapy, and 
attending to diversity (of people, and of experience) when it came to whom 
psychotherapy was for. Central to this was the commitment not to ascribe to the sets 
of practices and epistemological frameworks of psychiatric diagnosis. 
 
Crucially, it was not just that psychiatric diagnoses were entirely invisible or 
irrelevant in these voluntary sector clinics (as was the case with other biomedical 
practices or objects, such as pharmaceuticals). The vignette above, taken from my 
early field notes, illustrates that pressures to define and classify needs according to 
diagnostic categories was never far from their doors. And so the diagnostic system 
was part of an outside, but ever-present mainstream. Borrowing from the work of 
previous scholars, I take diagnostic systems to be an “absent presence” in the spaces I 
observed (Law and Mol 2001; Law and Singleton 2003). The absent presence is a 
deliberately paradoxical phrase, describing that which is manifest in its absence and 
performs the function of making something else present within a set of relations. Before 
exploring the various enactments of that “something else,” in the final data chapter, I 
will dwell here on the choreography involved in making diagnoses absent, paying 
particular attention to possibilities and risks involved when clients and therapists put 
this into practice. How do these different actors manage their proximity to the 
mainstream and its classification systems? What possibilities are opened up by 
making these classification systems “absent” from the therapeutic space? What risks 
and dangers come with being too close, or indeed too far, from these systems, which 
continue to hold so much power and currency in the wider mental health context? 
 
Chapter overview 
 
My aim in this chapter is to demonstrate how the systems of assessing and sorting 
need were a function of key relations between the clients, the therapists, and (with a 
deliberate leap in scale) “the mainstream”. If we consider a relation to be a reference 
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back to something, or a comparison, that can be made across different organisational scales 
(Strathern 1995, 23), then observations of how people relate to mainstream systems 
become productive. In the vignette above, the relation is between the therapists at 
Culture in Mind (the voluntary provider) and the IAPT service (broadly representing 
“the mainstream”). Through their rejection of using diagnostically defined mental 
health needs, they performed an important sense of distance between their “small 
organisation” and the “big NHS.” After his visit, the faceless representative of the 
IAPT service provider was made distinctly absent, and yet, his visit would reverberate 
through the Tuesday clinical meetings for weeks to come. Their proximity to the 
mainstream had felt risky, the politics of which I will describe in the following section.  
 
Through an exploration of this particular dynamic of making diagnoses absent from 
practices of assessing need, I look at three different relations: the relation between 
therapists and the mainstream (Part I, “Therapists making diagnoses absent”); the 
relation between clients and the mainstream (Part II, Clients making diagnoses 
absent) and finally, the client-therapist relation (Part III, Clients and therapists: 
different but close). I argue that the present – absent relations play a fundamental 
role in defining the relation between the two “presences” of the client and therapist: 
their therapeutic relationship, and their degree of closeness and commonality. In 
other words, the commonality between the client and therapist is contingent on their 
mutual difference or break with the mainstream, a third node in this small network of 
relations. But, as Strathern reminds us, “anthropologists do not pursue connections 
simply in order to be ingenious,” rather, they “route them in specific ways” (ibid., 
11). I seek to route these connections through the men and women concerned with 
understanding their own and others’ mental health needs, towards some tentative 
answers to my questions about the risks and possibilities of going about this 
“differently.”  
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I. Therapists “making diagnoses absent” 
 
As I have started to explore above, to talk about an absence is not necessarily to talk 
about that which is completely invisible in a given space. Rather, it can be to talk 
about that which is actively made absent, and therefore always kept in view. I found 
this to be the case with the work it took for actors in voluntary spaces to make the 
frameworks and practices of the mainstream mental health system absent from their 
ways of working, whilst also being largely dependent on and (often) in close proximity 
to NHS providers such as IAPT. In a meeting similar to the one I opened this 
chapter with, but which took place in another centre, I was part of a long discussion 
about just this. Therapists were considering how they could continue to “work 
differently in the room, without labelling their clients,” whilst they felt pressure from 
“the system” to sort and classify clients in ways that (to them at least) felt 
pathologising. At stake was their ability to secure and maintain funding for delivering 
their therapy. Again doing something different was central to maintaining a “radical” and 
non-diagnostically oriented way of understanding and addressing the mental health 
needs of their clients. But what was painfully apparent throughout this meeting, and 
many others, was that doing something different was not just defined in relation to 
the mainstream, but was constantly constrained by it. This was an example of how the 
work of making the mainstream absent, paradoxically, makes this “system” 
particularly manifest and visible in these spaces. In the following section, I follow 
several different ways this played out, through continuing the story I began at the 
beginning of this chapter. 
“If they have anxiety, we have to send them back!” (The politics of need) 
The visit from the IAPT manager to the intercultural therapy centre had on-going 
ramifications over the months that followed. Despite her protests, K was not in a 
position to ignore the terms of their contract with the clinical commissioners that 
funded almost all their work for the residents of that borough. The commissioners 
took their guidelines from the IAPT service, and had made them the hub of all the 
commissioned services in the area, meaning that in instances like this, the centre was 
beholden to those who funded the service. The specific demand that therapists were 
particularly unhappy with was the injunction to send any referral whose “primary 
presentation” is anxiety back to the IAPT hub for a different kind of therapy. This 
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raised a myriad of issues, which challenged some of the core logics of the intercultural 
therapy centre’s psychotherapeutic approach. Aside from concerns about people 
being unnecessarily “pinged back and forth between services,” as one therapist put it, 
the demand posed a more fundamental challenge to the way the therapists assessed 
the needs of potential clients.  It assumed that therapists could isolate one particular 
problem or disorder (anxiety), which took priority over other issues and would 
determine what kind of help a person would receive. I will turn briefly back to the 
clinical meeting I described above to share one more observation I made about how 
the ways in which the centre defines itself by “doing things differently” to mainstream 
mental health services. In this scene, their non-diagnostic approach was actively 
performed as well as narrated by the therapists in the room.  
 
K leaves the room to fetch something that she wants to show us, and comes back 
holding a rolled up magazine, “Therapy Today.” She sits back down in her place in 
the circle of chairs and flicks to the page she wants. It is an article about a recent 
study that was carried out looking at the wellbeing of NHS staff responsible for 
delivering IAPT services. Tracing the headline with her finger, she tells us that this 
caught her eye as she flicked through the magazine at lunch: that IAPT practitioners 
are themselves feeling the psychological impact of working to meet strict targets and 
high demand. And so, she tells us, if we are talking about anxiety, we must think 
about the fact that he must be very anxious working in the climate he has to work in. 
Rolling the magazine back up and tapping it on the palm of her other hand as she 
speaks, she explains that it is likely that in their meeting the week before, he was 
projecting all the stress of working in the IAPT service onto them. Her colleagues are 
quiet, but there are nods of agreement. There has been much talk recently of how 
politically charged the monitoring of talking therapies has been in mainstream 
services, and how everyone is having to prove that what they are doing works. B 
comes back to this a little later when he describes how the same IAPT manager had 
seemed to feel he had to defend the value of cognitive behavioural therapy by 
criticising the psychodynamic approach. He remembers him reprimanding the 
centre for providing psychodynamic therapy to “anxiety cases”, because CBT 
advocates claim that it actually causes damage to people with anxiety. At this point, 
B shoots an apologetic look towards me, saying that this just goes to show how 
political this work has become.  
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Despite the therapists’ obvious hostility towards how they were being asked to assess 
the client needs, the team were being fairly generous to the IAPT manager in the 
way they were contextualising his request, couching it in what they understood to be 
an intrinsically hostile professional environment. But their recounting and reading of 
the situation in this way did more than this. Not only were they naming the man’s 
request itself as unreasonable— pathological, even— they were doing this in a way 
that performed their oppositional approach to naming a problem that could be called 
“anxiety”. K had contextualised the magazine article’s commentary on high levels of 
stress, depression and anxiety in IAPT practitioners with her own understanding of 
the culture and politics of mainstream mental healthcare, to reframe what could have 
been described as an entirely within-person problem to be about the external reality 
of that individual. This echoed precisely what her organisation’s therapeutic 
approach aimed to do when identifying people’s needs; as well as attending to 
people’s inner worlds, they would ask what political climate they have come from 
(and perhaps travelled away from), how other people in their community might be 
reacting to and dealing with this climate, and how this might be affecting their social 
relationships. Preserving this culturally informed approach to assessing and naming 
mental ill health returned us to safety, well away from the IAPT approach and its 
obsession with the category of anxiety. The magazine article had provided a window 
out into the much wider world of mainstream mental health care. We had zoomed 
out for a brief moment, before scaling back to the logics of the intercultural centre. 
 
Framing different psychotherapeutic approaches as risky to practice with certain 
people, rather than simply ineffective, was a symptom of the so-called “therapy wars” 
rumbling on in background to these more micro-politics, in which psychodynamic 
approaches in particular had long been narrated by critics as dangerous and 
disreputable (see my section on the “therapy wars” in the Interlude preceding this 
chapter). However, from my seat in this particular circle of psychotherapists, and 
others in similar teams, I came look at the risks of assessing and meeting (or failing to 
meet) certain kinds of psychotherapeutic need in a rather different way. The 
therapists here were not afraid that clients with anxiety would “get worse”; in fact, 
they were candid about the likelihood of people feeling painful emotions associated 
with issues underlying symptoms such as anxiety, even at the end of their six or twelve 
sessions. As I will explore more fully in the next chapter, these therapists did not 
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require a client’s needs to be entirely “meet-able” in order for them to be eligible 
therapy. However, they were concerned about their therapeutic work being 
discredited by the commissioning bodies they were dependent on to continue 
providing their service. Naming need in diagnostic terms made these organisations all 
the more at risk of being discredited, because they weren’t able to demonstrate 
“recovery” from these psychological problems, as Cognitive Behavioural Therapy 
services seemed to be so good at.  
 
The tendency to push away purely diagnostic assessments of need for the reason 
(amongst others) that “recovery” would become at once more expected and often less 
obtainable, was true for all the organisations I worked with, though I never saw quite 
such an explicit embargo, and on such a particular category of need, as the contract 
that excluded anxiety cases. “PTSD” was certainly a risky category to get too close 
to, because it sat so firmly within the medical framework for understanding trauma. 
Clinical managers were increasingly vigilant that their staff remained objective in 
their clinical notes, and they didn’t have the tools or training to objectively back up 
these diagnoses48. Another diagnosis, which all three centres had to carefully 
choreograph their association with, was Borderline Personality Disorder (the most 
common of several personality disorders that clients might come with a diagnosis of); 
a category of need with a contentious history of being considered un-meet-able at 
least within the medical model (Castillo 2015). This category carries many other 
associations with risk, some of which I will touch on in the ethnographic material 
below. What all of these worries point to is the risk of the diagnostic model exposing 
them to the particular standards of the mainstream. At worst, they would be charged 
with a failure to meet needs that another service could, and in doing so precluding 
the client from receiving that other service. This wilful creation of spaces of 
indeterminacy when it came to assessing mental health need is a practice I describe 
more fully in the next chapter, pointing to the various ethical motivations for it. 
Here, I identify this practice as a means to avert the risks associated with being 
dependent on and operating on the edge of the mainstream mental health system. 
 
48 This vigilance was necessary when therapists were asked for professional statements for appeals to 
the Home Office, or police enquiries about migration cases, because it was tempting to emphasise 
clients’ trauma and need for care in the UK with a concrete diagnosis like PTSD. 
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“Moving” and “removing” diagnostically defined need  
The injunction to “send back” people with anxiety from this borough (and soon after, 
another of their largest boroughs) was rarely a case of simply taking the highlighted 
word “anxiety” and sending that person back to the IAPT service. For one thing, this 
directly opposed the idea that they “take almost everyone” who comes to them, as W, 
the administrator, put it. Often, in this site and others, clinical meetings provided a 
space to think through how they would differentially describe a new client’s problem, 
so as to transform it into a need they could address. In doing so, they were able to 
make the diagnostic category of, say, anxiety absent from their service, without 
removing the person who carries that diagnostic category with them when they are 
referred. The focus of decision-making turned from risk to possibility. An example of 
one of these ways of making anxiety absent:  
 
We are back in the meeting room for the Referral, Screening, Assessment, and 
Allocation team meeting. There are six of us in the room, including four therapists, 
an administrator and myself; there are a lot of complex cases to talk through today. 
By the time we get to this final case, my wrist is aching from scribbling down the 
minutes on each decision-making process for the team to use to communicate to 
clients, or—as was often the case—carry over to the next meeting when more 
information had been gathered about the cases, usually by telephoning people or the 
professionals that had referred them. This particular case had been carried over 
several times, partly because the psychiatrist who referred him, and the complex care 
team who are currently working with him are also unsure how to describe his 
presenting problem. K reminds us of the man’s background: a Turkish man who had 
been living in the UK for some years, with issues that his psychiatrist had thought 
could best be worked through with a Turkish therapist. When the psychiatrist 
initially referred him to the intercultural therapy centre, however, he informed them 
that this man had severe anxiety, as well as other complex needs. They hadn’t taken 
the case on for therapy that time because they felt that it might be better to send him 
to the complex care team; a decision that was further justified by the rule about 
sending back anxiety cases. However, K informs us today that, “His psychiatrist just 
called us back. Apparently they have tried everything in the complex care team and 
they want to re-refer him to us.” 
 
She pulls the slippery cellophane file, thick with paperwork, from the bottom to the 
top on the pile that rests precariously on her crossed knee. With her hand resting on 
 164 
the top, she tells us that from what she understands from his assessor, this man’s 
problems are not only about the disorders he has been diagnosed with but also about 
negotiating his cultural identity and his sexuality. She announces that for this reason, 
she has decided they should take him in. She turns to the administrator who is with 
us, and says, “we need to remove the ‘anxiety’ as the primary presentation, and move 
this to a ‘cultural issue.’” Then she turns to another of the senior therapists, “you 
should see him, as a man from the same culture who may be able to bring up taboos 
and break through them with him.” An unusual sense of resolve settles over the 
room, even though they still do not know for sure if or how they will be able to work 
with the man. They decide they will call him directly and ask him in for a second 
assessment, a kind of consultation to find out from him how best they are able to 
help him.  
 
Although it centred around a distinct and unusual case, this moment of 
(re)negotiating and resolving a decision like this spoke to other such moments, where 
a diagnostic label had to be “moved” or “removed” from the final assessment in 
order to make way for a justification, articulated in “intercultural” terms for taking a 
person on for therapy at this particular centre. Countless conversations came back to 
the idea that even if something like “anxiety” was “there” it was often interwoven 
with other things, or connected to larger underlying issues of trauma or cultural and 
geographical dislocation. Faced with a system that asked that they consider some 
people’s problems to be defined by this diagnostic category, and therefore not eligible 
for the therapy they provide, the senior therapists made it their job to seek out and 
name the things that disrupt this notion of a medically defined “primary 
presentation”. In this centre, it was working interculturally that shaped their view of 
the diagnostic system and its particular shortcomings. Through their practice, the 
diagnostic, and the alternative intercultural model of identifying mental health need 
came to be defined relationally. Making anxiety (or other diagnostic labels) absent 
from their practice was less about making it completely disappear from view than it 
was about keeping it in sight and shaping the intercultural approach in contrast and 
opposition to it.  This brings us back to the idea of an absent presence.  
 
The practice of doing things differently this time was about creating possibilities, 
rather than avoiding risk. The therapists could afford to bring the mainstream a little 
closer here, because of the possibilities for creating contrast and opposition, and 
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ultimately, the possibility of a different kind of care. This was something I observed at 
other moments and in different sites, too. I marvelled at the resourcefulness with 
which therapists could sometimes create different eligibility criteria, in parallel, and 
in contrast to diagnostic categories. Nour, a therapist I got to know well whilst 
helping her select people for a therapeutic group, took the category of “depression” 
and transformed it into a thematic idea that would allow her to include anyone she 
felt could benefit. She was interested in the taboos that got in the way of talking 
about painful experiences and so the theme she was working with was simply “saying 
the unsayable”. The diagnostic category of “depression” functioned to clear her a 
space for this different theme that expressly tried not to categorise people according to 
any one need, or set of needs. This was a particularly non-risky situation, given that 
the project was funded by a charity donor and was much less invested (than the 
IAPT commissioner, for example) in using diagnostic categories to organise the 
services they fund. All in all however, constant choreographing was taking place to 
manage how near or far, how in sight or out of sight, therapists could position 
themselves in relation to mainstream systems and practices. 
 
II. Clients “making diagnoses absent” 
 
The previous section, I focused on the relation between therapists and the 
mainstream mental healthcare system, made visible by the on-going practice of 
rejecting the mainstream, through making diagnoses absent from their own assessment 
and allocation processes. I turn now to another relation, which was characterised by 
a process echoing those I have described above. By focusing on the relation between 
clients and the mainstream, I want to highlight how clients participated in therapists’ 
practice of making diagnosis manifestly absent from their encounters. It is important 
to note that rarely did I encounter explicit value judgements about whether 
diagnoses, or even diagnostic labels, were ‘good’ or ‘bad’ in the eyes of the clients (in 
contrast to many of the therapists, whose professional judgement would lead them to 
more explicitly reject this mode of understanding mental health need). However, 
clients did often actively push their diagnostic experiences in the mainstream away 
from their encounters in these voluntary spaces. This wasn’t simply a case of clients 
echoing what they observed in their therapists’ practice, and served a multitude of 
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different functions relating to how people wanted or expected their needs to be 
understood and articulated in certain places.  
 
The story I draw upon to bring this to the fore is a series of several encounters I had 
with Samira, a young woman I first met early on in my fieldwork and whose therapist 
I knew very well.  The layering of these different encounters over a period of time in 
this story built a more complicated picture of how different diagnostic labels were 
avoided or rejected by different actors, and to what end. The more multi-perspectival 
experience that this presented me with helps to push yet further the relational 
argument I have been making about how absences and presences are produced. I 
will continue to extend this argument through putting Samira’s story into contact 
with her therapists’ experience in the final section of this chapter. 
Samira: Different, disordered, or simply hard to place?  
The first time I met Samira, she was coming out of the women’s toilets at Culture in 
Mind, entering into the staff workspace where I was chatting to some of the other 
therapists. She walked towards us, informing us that the tap needed fixing as it was 
stuck and wouldn’t stop running. Wondering if we’d met before (she spoke boldly, as 
if we might have) I suddenly remembered that there was a new therapist that had 
been told I should meet. I held out my hand to introduce myself and asked the young 
woman standing in front of me if she was the new therapist. As soon as I did this, I 
felt a haze of incomprehension engulf us all. In the moments it took for our hands to 
reach each other it became starkly clear that I had made a mistake, and even before 
she opened her mouth I realised she was, of course, a client. The rest of the exchange 
was a clumsy realigning of positions, involving Feven (her therapist) stepping in to 
introduce us, eventually suggesting that Samira took part in my study as an 
interviewee.  
 
By the end of this odd encounter, we were all set to meet the following week, clearly 
positioned, finally, as client and researcher. Looking back, however, I came to see 
this dynamic as less anomalous than I thought at that moment, and spoke profoundly 
to the many ways in which Samira was hard to place. I want to explore a little more 
closely how she had negotiated, and struggled with, her experiences of professionals 
trying to place her diagnostically; how she had put the ambiguousness of her mental 
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health problems to work, in order to evade one particular diagnosis she had received 
in her long history of clinical encounters. Again, diagnostic practice was at once 
being made absent, but remaining manifestly present. 
 
Samira and I meet in the centre after her session, as planned. She is upset from what 
she has been speaking about with her therapist, but sits down telling me firmly she 
wants to stay and talk. I am moved by how at once vulnerable and tenacious she is. 
We decide to have just a short meeting and to arrange another time to talk properly, 
which Samira likes the idea of. She has moved around a lot recently but has just 
moved into somewhere she thinks she will be able to stay. Before she leaves, She 
invites me over to her house— she could do with the company, she says, and can 
make us coffee there.  
 
For now I keep the questions brief, focusing on how she had been referred to the 
service, where she had heard about it, and so on. Samira tells me about how keen 
she had been to come to therapy and how it had really been her choice, even though 
her doctor had referred her: “I knew I needed it—somewhere I could release some 
of this…” she makes a gesture with her hands pushing away from her chest to show 
me how much she had been carrying with her. In the past, she had spent a lot of 
time being observed and assessed by clinical teams; not in Lebanon, her place of 
birth, but in Sweden where she had done most of her growing up, and in the UK. It 
was in the UK that one doctor had given her a diagnosis of borderline personality 
disorder. But, she says, it turns out she only got this diagnosis because of the 
traumatic experiences she had had when she was younger, and not because she 
actually had the disorder.  
 
It takes some weeks for us to reconnect after this, as Samira has been doing lots of 
travelling, and when I see her again at the centre she tells me she is having a crazy 
time. Eventually she texts me out of the blue one day- can I come over now?? I 
arrive at Samira’s place and she is on the phone. She continues to talk to someone 
on a customer service line for twenty minutes or so whilst I sit myself down on one of 
her squashy sofas; I’m shocked to hear her thank the person at the end of the line for 
spending over an hour and a half talking to her. She doesn’t stop moving for the 
entire time I am there, asking me to pass her a huge armful of clean laundry for her 
to fold, between cigarettes, sips of tea and checking her phone, all the while talking 
to me, with impressive multitasking skills. Watching her, I think about her slightly 
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unnerving tendency to come across entirely differently each time I see her, but it 
soon becomes clear that whatever I find out about this dynamic and somewhat 
shape-shifting young woman will be inherently partial. One of the last things she says 
before I turn on the audio recorder is that she won’t tell me the whole story in case I 
use it against her. But even this seemingly distrustful message doesn’t match her 
warmth and generous telling of her experiences leading up to her accessing the 
therapy centre she is at now.  
 
She talks candidly about the various diagnoses she has had imposed on her, 
sometimes rejected by her, and often simply forgotten (“I don’t keep them to be 
honest”). Eventually she had received a diagnosis of Attention Deficit Hyperactivity 
Disorder, after being assessed yet again in a specialised psychiatric clinic based in a 
hospital “so big, so it kind of loses you”. She accepts this diagnosis now, even though 
she was hoping not to get a diagnosis at all. Resignedly she tells me that in the clinic, 
it had been established that she is “fully different.” In a rare moment of stillness, she 
looks at me steadily and asks: how could she be the only one who is right, whilst 
everyone else is wrong? Yet she still finds it difficult to take these doctors entirely 
seriously, recounting again how her diagnosis had initially been taken for a for a 
personality disorder. She thinks it was because of the way she had acted in the clinics 
when she became bored and frustrated with all the assessments. She would say, 
turning the doctors’ unanswerable questions around on them: “‘okay, so why are 
your socks green?’…” She shoots me a sardonic look, “They most likely thought I 
was stupid— like, mental— like proper, proper mental.” 
 
Whether it was the diagnosable disorder or a more difficult-to-pin-down non-
coherence or non-order that explained why Samira was seen so persistently to be “fully 
different,” there was something that had been waiting to be re-named, or at least 
understood in a new way, once she moved out of the psychiatric sphere and into the 
psychotherapy centre where we came into contact. She was well aware of what this 
diagnostic label would, or could, do when it came to accessing care; she leaned in to 
one psychiatric explanation of her distress in order to secure her place in the centre, 
but again, this was risky. Samira had taken the name of one disorder in lieu of 
another, framing herself as “different”, but perhaps not so “mental” that she would 
be seen as too unwell or difficult to work with.  
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Once she had accessed the service, Samira felt, for reasons I will explore more closely 
below, that she was understood in ways she had not been before in the various clinics 
she had been assessed in, taken aback by how comparatively soft her therapist’s 
approach had been to finding out what her problems were. I could not help but feel 
relieved for Samira that she had managed to reject the label she had first been 
assigned; it was a hard one to shake, and even in the voluntary organisations that 
made it their business to reject the diagnostic model, a personality disorder diagnosis 
in a person’s records would be taken seriously. Having a diagnosed personality 
disorder was not a hard and fast barrier to being eligible for therapy in these 
organisations, but the assumption was they did not have the capacity to provide 
therapy for this kind of severe and enduring condition. Despite the apparent 
disinterest with which she stopped keeping her various psychiatric diagnoses (I was 
struck by the image of her tossing them aside, like old paper bank statements), she 
kept a close eye on the personality disorder. She spoke a lot about what it was, and 
how it could be confused with other things: trauma, an attention disorder, or just 
being different. Of all the people I spoke to who had previously been in contact with 
psychologists and psychiatrists from other services, Samira was at once the most the 
most rebellious against their assessments of her, and the most preoccupied with the 
marks they left on her. Others, for whom diagnoses were less risky, (could afford to) 
put much less work into distancing themselves from other services. They would tell 
me simply “I have depression,” or “I have a sickness,” before decentring this from 
their account, talking about different psychosocial issues that they had focussed on 
with their therapist. In line with what I observed amongst therapists, the work it took 
to avoid the risks associated with a particular category of need had a paradoxical 
effect: it made the diagnostic label manifest, and persistently present.   
 
III. Clients and therapists: Different but close  
 
In the previous two sections, I have highlighted the ways in which therapists and 
clients make diagnostic practice and labels absent from the space in which these 
actors access and provide therapy. Looking at these processes from within the 
voluntary settings, we can refine this broad notion of doing things differently to talk about 
alternative enactments of mental health need, in contrast to mainstream psychiatric 
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or diagnostic terms. As such, it could be articulated more specifically as possibilities 
for “doing need” differently: an idea I will explore more fully in the next chapter. What 
the ethnographic data I have drawn upon so far has shown, then, is a series of 
relations between actors in voluntary settings, and an absent “mainstream.” Making 
the mainstream manifestly absent has taken the form of actively rejecting, subverting, 
or simply setting aside diagnostic practices and labels, depending on the possibilities 
and risks this entails for the actors involved. What I want to turn to now, is the 
relationship between the two “presences,” client and therapist, and think about how 
this gets shaped in the context of the relations I have described above. 
Triangulating “difference” 
These processes of ‘making absent’ gave clients and therapists a common point of 
reference, which they may both make a break with, providing new affordances for the 
client therapist relationship. As such, far from being an entirely “absent Other”, “the 
mainstream” (embodied in the practices, technologies and labels of a diagnostic 
system) played an important part in shaping the relations that were more visibly 
present in non-mainstream assessments and therapeutic encounters. Moving beyond 
thinking separately about therapists and the mainstream, and clients and the 
mainstream, we can think about the mainstream as the third point in a triangle. The 
triangle has multiple resonances in psychoanalytic theory (Karpman 1968; Stern, 
Hard, and Rock 2015), though I draw on it simply to help me think through the 
relevance of a third component in a set of relations: at once directing the other 
components away from one another, and connecting them via that same point. I am 
interested in how people’s experiences with mainstream assessments of need had a 
bearing on their relationship with their therapist, and their sense of how their needs 
might be jointly understood, or even co-produced, differently in these settings.  
 
As I have said before, there was nothing uniform about how clients engaged with or 
rejected the diagnoses they had inherited from other professionals—diagnoses are not 
in themselves ‘bad’. However, depending on which diagnosis we are talking about, 
and who has the power to name someone’s mental health need in that way, they can 
be risky. Similarly, alternative sources of therapy are not necessarily “better,” but 
they may open up new possibilities for understanding need, particularly when a space 
has been carved out where difference (rather than sameness, or universality) is explicitly 
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valued. In order to bring these ideas out of Euclidean space and back into the world I 
am attempting to animate with this data, I return to the story of Samira, her 
therapist, Feven, and my own brief entanglement in it. 
A glitch in the client-therapist relation 
By the time I went to see Samira at her house, she had been seeing her therapist, 
Feven, for almost 12 weeks. This happened at a time when I was spending a lot of 
time with Feven at the centre. She had become more than someone I would 
encounter only during formal observations or whilst I was recruiting for interviews. 
Dragging a chair next to her desktop computer in the communal workspace, I would 
perch next to her, perhaps editing the English on her correspondence with clients’ 
GPs or lawyers, stopping often to hear about the kaleidoscopic range of different 
work she did with what she called “the community.” This community referred both 
to her own dense, informal Eritrean network, but also to clients she encountered 
professionally here at the centre, from various different cultural, ethnic and linguistic 
minorities.  
 
Usually we would make a point of steering our conversations away her clients, who I 
had, or would be, speaking to in my research. But, standing in the kitchen chatting 
over tea, we were caught off guard when I received the message from Samira that she 
was back in the country and could meet. Feven spontaneously told me that this is the 
person that they had just been discussing in their clinical meeting. She had been 
seeking advice about how best to work with someone with a borderline personality 
disorder diagnosis. To my surprise, it turned out this diagnosis had been in Samira’s 
notes, but Feven had missed it when she took her on as a client; now she felt worried 
about whether she could help Samira and declared that in this instance she should 
have paid more attention to the doctor’s clinical notes than she normally did. Our 
conversation became stilted as I tried to square the multiple contradictions this 
brought up: not just that client and therapist accounts of the (mis)diagnosis did not 
match up, but also that Samira’s story of re-framing of the problem in terms of 
trauma must not (as I had assumed) been the result of this team’s assessment of her 
presenting problem. I worried about this divergence in the way Samira and Feven 
were relating to this diagnosis.  
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As I spent time with Samira that afternoon, however, I listened to her stories of her 
feeling chronically misunderstood by doctors, teachers and other professionals, and 
how grateful she was to have been able to build the relationship she had with Feven. 
More importantly, I realised the contradictions I had been hoping to decipher or sort 
out, about whether Samira “had” a personality disorder or not, were in fact simply 
sitting in the back of my mind, neither obscuring nor revealing what it was that had 
made Samira feel so understood by Feven. At one point, after Samira had told me 
about all the diagnoses she had received and rejected, I asked her directly whether 
she had spoken about these experiences with her therapist. She was unsure; they had, 
but then again, they hadn’t, because there was so much else to talk about. She told 
me was hard for her by then to know where her problems really started, as she had 
spent so long blocking them.  
 
Crucially, she had had the chance to discuss all of this with her therapist in her 
mother tongue. Although her English was fluent, Samira had wanted to see a 
therapist who understood her background—they didn’t have to be Lebanese exactly 
but at least Arabic speaking, and a dialect she could actually understand. As it 
worked out, she had ended up with a therapist from another geographic, cultural and 
religious background; but it was someone who understood her mother tongue, and 
shared her experience of negotiating her cultural “difference” in relation to a 
majority culture. This could be found in the phrases that I had previously heard 
therapists use to describe how they would avoid trying to “match” clients and 
therapists culturally: “not too close but close enough,” and how they would say they were 
always “working with sameness and difference” in the therapy room. The way in which 
Feven and Samira related culturally echoed the way they jointly approached 
Samira’s presenting problem: in both cases, their relationship was shaped by the 
“third point” in a triangle, and in both cases, that point stood for a contingent 
majority or mainstream.  
 
Conclusions: Different risks, shared possibilities(?) 
 
Returning to the way clients and therapists might do things differently in this space, or 
other non-mainstream mental health settings, there is more to learn from the triangle 
 173 
relationship of Feven, Samira and the mainstream mental health services that I have 
been treating as an “absent presence”. It reveals that the risks associated with this 
diagnostic category were felt by both but were very different for the therapist than 
they were for the client. In a similar way to the risks of accepting “anxiety” cases into 
the service for a specific contract, accepting someone with a diagnosis of a personality 
disorder technically breached the contracts this service had agreed to work under. 
The potential for harm was evoked by the assumption that a voluntary service like 
this could not meet the more severe and enduring needs often connected to this 
diagnostic category and that were the responsibility of other professionals or services. 
In certain cases, like this one, the riskiness extended to the unpredictability associated 
with certain disorders49. But these proxemics of diagnoses and the mainstream were 
completely different for the people who carried these (potential) diagnoses. Clients 
were rarely aware of what and whom the service was for, beyond the information 
given to them by their referrers or on the website. In a healthcare system that was 
generally based around diagnoses being the gateway to some kinds of care, and 
exclusion from others, the riskiness was both harder to judge and carried more 
weight. Looked at in terms of risks, then, the politics of making diagnosis absent looks 
very different for clients and therapists. But what of the possibilities? 
 
What was striking about the client-therapist relations across the body of ethnographic 
material was that there appeared to be a sense of understanding and attunement in 
these relationships despite differences in the interactions and relationships between 
clients and therapists. The case explored above shows that some professionals in 
voluntary settings did utilise diagnostic modes of classification and thinking when 
trying to situate the mental health issues of clients, however, these professionals did 
not make diagnoses themselves, and were committed to distancing themselves from 
the biomedical framework. This is important because it illustrates that it is not, of 
course, the case that all therapists working in voluntary settings always reject a 
diagnostic description of mental health needs. It is much more relevant and accurate 
to think about the way in which actors generally position themselves in relation to the 
mainstream and its expectations. It is this positioning that creates a space in which it 
 
49 This riskiness was hard to ignore, once the problem had been named in this way; I too, noticed a 
reticence to “get too close” as I sat on the bus on the way to the outskirts of town on my way to 
Samira’s house, and an added edge on my responses to her eccentricities and contradictions. 
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is possible to understand, articulate, and enact needs differently. What becomes 
interesting about the phrase doing things differently more generally is that it can take on 
a double meaning in this space: not only are actors doing things differently to the 
mainstream, but they may all be doing things differently—even from one another.  
Just as client and therapist can be both different together and different from one another, 
they may also think differently about needs together, or think differently from one 
another. By making the mainstream, (its diagnostic practices and labels) absent, there 
is space for difference and non-agreement, but this always depends on that third 
point, constantly present and yet constantly made absent. 
 
This was a chapter on relationality: how entities can be understood in relation to 
others, even as these relations span very different scales. In fact, the “big NHS” as K 
described it (“so big it kind of loses you,” according to Samira) next to these small 
community based centres was a key part of, and exemplified, their relationality. In 
this way, I have pushed my analysis of relationality further than an inside/outside 
contrast that arose in the first three data chapters, to one that begins to encompass 
multiple relations, of which I have analysed a very small network in this chapter. This 
nods to the radical relationality, which I described in my deployment of vitalist ideas; 
a relationality no longer tethered to a totalised centre in relation to an outside 
“surrounding,” but rather a whole network of relations spreading out from any living 
thing. This chapter was also about risks and possibilities (or potentialities) to do things 
differently, which were created by making mainstream systems absent from their 
practice. In the next chapter, I look at more active ways of “doing difference” and 
more specifically, build on a concept I have touched upon here, of “doing need 
differently.”     
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Chapter 8: Doing Need Differently  
 
Scene 1: Spilling out of the “IAPT box” 
The screening of new referrals takes place during snatched moments during the 
clinical manager’s impossibly busy day. The process is necessarily ad hoc, given that 
referrals have to be looked at before they enter the system, reducing the risk of them 
being unnecessarily added to the (consistently overloaded) waiting list. Today, I have 
asked to join one of these snatched moments. I lean in across the outspread files to 
watch the clinical manager stripe each relevant piece of information on the referral 
notes with a highlighter, commenting under her breath as she goes. The information 
she is highlighting will help justify why these cases have been earmarked to be 
“IAPT-Plus”: a strange category, which I haven’t heard before. The audible 
commentary and bits of highlighted text materialise as a fragmented list in my field 
notes: 
 
An Iranian woman of 39: “Domestic Violence,” “Loss of husband after 
leaving eight months ago,” “Potentially a child bride when married.” 
… 
An asylum seeking Kurdish man: “recently migrated from Iran, to Iraq, to 
the UK” “PTSD” [she brackets this, saying she is not keen on the term, 
adding her own notes to the margin:] “Family shot in front of him,” “asylum 
claim rejected” 
… 
A British Caribbean man: “homeless” “in and out of psychiatric care,” and 
“a previous client at the Centre” [he called the service after his file was 
closed, saying “help me,” I am told]  
 
As we take a last look over the final list of referrals, the highlighted text makes the 
case for these people’s need to access care painfully clear. And yet it also seems to 
massively exceed the remit of a community service, commissioned to provide talking 
therapy for low level “common mental disorders.” This, I find out, is what “IAPT-
Plus” is for: a label that has recently been made available to services which are 
“similar” to mainstream talking therapy services, but which have been commissioned 
to enable the inclusion of people facing different, more severe problems. It has been 
introduced amidst difficult, on-going negotiations between local clinical 
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commissioners and practitioners in voluntary sector services about the parameters of 
“appropriate need.”  
 
If the previous chapter was about the work that goes into making diagnostic 
categories absent, then this chapter can be understood as an analysis of the work that 
goes into making that absence into a presence. Where diagnostic categories of mental 
health need were seen to be something that were too medical, too individualised for 
the values that have long been established in these voluntary settings, I have 
described how both users and providers sought to do things differently. I came to 
refine this concept, with an eye on how it works in the assemblage of practices, places 
and concepts that make up “access,” landing on the practice of doing need differently. I 
focused on the relations that this enacted between different sets of actors; specifically, 
how the relation between client and therapist was shaped and enabled by the absence 
of the mainstream. What was important about this relationship (between client and 
therapist) was the space that this created for something other than a medicalised or 
mainstream psychotherapeutic encounter such as CBT. I framed diagnostic 
categories as an “absent presence” (Law and Mol 2001; Law and Singleton 2003): 
that which is manifest in its absence and performs the function of making something else 
present within a set of relations. But what is the “something else” that the absent 
mainstream brings into being within each site of alternative mental health care? How 
exactly might this afford different, non-diagnostic enactments of mental health need 
in each therapeutic space? And what tensions remain between the ways in which 
need comes to be felt, articulated, and made known across these spaces? 
 
Chapter overview 
 
In this chapter, I look at the internal logics around need within each site, even as 
these actors wrestle with expectations and demands from the outside. I will “zoom 
in” on various scenes of negotiation, which all say something specific (but 
interconnected) about the concept I introduced at the end of the previous chapter, of 
doing need differently. This data will make visible the work, negotiation, and pitfalls 
involved in this practice, specifically for practitioners involved in the administrative 
work of inclusion or exclusion at each service. The scene I have just sketched above 
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hints at the on-going negotiation and compromise, which practitioners carried out in 
order to maintain a space within which they could provide therapy for problems that 
“spill out” of contractors’ and funders’ conceptualisations of mental health need. 
Throughout parts 1 and 2 of this chapter, I will return to this particular story to 
explore what exactly the “IAPT-plus” category was and what function it performed 
in this particular voluntary organisation. The unfolding of this story will help to move 
my analysis on from the more discursive practices around what doing need differently 
‘should’ look like, to the hard work it takes to uphold these ideals in everyday 
practice.  
 
In the second part, I extend my gaze to other scenes across my field sites, in which I 
trace the labour-intensive negotiation that took place once these ideals “hit the 
ground” in clinical practice. These scenes, in contrast to the discursive spaces of the 
first part, are characterised by messy, murky and perilous enactments of need 
through administrative work, clinical decision-making and the day-to-day struggle to 
maintain these organisations’ capacities (financial, therapeutic, social, spatial) to 
provide care. These frontiers of negotiation are where need is produced and where 
this need, in turn, produces eligibility for care. And so whilst these scenes show how 
need is uniquely negotiated and “done differently” (in different places, by different 
people, with different values) they share these themes of productivity and the on-going 
labour of inclusion. But what is strange about both of these spaces, is that they are 
purely professional spaces, devoid of the “human-in-need”, as I describe it in the last 
part of this chapter. The third part of the chapter therefore forms a discussion 
around this (non)-negotiability of need, exploring a final space that was largely 
invisible to me: that of the therapeutic encounter. In all the centres, there was a very 
“human” encounter of a clinical assessment, the length of a therapy session, that was 
central to clinical decisions about access. I present this human encounter as just one of 
the ways in which need emerged in a milieu, but one that was particularly valued by 
my interlocutors because of an ethical commitment to understanding need as located 
in place and time.  
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Tensions and entanglements between lived and known need  
To make sense of these spaces in which need is negotiated, enacted, and produced as 
eligibility criteria for care, I make use of the concept of the “milieu,” as I have 
described it in earlier chapters of the thesis. As a “fundamentally relative notion” 
(Canguilhem 1952/2008), the milieu works as a category to understand the relation 
between living things (such as the human in need) and their environments. The 
ethnographic material speaks to the way that need emerges differently at different 
sites, but that there is nothing pre-determined about this, because each person shapes 
their own milieu. This opens up possibilities to look at the ways in which need is 
produced vis a vis different environments within various scenes of negotiation: the way 
that, in practice, needs do not simply exist, waiting to be named, but rather they are 
produced in relation to specific environments. In this case, they are produced in 
relation to places of therapeutic care, which contain very particular value sets, as well 
as having their own capacities and boundaries.  
 
The scenes in this chapter show the painful tensions and entanglements between 
lived and known need. This means my analyses go beyond the clinical encounter and 
attend to the administrative, professional (and yet often distinctly affective) spaces 
where need comes to be known and legitimised. In this way, these spaces are part of 
a milieu that has multiple constraints, constantly being negotiated by both therapists 
and clients.  Here, need is not only felt or experienced moment-by-moment but also 
must be pinned down and made legible through clinical and administrative practices. 
I argue that whilst this is a productive space, it is one of ethical compromise and 
constraint. It is also indicative of the constant tensions between need that is 
understood as “different,” indeterminate, limitless and need that can be contained 
and fixed to eligibility criteria. In the pages that follow, I grapple with questions of 
how care providers struggle with these tensions. 
 
I. What should “doing need differently” look like? 
 
I was interested in the ways that these voluntary organisations articulated their 
approach to need, and “meeting needs,” particularly when it came to differentiating 
themselves from mainstream NHS providers. In the previous chapter, I framed the 
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“the mainstream” in relation to other actors (the people and places that make up the 
voluntary sector, in this case), suggesting that it is not a fixed point, but rather 
constantly (re-)defined in correspondence with these other actors. In taking such a 
relational perspective, I do not, however, want to obscure from view the clearly 
oppositional sets of knowledge about mainstream/alternative approaches to mental 
health, which were described and reinforced by many of the people I came into 
contact with in my fieldwork. For example, the understanding that mainstream 
services such as IAPT have based their assessments of need on universalist principles, 
which may not be useful for more specific client groups, whilst community-based 
services can better understand the needs of women, ethnic and cultural minorities, or 
people suffering the loss of a loved one. As Anna Tsing (2015, 122) reminds us, even 
though most dichotomies are oversimplifications and suffer as soon as they “hit the 
ground,” they can be useful tools, because they urge us to look for difference. Such 
differences are worth teasing out, before diving into the ways in which they might get 
negotiated, merged and stretched in everyday practice. Let’s call this particular 
dichotomy mainstream need versus doing need differently, and look to an instance where 
this dichotomy was played out in discursive practice (Bacchi and Bonham 2014). The 
exchange below brings to light a rare moment when a representative of the (usually 
distinctly “absent”) mainstream came into one of these voluntary spaces. 
The “IAPT friendly” Outsider 
The clinical meeting at Culture in Mind is different today; the usual cosy circle is 
interrupted by a PowerPoint presentation, projected onto the television screen that 
Miles installed in the new place but is rarely used. We are all sitting a little straighter 
than usual. There is an Outsider here, someone from the local IAPT team, come to 
tell us about how the “recovery system” works and how the centre can improve its 
recovery rates. The organisation needs to know this because, although they are not 
an IAPT service and work with their own specific client group, they have been 
commissioned by the NHS and are monitored using the same system as the 
mainstream services. The problem is that they are nowhere near hitting the national 
IAPT target of at least 50% recovery rates, which in theory they need to be reaching 
if they want their NHS funding to continue. As the therapists filter in and take their 
seats in the horseshoe formation, I learn that the Outsider is not a complete stranger, 
being an old colleague and friend of a senior therapist who recently left the centre. 
Both men are part of the Turkish community and would cross paths working with 
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Turkish speaking clients. One of the other therapists leans in to share this 
information with those of us who can hear, reassuring us that it means he should 
understand at least some of what it means to work with “the community”. There are 
high hopes that he will play the much-needed role of mediator between this small 
room and the huge spectre of IAPT, with its stark measures of mental illness and 
recovery, and its unreachable targets. 
 
As the presentation rolls on, and the interjections come in thick and fast, I realise this 
debate on how to improve recovery rates has less to do with becoming better at 
meeting need (there seems to be broad agreement that they are doing a good job, and 
as well as an essential one), and more about discerning which needs they are (and are 
not) responsible for meeting. More specifically, a stark differences are being made 
visible between the Outsider and the Insiders on how need should be defined and 
contained. On the one hand, there is a commitment to staying true to the rigid IAPT 
criteria of severity and type, and on the other, the expansive psychosocial concerns 
of the intercultural therapy centre are being rearticulated and defended.  
 
Early on in the meeting, it seems like the therapists might be persuaded to adapt 
their gatekeeping practices so that they will take only clients who fall into the 
“depression” category of common mental disorders, and levels 2 and 3 on the mental 
health clustering scale for severity.50 The reward will be that their recovery rates will 
be better and their contract secure, but in order to get to this point, they will have to 
make sure that the clients they take on are—our visitor chooses his words carefully—
“IAPT friendly.” As the back and forth goes on, and senior therapists describe 
insistently the consequences of ignoring the linguistic or cultural needs potential 
clients come to them with (“they will have nowhere else to go”), the advice from our 
visitor becomes more stark: “You really need to work hard at choosing people who 
fit into the ‘IAPT box.’”  
 
His choice of metaphor is unfortunate, given this particular group’s strident 
opposition to “putting people in boxes,” but it exposes something important about 
predicament they are in. On the one hand, the service has been contracted to deliver 
 
50 The Mental Health Clustering System is based on an NHS tool developed for care providers to rate 
the combination and severity of needs, based on their routine screening and assessment process at the 
point of initial assessment or a moment of change in care. The “levels” of need underpinned how 
services were commissioned and was used to differing extents in the clinical decision-making of each 
service.   
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a talking therapy that promises to be “evidence based” and to select service users 
according to a standardised idea of what kind of need they might reasonably be 
expected to meet. On the other hand, however, the whole value system and rationale 
of the intercultural therapy centre is based around being sensitive and responsive to 
different needs. Doing things differently, in a general sense is not just a principle or a value 
in their work; it is their unique selling point and means of financial survival when it 
comes to securing contracts. How else, but by offering such a specialised multi-
lingual and cultural service, could they compete with the evidence-based efficiency of 
CBT services? As the meeting drew to a close, an exasperated Miles explained this 
point to their (by then equally exasperated) visitor, “we are not an IAPT service; if we 
were, the commissioner would say to me, ‘I don’t need you, I have an IAPT 
service.’”  
 
In order to prove the service was having an impact in different ways to what the 
recovery rates showed, it was necessary to defend and justify delivering therapeutic 
work that might not get further than understanding or “bearing witness to” (as one 
therapist put it) people’s needs. Such defences ran through many small mundane 
channels of communication between providers and contractors. A rushed email, 
circulated around one centre on the brink of losing a Charity Impact Award because 
they were falling short of the recovery target, arrived in my inbox early one morning. 
The request for explanations “off the top of [therapists’] heads” had produced a 
cogent list of the aspects of need that could not be contained by the IAPT-defined 
categories such as “level two depression”: 
 
...2. The issues faced by a number of our clients are rooted in socio-economic 
factors. These factors can be poor housing, unemployment, poverty and these factors 
are reflected in how their distress/symptoms manifest. 
3. The complex cases presented here, often by clients who are seeking not only a 
waning in distress or symptoms but in the search for a credible witness to their 
traumatic stories and experiences… 
 
…and so on. Shot through these summary points, buried in a thread of forwarded 
emails, was an insistence that “need” often spills out of the confines of observable 
depression symptoms and measurable levels of severity, into the realms of the socio-
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economic and biographical: what these therapists would often call the clients’ 
“external realities”. This apparent overspill and limitlessness of need was made 
particularly visible by the infamous “IAPT box.” In Part II of this chapter, I revisit 
this tension and examine the creative ways it was managed in clinical and 
organisational practice.  
Doing need discursively 
In discourses of doing need differently, such as those in the talk and text I have described 
above, “need” is framed as inextricable from the “external realities” of people and 
their communities. This non-medical, community focused approach can be pitted 
against a discourse about “the mainstream” that sees need as intra-psychic, and 
understood in terms of the dysfunctional thought processes that could, for example, 
be treated with cognitive behavioural therapy. In the case of Culture in Mind, from 
which I have drawn the examples above, mental health need was seen to be tightly 
bound to external realities of dislocation, discrimination and intersecting socio-
economic factors. Similarly, therapists at the Pankhurst Women’s Centre would be 
attuned to these same issues around migration and dislocation, as well as their 
specific gendered dimensions. Finally, the Stepping Stones Bereavement Service 
works on the assumption that need arises with a particularly complicated or 
distressing grieving process; when the “normal” experience of another person’s death 
becomes entangled with the difficulties of one’s own life. Discourses around need 
were thus embedded in specialised understandings of these external realities, often 
because of personal experiences of being a part of the communities they serve. 
Therapists’ talk about need therefore strengthened the dichotomy between the 
within-person focus of mainstream need, and this more politicised, holistic means of 
doing need differently. 
 
Other dichotomous framings of mainstream need versus doing need differently, which 
surfaced in various ways from the talk of staff and volunteers across all three sites: 
“they” (the NHS) works with a general population, whist “we” (voluntary 
organisations) provide for a specific client group or community; “they” recognise 
mental health need using the tools and training of the medical professions, whilst 
“we” recognise need through interpersonal dynamics; “they” consider need as 
something to be measured (even when it cannot be fully understood), whilst “we” see 
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need as there to be understood (even if it cannot be measured with NHS or NICE 
approved tools). A lot rested on maintaining such distinctions. Recall Miles’s 
cautionary note that if his organisation conformed to the same inclusion and 
exclusion criteria as the IAPT services that they were commissioned alongside, they 
would no longer be of use to the community they served and would lose their 
contract. In similar ways across the discursive spaces of these voluntary settings, it 
was necessary to highlight a certain kind of difference and specialism, so as not to 
become muddled with the mainstream, falling into the trap of being unfairly 
evaluated against their standards (which assumed a great deal more resources to treat 
for a much simpler kind of need). The set of “ideal type” distinctions that I have 
recounted above helped with this, but often they were hard to maintain.  
 
In the following section, I take a closer look at how these dichotomies would “hit the 
ground” to find a host of competing values about the way need should be 
constructed. In the ethnographic scenes below, I seek to demonstrate that there is no 
pure space in which a single set of values can be put into practice; rather, need is 
practiced through laborious processes of negotiation and compromise. One feature of 
these discourses “hitting the ground” was the way they were operationalised within 
administrative practice. I have raised the question of how absent diagnoses might be 
made into “something else” – a different articulation of need. Making absence into 
presence is often talked about as something being “made visible,” but this doesn’t 
speak well to the enactment of need, which never takes shape or becomes something 
solid that one can see. I prefer to talk about need being made legible, in order to 
understand it as a recognisable entity. “Administrative legibility” (Matza 2018, 152) is 
a useful idea, because it speaks to the bureaucratic requirements of enabling access to 
care, and to the painful compromises that I describe playing out in the scenes below. 
 
II. Negotiating need 
Scene I: Spilling out of the “IAPT box” (continued) 
The pre-assessment screening again: we are in the communal workspace of Culture 
in Mind. K and I are eyeballing the list of what she has earmarked as potential 
“IAPT-plus” cases: people who require culturally sensitive therapy but who may not 
“recover” in 6-12 sessions. This sentence catches in my mind, the reasoning behind 
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it still unclear to me. It’s not the first time I have heard the term “IAPT-plus” but it 
is the first time I have seen it put to work. K explains to me that only one in five 
cases are allowed to “be IAPT-plus,” the rest must be treated as “normal cases”. The 
parameters of need in a “normal case” were initially set by the local clinical 
commissioners according to numeric “cluster levels” and diagnostically defined 
“common mental disorders.” But it became clear (apparently even within the IAPT 
programme) that there were people presenting with needs that went beyond what 
was appropriate for a normal IAPT case but did not have access to secondary mental 
health services,51 usually because they did not have the right diagnosis. Most visibly 
(at least here), these seem to be people who have experienced adverse or traumatic 
life events, due to migration experiences or other forms of cultural dislocation. 
IAPT-plus had been designed to capture cases like this and allow them to access 
talking therapy. After the stand-off about the limitations of the “IAPT box,” and 
other appeals for more generosity in the way appropriate need was defined and 
monitored, the IAPT-plus category was made available to Culture in Mind and 
organisations like it. The only problem is that we have been told it may only be 
applied to a maximum of one in five of all the referrals. Three out of the nine 
referrals in this screening session is too many, but none are excluded from going 
through to the waiting list for full assessment. The decisions will be put off until later 
stages of the assessment and allocation process. By then we will know more about 
who is most likely to benefit from the therapy, who may or may not be able to turn 
up to their sessions every week, and who has already dropped off the waiting list for 
missing two or more assessments. 
 
The strangely permissive “overspill” category of “IAPT-plus” was pivotal to the 
negotiations about what kind of need the service could address under its contracts; it 
opened up more possibilities for legitimately taking on people whose need could not 
be met under the standard IAPT framework.52 Crucially, the category was designed 
for those people who were likely to benefit from the service but would not necessarily 
recover. The fact that the 50% recovery rate target was not being met here—or in 
 
51 The outcome of a clinical commissioning group meeting that year, assessing mental health service 
provision in the local area. 
52 These complex problems are described in the report that came out shortly after this was taken up on 
the Effectiveness of Improving Access to Psychological Therapies (IAPT) and Similar Services as: 
“longstanding complex problems of depression or anxiety, often associated with major adverse historical 
and/or current life difficulties, and co-morbidities, such as personality or relationship difficulties, or long-term 
physical health conditions and medically unexplained conditions (emphasis added) (Galczynski 2017). 
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any of the centres I worked with, for that matter—was no secret, and was often taken 
as validation of what they already knew: that the problems they addressed with their 
clients were unlikely to be solvable in their time-limited sessions. But this was a means 
by which therapists, evaluators, and the commissioners could legitimise identifying 
and addressing need without the promise of recovery. The category was necessary 
because of the impossibility of “meeting” needs relating to homelessness, statelessness 
or on-going domestic violence in twelve sessions, which would bring down the 
recovery rates if they showed up on the IAPT monitoring system. Like most 
negotiations between big contractors and small sellers of services, however, there 
were conditions to the deal that got struck as a result. The fact that the application of 
this category covered only a maximum of one in five clients left the assessing 
therapists in a constant state of compromise. Whilst workable, and in many ways 
effective, it seemed a somewhat limited solution to the problem of need that is 
(according to these therapists) potentially limitless: un-meet-able in twelve sessions, 
and reaching far beyond the inner world of the client.  
 
This negotiation harks back to the riskiness of articulating need according to 
diagnostic categories and the way it exposes these services to damning evaluations 
further down the line when the effectiveness of the therapy is monitored with a 
mainstream system. Wilfully creating this space of indeterminacy helped to avoid 
bounded notions of mental illness from which one can “recover” or indeed remain 
stuck to. Yet still, need had to be made legible, to be transformed into an 
administrative reality of eligibility criteria. Here, then, need was produced vis a vis a 
particular kind of difference. Recall the cases that K highlighted in the opening 
vignette, highlighting certain parts (country of origin, immigration status, childhood 
experience and so on) and bracketing off others (the label of PTSD). Here, need was 
made legible vis a vis cultural difference or extraordinary life experiences of trauma 
and dislocation, rather than being made legible as an illness category with its own 
specific clinical criteria. The diagnosis was made absent but need was still made 
legible, in relation to cultural difference. 
Scene 2: Negotiating upper and lower thresholds of need  
I am sitting in on an assessors’ meeting, this time at the Bereavement Service. Sian is 
leading the meeting, but the discussion—over strong breakfast tea and a table 
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smattered with the crumbs of digestives—feels relaxed; this is one of the few chances 
in the month they are able to do this “catching up”. They are talking about the 
enormous range of different people who come into the service these days, often 
stratified by the time of day their sessions fall into. Marion works in the evenings and 
sees clients who tend to be high functioning professionals and sometimes even willing 
to pay for the service on a voluntary basis. Ralph works during the day, meaning his 
experience of the clients is the “exact opposite.” Sarah concurs with Ralph, but her 
tone is less breezy, less inquisitive than his. She also works during the day, and has 
become uneasy about the kinds of problems she has been seeing in her assessments 
and regular sessions recently. In addition to their experiences of bereavement, one 
client is very paranoid, another has severe panic attacks that stop her getting to the 
centre some weeks… As she trails off, Sian (as Sarah’s supervisor) interjects with a 
question about how this came about and wonders whether the assessments could 
have been done differently, implying that a different conclusion may have been 
reached. Sarah thinks back to the last client she mentioned, eyes raised to the ceiling. 
“Well, it was clear from the clinical notes from [the referrer] what the issues were, 
but we were never going to turn them away.” 
Ralph turns to me, knowing that this is something I am interested in, explaining 
gently that, “Once someone has come through the door here, we hardly ever turn 
them away. So in a way, the assessment almost isn’t there to decide if they’re 
appropriate.” 
Sian shakes her head ever so slightly, waiting for Ralph to finish. Then she changes 
tack from her exploratory questioning, and, looking pained, leans in with her palms 
flat on the table, insisting, “but it is. The assessment has to be more discerning now. 
We can’t take everyone in.” 
 
This moment of disagreement within the assessors’ meeting embodied a paradox in 
the way that this service had to work at that time. Sitting alongside, and in tension 
with their longstanding ethos of keeping “open doors,” the staff were having to think 
seriously about how to manage the increasing volume of people being referred to 
their service, and the severity of the problems that they were coming to them with. 
This theme emerged uncomfortably intertwined with the “dumping ground” 
metaphor I explored in detail in chapter 4. What had been a policy that was deeply 
bound up with their principle that bereavement counselling was open to anyone, was 
now threatening to “sink them,” as a concerned outsider from another member of 
the consortium put it. Again, metaphors of survival and disaster quickly creep in to 
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talk about the boundaries and capacities of these spaces of care.  I was told many 
times that the change was (at least in part) a fallout from the cuts to mainstream 
secondary mental health services over recent years. More and more people who had 
suffered a bereavement but had had additional, often pre-existing and severe mental 
health difficulties, were being referred to the service rather than to the NHS for more 
intensive treatment.  
 
The service had become more and more professionalised as a result of this over the 
years, a move away from the era when they would provide induction courses for 
untrained volunteers wanting to offer community-based counselling. As the client 
group changed, the service adapted: a neat echo of the supply and demand logic the 
commissioning system is rooted in, perhaps. But not quite. The principle of supply 
and demand in health services suggests that services respond to need “in” individuals 
“out there” in the communities they serve. The therapists and other staff members I 
was talking to were acutely aware of the heightened levels of need they had become 
responsible for attending to, but they almost never put this down to changes in the 
community itself, but rather the changing (and increasingly sparse) landscape of 
“supply”, of which they were only a tiny part. 
 
The practical challenges of this shift in responsibility threw the hard work of 
negotiating need into sharp relief. The Bereavement Service’s version of “doing need 
differently” revolved around a normalisation and de-medicalisation of grief and loss: 
“everybody in the end, if you live more than a week, has somebody that dies—it’s 
part of normal life!” A quote from Gail, an administrator, who reminded me of this 
during an interview in which I was probing about her declaration that the service was 
for “Anyone.” She went on to say that whilst bereavement is normal, what makes 
people come to the service is their complicated lives. Like in the first scene at Culture in 
Mind, I observed a kind of “spilling over” from a narrowly defined concept of need 
as internalised disorder, to the external realities of living and, of course, dying. This 
time, however, these external realities were not so much focussed on the minority or 
marginal experience as on experiences that were potentially universal. There was an 
insistence that this particular expression of need is not only normal in that it is not 
pathological, but also in that it is universal: “people die, that’s life!” (Gail again). But 
how was the service to remain, in principle, for “Anyone”, when an increasingly 
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large proportion of their clients were coming to them with needs that were (according 
to the service’s contracts, at least) too severe to be addressed by volunteer 
bereavement counsellors? Who is “Anyone”, when the upper and lower thresholds of 
need were pressing in on the eligibility criteria for the service?  
Needy enough/not too needy 
A balancing act was taking place, which was arguably unsustainable, but the only 
way in which therapists could enact need according to the organisation’s ethos. 
Therapists and administrators took seriously the limited capacity for absorbing the 
new more severe need they were encountering whilst also working to make anyone 
they believed would benefit from their care eligible for it. The thresholds for 
eligibility were set largely by their NHS contractors through the “Mental Health 
Clustering” system, which determined the level of (potential) clients’ mental health 
need calculated by screening tools for anxiety and depression. Assessors often had to 
manage a mismatch between their clinical judgement and the scores on clients’ 
forms. A woman falling short of the lower threshold for being an eligible “case” for 
the service made Sian exclaim as she pulled out an intake form she had been 
searching for in the filing cabinet: “I know damn well that this woman’s problems are 
not being captured in the form.” Waving the thin yellow sheet in front of her, she 
went on, “She’s the kind of woman who wouldn’t want to make a fuss or worry 
anyone, so she appears like this on paper.” Sian announced there and then she was 
going to roll out a training on this—how therapists can encourage clients to “express 
what they need,” in order for them to access the help the service offers. The 
negotiations of paper-based thresholds played out at the upper-end too. In a training 
session on how to “cluster” clients to assess eligibility, there was talk of doing the 
forms orally for clients who were scoring “too highly” because of the stress of filling in 
the forms. Experienced therapists were very willing to put the “art” of their clinical 
judgement over the “science” of standardised guidelines to accept people who were 
technically too severe but whom they felt would benefit from their therapeutic care. 
 
The necessity to limit the enormous range of different needs the service attended to 
risked undermining the Bereavement Service’s version of doing need differently, in that it 
made it increasingly difficult to practice the ethos of opening their doors to anyone 
and everyone. In response, staff members who found themselves in new gatekeeping 
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roles continuously negotiated these upper and lower thresholds of what constitutes 
“appropriate” need (needy enough, not too severely needy). This was not a case of 
“breaking the rules” or disregarding the need to ensure that the service was not 
taking on people they could not help; rather, a whole set of actors, including Sian, the 
trustees, and assessors coalesced around the problem and the paradox that became 
something of a public secret: that whilst the service was supposed to be for “anyone”, 
it “could not take everyone in.” Making people eligible for the service involved 
paying constant attention to where needs may have been over or under estimated by 
clinical tools and adjusting for this accordingly.  
 
“Need”, in this case was being enacted in a dangerously porous environment, which 
nevertheless had limited capacity. Assessments and articulations of need emerged in 
surprisingly technical forms and in increasingly bounded (if artificially so) ways in 
order to manage this. The understanding that death and loss is part of “normal” life 
meant that doing need differently was about constantly managing and limiting the many 
forms of loss experienced by a growing range of people—not according to specific 
pathologies or categorisations but rather through levels of “appropriate” need. And 
so the adjustments of eligibility criteria, such as where people fell within the clustering 
system, were about carefully containing limitlessness, in contrast to the scene I 
described above, which was all about permitting it. Need here was produced vis a vis 
de-medicalised but nevertheless “normal” experiences of human life and death. 
Scene 3: Negotiating ‘Other’ classifications of need  
The unwieldy sheet of paper, which is usually stuck to the wall of the administrative 
area of the Women’s Centre, has been extricated from the pin board and brought 
into the clinical meeting. The document, containing a chart of all their funders and 
contracts, is treated with a sense of distain; it is a representation of the fragmented 
and scarce funding landscape they must navigate in order to carry out their work. It 
seems to have grown since the last time I saw it. Melek battles with the sheet of paper 
on the small round table she is leaning on, amongst the piles of slimy plastic wallets, 
which hold all the client files that need to be discussed. It would be their reference 
point throughout the meeting, laying out all the names of their funders, how many 
sessions they would fund for each client, and—crucially—what kind of women they 
were providing funds for. An example: for the NHS contract, the criteria might tell 
them that if she is of BME (Black and Minority Ethnic) background, has experienced 
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childhood sexual abuse or domestic violence and is registered as a resident of the 
relevant borough, and there is money left in that funding stream, that woman would 
be eligible for 12 sessions of one to one therapy. If any of these criteria are not met, 
the therapists around the table will run their fingers down the left-hand column of 
the chart calling out names of alternative private sources of funding and then asking 
if the client could fit into their criteria: the Refugee and Asylum Seeker Women’s 
Project? Young Mothers? Trafficked Women? Much of the allocation process hinges 
on whether they can fit the woman into one of the boxes in the document. 
 
There are many cases to cover today, after several of weeks of sick leave from the 
clinical services manager, and the loss of the main volunteer administrator (who is 
perhaps the only staff member who has a constant handle on the on-going influx and 
management of new clients—remembering all the names and backstories by heart). 
The room is hot and the meeting already feels chaotic and difficult. The first case: a 
woman that has been earmarked for the ‘Empowerment and Access’ funding stream. 
This fund, for women with chronic illness and disability, is known for being 
notoriously easy to shoehorn almost anyone into, if they have a mental health 
problem that can be described as disabling. But according to Nour, who assessed 
her, she is very high functioning and just wants to explore some “interpersonal 
dynamics”. They start thinking about how to place her, if not according to a 
disability framework. “Is she a refugee?” asks D, hopefully, finger on the A3 sheet.  
“No, she’s Austrian,” says Nour. “Ok well then how about…” She suggests some 
streams that don’t focus specifically on BME, but more generally on “socially 
disadvantaged” women. Then someone interjects by asking again if she really is 
“socially disadvantaged.” Slowly it emerges that the woman is in fact “loaded” (or at 
least has much more money than the other women who access the service), and has 
had nine years of psychotherapy in the past. They all decide that Nour should liaise 
with the woman and tell her she is sorry but she “doesn’t fit into the category” of 
people the Women’s Centre provides free therapy for.  
 
Before we get to any further files, Paulette, who is not a therapist but in charge of 
much of the fundraising at the moment, asks to join the meeting. She wants to talk 
about unmet “targets”: the number of women they have been funded to provide 
therapy to but haven’t yet seen.  
“Do we have any BMEs? We are lacking them! We need BMEs…” she is half-
joking, putting on an announcer’s voice through a pretend loudspeaker to 
acknowledge the slightly farcical nature of the request. I know, from our endless 
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conversations about the politics of these categories, that she feels able to make light 
of this one, particularly as a black woman who would fall into this “BME” box 
herself.  But at the same time she is entirely serious; she needs some more women 
who can fit this category otherwise she won’t meet the target number of women for 
that funding stream. They move on through the pile of cellophane files and before 
long they encounter a case that is “complex,” which means, in part, that she is hard 
to allocate. Paulette pipes up again: “is she BME? What’s her name?” They look it 
up… “She’s Chilean! Yes!” someone remembers, and finally it is confirmed after 
much thumbing through the woman’s bundled-together clinical notes. Once the 
women finish rolling their eyes at the drama of all of this, they can allocate the (now 
eligible) client to a therapist and offer her twelve one-to-one sessions. They move on 
to the next case. 
 
This scene gives a glimpse into the pitfalls involved in translating different ways of doing 
need into an administrative reality. The realm of private, charitable funds brought a 
whole different set of problems for the assessors to work around. These problems 
were not exclusive to the site I have just described but were particularly pertinent 
there, as they obtained a smaller proportion of their funding from NHS contracts 
than the others and relied more heavily on charitable sources of income for their 
work. This relative freedom from the NHS and reliance on alternative sources of 
funding was a double-edged sword. It allowed them, for example, to provide up to a 
year of therapy to some women—something that was unheard of under NHS 
contracts—and carry out the community-based outreach work with migrant and 
refugee women I described in chapter 5. It was also, however, a large part of what 
drove the fears about the fragmentation and dilution of the therapeutic work that I 
described in the same chapter. The set of problems I want to explore here (which are 
different but interconnected to those ideas that I previously described in spatial 
terms) are about the new set of “boxes” that must be negotiated in the fragmented 
charity funding landscape. Specifically, the new sets of categories that get enacted 
once the argument that different kinds of people have different kinds of needs become 
formalised and translated into yet more eligibility criteria for accessing care. The 
cynicism that surrounded this ritual with the unwieldy funding chart was part of the 
work it took to “bracket off” this hazardous side effect of the Women’s Centre’s 
means of doing need differently.  
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“Difference” in this milieu was largely defined by a bewildering and fragmented set 
of funder-driven “boxes.” Part of what made the process of reviewing assessments 
and making allocations in this way so gruelling was the imperative to “pin down” the 
kind of need in crude enough terms that it could be allocated to one of these boxes, 
and thus, to a funding stream. The funding chart provided an almost cartoonish 
representation of discrete social categories of need, which facilitated this pinning 
down: “disadvantaged women,” “survivors of gender-based violence,” “trafficked 
women” and—troublingly, when put in these terms of self-evident or intrinsic need—
“BME”.53 Whilst this particular meeting revolved around making practical use of 
these funding “boxes”, it would be a mistake to say that these practitioners wholly or 
uncritically subscribed to this system of categorising need. For them, the labour of 
doing need differently involved not just the negotiation of IAPT-defined parameters of 
need, or upper and lower thresholds of appropriate need, but also this assortment of 
funder-defined social categories. The pitfalls of replacing one set of reified categories 
of need (diagnostic) with another (funding-defined), was something that many of the 
therapists were acutely aware of. Reflecting back to the clinical team my observations 
of therapists’ dissatisfaction with funding-defined categories, I was met with the blunt, 
rhetorical question: “Is there really any difference between the NHS diagnostic 
model and the charity funding framework?” So despite the air of pragmatism that 
accompanied much of the clinical and administrative decision-making, these multiple 
forms of negotiation were a constant burden. They also made for tough, often 
inefficient work. 
 
Therapists at this centre found themselves making need legible and legitimate vis a vis 
a less-than-ideal and largely funder-driven framework of difference. In order to resist 
“pinning down” need entirely within this framework, these women would craft 
spaces of indeterminacy. At times this involved them spreading out statements of client 
need (temporally and across documentation), and at other moments, gathering together 
eclectic categorisations of need in one place: As I was often reminded, there was no 
single moment of “diagnosis” in the assessment process at the centre, though there 
were several points at which the kind of need was partially, temporarily or 
 
53 As much as this category of “BME” was used as a shorthand for recognising the disproportionately 
low levels of access to psychotherapy across non-white, non-middle class groups, it was never explicitly 
suggested that being in the “BME” category (as almost all the therapists were) made you inherently 
“needy.” 
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provisionally articulated by therapists or administrators. The assessment and 
allocation meeting was one such point in the process of spreading out. Other points 
included the “presenting problem” (a record of the client’s first expression of their 
needs) and the longer, “clinical formulation” (the outcome of the assessment). Later 
on in the meeting I described above, when the women had grown frustrated with the 
constant back and forth between these different sources, someone came up with a 
suggestion: that the assessors come up with a “one-liner” to write at the top of each 
case to summarise the “outstanding issues” to help fast track them to the most 
appropriate funding stream. In fact, I was more conscious of the growing 
proliferation (rather than consolidation) of different administrative spaces to 
document need, and doubt that this was ever taken up as a simple solution to this 
problem. But the fantasy that they might summarise these vastly heterogeneous issues 
in a “one-liner” exemplifies a second strategy for avoiding the pinning down of 
particular needs: of gathering together different, eclectic forms of need. This was already 
a feature of all the existing assessment documentation, and it was hard to imagine a 
more composite set of descriptors. One “presenting problem”, read out to me from 
an assessment form, frankly itemised “trauma, sexual abuse, rape, moderate 
depression, anxiety.” As such, the “presenting problem” alone could contain an array 
of problems, holding together clinical, biographical and social categorisations of 
need.  
 
The loose, aggregate statements of need, and the different points at which need was 
articulated, formulated and recorded, which all emerged from these practices (of 
spreading out and gathering together), maintained a somewhat elusive space in 
which need could never quite be pinned down, and much less be reified through any 
one system of categorisation. They created important spaces of indeterminacy, which 
countered some of the “box-like” qualities of funder-driven need. And yet, this took a 
huge amount of work, which at times was hard to manage without the technical 
support of paid administrative staff, ironically creating more paperwork, box-filling 
and preoccupation with “the system” more broadly. Producing need as something 
legible and indeterminate was perilous—nearing impossible—in this particular centre. 
This was largely due to the fragmented and funder-driven mode of “doing 
difference” that characterised the organisation at that time.  
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The negotiations were particularly fraught in this setting, but I have been arguing 
that in all these scenes of negotiation, the forms and articulations of difference are 
crucial to understanding the process of enacting need.  Doing need differently cannot 
only be understood in relation to the mainstream, but also in relation to forms of 
difference within a particular milieu. Put slightly differently, doing need differently is not 
done only in opposition to universality, but also in reference to particular forms of 
differentness (a theme I explore further in my discussion chapter of this thesis). Far from 
being straightforward, more authentic alternatives to diagnostic categorisations of 
mental health need, these enactments of need were troubled by the bureaucracy, 
limited capacities, and competing interests associated with this differentness. In the next 
part, I discuss a concern that underpinned many of these problems in the 
bureaucratic negotiation spaces I have been describing. 
 
III. Where is the human in need?  
 
The scenes I have explored above have animated three aspects of the work, 
negotiations, and perils that go into maintaining space for alternative ways of “doing 
need.” They focused particularly on the decision-making processes about eligibility 
and the inclusion or exclusion of incoming potential clients. More specifically, the 
improvising and hustling which therapists did on behalf of the men and women 
accessing the service, whom they understood to be in need. Where were these men 
and women in the negotiations?  Was there some part of them “in” the clinical notes, 
the discussions, the emails, the (non-)recovery rates and so on? More interesting, 
perhaps, is the possibility that they were in some ways “made up” in the processes of 
managing, containing and gathering together various categories of need (Hacking 
2006). All of these ideas are likely to be at work here, but I want to dwell on a much 
simpler observation: of the absence of the living human-in-need in all these discussions. 
There was, as I have described above, an all-important assessment session of fifty 
minutes, which served the precise function of an assessment of need, and which was 
highly valued by clients and therapists alike, for its therapeutic value as much as its 
function in gatekeeping. However, I have made a choice to focus on encounters and 
discussions whose subjects are nowhere to be seen, kept at bay with waiting lists and 
other administrative functions. Their absence is important to note, because it is a 
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reminder that this is a particular story of the way that needs were enacted in these 
therapy centres.  
 “Once I have a human being in front of me…” 
People, human interaction, and humanness in general, was foundational to the values 
of these centres. For example, the trope of not treating people like numbers was important 
in all my field sites. It often came up in day-to-day talk and was almost always used in 
reference to mainstream institutions, whose client groups were so large that (it was 
implied) people would be treated as no more than a number or a statistic. In these 
smaller, community based sites, humanness and treating people like humans was one of the 
ways in which they distinguished their practice from that of mainstream providers. 
And yet, the work that I have documented here has been the work of doing need in the 
absence of the individuals who live and feel that need. This tension emerged as I 
became aware of a split in many therapists’ work, where they would operate 
according to two parallel registers about the clients or potential clients they 
encountered. One register (predominant in the scenes above) referred to the abstract 
terms of “communities”, “client-groups”, or “cases” not yet engaged in therapeutic 
relationships; the other referred to the people that they encountered once the access 
process was complete and regular contact was being made in the therapeutic space. 
The latter seemed to speak to this idea of the cherished role of the human in these 
spaces.  
 
I reflected this tension back to a group at the Women’s Centre, in which the 
therapists bore much of the responsibility for the administrative work of facilitating 
access to the service. The observation in this particular feedback session struck a 
chord, eliciting nods of recognition and bids to share personal interpretations of this 
pattern. Jehona, who ran the refugee project, explained it in terms of shifting 
between two terminologies of “targets” and “human beings,” 
 
For me it’s like shifting between the two… once I have a human being in front of 
me, I treat them as a human being, but there’s a different part of our work which 
requires me to call them “trafficked bla bla.” Now it comes naturally to me, this 
shifting. 
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This echoed around the accounts of others: negotiating need as eligibility criteria felt 
like “playing the game” of contracts and funding, and there was talk of a pragmatic 
approach to “working the system,” but all of this was pitted against a different way of 
working in the room (by this they meant the therapy room). This latter way of working 
was the other, more difficult-to-narrate part of the story of doing need differently. Was 
this where the ‘real’ doing of need took place? I don’t think so. Need was negotiated 
and made legible in the scenes and discourse I described above, and was thus made 
real in different ways, in different kinds of environment. But I am compelled to take 
seriously what all that negotiation seemed to be for: the moment of having “a human 
being in front of me,” when all the game-playing and pragmatism can (at least 
potentially) be set aside. I would argue that it is more productive to understand this in 
terms of ethics than ontology: that these therapists’ concern was less about whether a 
particular need was real than it was about knowing and enacting that need ethically 
according to their logics and values of care. 
 
(When) is need non-negotiable? 
Therapists’ commitment to the human encounter, in which need is un-bounded, 
dynamic and always related to the “external realities” of clients, pertains to the third 
way in which need comes into being. This is different to both the doing need discursively 
described in the first part of the chapter, and to negotiating need in part two. It is also 
closest to the vitalist philosophy that need cannot be pinned down by mechanistic 
explanation and categorised as a fact; rather, it emerges from the relation between 
the individual and its milieu. There seemed to be intrinsic value to this human 
encounter and it was no surprise that service users and providers strived for this one-
to-one space where need could be seen as emergent and unfixed. But the problem that 
they constantly faced was that this kind of need is illegible beyond that therapeutic 
encounter. The need may be produced vis a vis differentness rather than universality in 
the therapeutic encounter but this differentness could take an infinite number of 
forms. This milieu was therefore less productive in creating eligibility than the more 
bureaucratic scenes of negotiation. What I am talking about here is need as it is lived 
and felt by people, compared to the representations of need as they were being 
negotiated by others, at a distance. Again, I would say that these different 
articulations of need are more than “real life” versus its representations: the relationship 
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between life and knowledge was also something of key concern within Canguilhem’s 
vitalism (1952/2008) and plays out vividly in this material. The questions around 
need and its representations in this chapter animate this difficult and always 
imperfect relationship. It is in these terms that I want to acknowledge the tension 
between the way in which therapists and clients would do need in these more intimate 
client-therapist encounters and in the negotiation practices I have been describing. 
 
I was not there to witness these intimate moments of shared client-therapist decision 
making within assessments, but the encounters, as they were described to me, by both 
clients and therapists (and as I recounted in the previous chapter, through Samira’s 
story) were not characterised by the language of compromise, or “playing the game,” 
of the allocation and funding discussions. Unlike the negotiability of IAPT or funder-
defined models of “appropriate need”, there was a sense in which a person’s need 
became self-evident at those given moments. As such, it could not be “pinned down” 
and recorded indelibly as any one “thing” on the assessment form, but in those 
moments, need would emerge and become—if only temporarily—absolute. What I 
understood from both clients and therapists was that in the therapy room, need was non-
negotiable and taken at face value. For clients, the negotiation and questioning took 
place at different moments: the GP, the Home Office, the hospital; for therapists, it 
took place in clinical meetings such as I have described in the ethnographic material 
on “negotiating need” above. This enactment of dynamic, but non-negotiable need is 
the goal of doing need differently, an embodiment of the values that guide this practice.  
However, I have been arguing that the work it takes to uphold these values 
introduces another, messier, more uncomfortable aspect of doing need differently. And 
so, whilst need may be non-negotiable at certain moments of feeling and witnessing 
in the clinical encounter, the data I have presented in this chapter demonstrates that 
the enactment of need goes beyond this clinical encounter. The work, negotiability, 
and perilousness of doing need differently outside of the therapy room tells us that there 
are multiple and often competing values and interests involved in the enactment of 
need. 
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Conclusions: A compromised ethics of inclusion 
 
Taken together, these ethnographic data animate various iterations of doing need in my 
three field sites: the discursive practice of performing the values that underpin the 
assessment of need, the work and negotiation it takes to enact need legitimately yet 
differently to the mainstream, and (mostly invisible here) the moment-by-moment 
dynamic emergence of need in the clinical encounter. Each of these shows the production 
of need within a milieu but with different tensions and entanglements between lived 
and known need: the painful tension between indeterminacy and legibility being 
central to this. 
 
In this chapter, I have turned my attention “inwards” at the specific architecture of 
each of my field sites, in contrast to the previous chapter where I focused on more 
general relations with “the mainstream.” I have focused most intensively on the 
second aspect of doing need differently, myself labouring over the (sometimes tedious) 
scenes of negotiation, where the specific values of each organisation must be 
defended, but also compromised to make need knowable, visible and administratively 
legible. I have focused on these scenes of negotiation, not to suggest that this 
particular enactment of need is “most real,” but to shine a light on those practices 
and spaces in which need is a) most labour-intensively produced, and b) most 
productive, in terms of what it does for people in the bigger story of accessing and 
enabling access to therapeutic care. Much of what is laborious about this process of 
doing need differently, is that it performs important boundary work between these 
voluntary organisations and an ever-encroaching “mainstream.” This speaks more 
broadly to my arguments in the first part of this thesis, about the making and 
remaking of the “surfaces” of these places: their boundaries, porousness and relations 
to the wider system of care. More crucially for the users of the services, however, 
these scenes of negotiation are where decisions get made about what constitutes need 
in general, and who, specifically, is eligible for care.  
 
In these scenes of negotiation, need was enacted vis a vis certain forms of difference, 
which was largely what defined these centres as alternative spaces of care. Each 
centre had its own architecture of differentness, which emerged out of a complex set 
 199 
of values and interests—both internal to each organisation, and coming from the 
mainstream. These values and interests were made most explicit in the second part of 
this chapter, where I described negotiations that revolved around the constraints that 
therapists and administrative staff found were placed around their ideal ways of 
doing need, from “the outside” (be it NHS commissioners, IAPT monitoring 
frameworks, or charitable funding streams). This was a manifestation of their 
positioning on the peripheries of the formal mainstream mental health system: in 
many ways dependent on it, but at the same time having to remain always different. 
Need was therefore enacted vis a vis their own values (of doing things differently), as well 
as in relation to the values and constraints of the mainstream. Adopting the overspill 
category for the IAPT monitoring system, tinkering with the upper and lower 
thresholds of mental health “clustering” set by contractors, and negotiating multiple 
funder-defined “boxes” of neediness, were all ways that this played out in the 
bureaucratic, but affectively charged environment of clinical decision making.  In this 
way, need only came into being in relation to values and articulations of difference, 
within a given environment. 
 
I have been arguing that this administrative, bureaucratic environment was a 
surprisingly productive space, because this is where need was made legible and in turn, 
made people eligible for care. Unlike the abstract discursive space I described in the 
first part of the chapter, or the intimate one-to-one therapeutic space in the last one, 
this was where need took shape as an administrative reality, rendering people eligible 
as recipients of psychotherapy. In the discussion section of this thesis, I raise the issue 
of when need becomes more or less legible within a wider context of national or even 
global matters of concern.54 But here I want to shine a light on the more immediate 
and situated costs that come with this labour of inclusion. When doing need was 
performed in dialogue with multiple constraints and precarious relationships with 
funders, it could never be a pure enactment of the values that therapists strived to 
uphold. All three scenes showed actors employing less-than-ideal parameters of need, 
 
54 Of note here is the way in which Culture in Mind was able to use the “IAPT-plus” category to 
include certain people with severe or “limitless” need through logics of cultural difference and 
migration, whilst the other services tended to have to make the case for each individual, under much 
more fragmented systems of defining their differentness. 
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which they then negotiated and reconfigured—often seeking out spaces of 
indeterminacy in order to make more inclusive, less “box-like” criteria for eligibility.   
 
This chapter has destabilised the notion that by doing need differently to the mainstream 
mental health system, these care providers are enacting a somehow “more real” 
need, or one that is less mediated by categories and bureaucracy. However, it does 
show that these practices are able to produce a more generous, permissive, and 
ethical mode of articulating need, embracing rather than trying to stamp out 
indeterminacies. There is a strong ethics to this: an ethics of inclusion. But putting 
this into practice does not come without cost. I have shown that the labour of 
inclusion is full of perilous negotiation and compromise. Most perilously, it is possible 
to lose sight of “the-human-in-need,” even when this is central to the values and 
ethos of the provider of care. Whilst at any given moment a need may be absolute, so 
much of the work of enacting need I observed was about making need negotiable, 
knowable, and legible. 
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Chapter 9: Discussion and Conclusions 
 
“the milieu proposes without ever imposing a solution.” (Canguilhem 1952/2001, 17) 
 
A year or so after finishing my fieldwork, I push the door open once more and step 
into the familiar space of Culture in Mind. I had received an email from Miles the 
week before: there’s someone he’d like me to meet. The place looks and feels 
simultaneously the same and different. The hotel-lobby waiting room is looking 
more “homey,” having acquired a small jumble of toys in the corner and some more 
chairs, but otherwise not much has visibly changed (to my embarrassment, an image 
of my face, on the poster I made to inform people about the visiting ethnographer at 
the service, still hangs from two pins on the crowded notice board). I know the door-
code, but I don’t use it this time, instead waiting to be buzzed in and greeted as a 
visitor: hugs at the door, a mouthed “hello” from one of the therapists down the 
corridor, hovering at the reception until Miles comes out of the meeting room with a 
young woman, about my age. He introduces her as a doctoral student, interested in 
specialised psychotherapy services and questions around culturally sensitive mental 
health care. 
 
As we finish introductions and sit down in a triangle in the meeting room, I ask 
about what’s new, hoping to get a sense of the real changes that have come to pass 
over the year. I am told that the most recent clinical manager has had to leave 
because, as one of the few paid staff, they could no longer afford to keep her on. I 
imagine this to be a disaster (who will be the point of contact for all volunteers and 
trainee therapists? Who will push back against demands from the commissioners that 
regularly undermine their therapeutic approach?) But I hear that the staff are getting 
on with things and the trustees are unfazed: “we have been in this position before 
and we always survive,” they say. 
 
As we talk about the commissioning contracts that have been renewed and those he 
is worried about, the student interrupts us “so is this part of the NHS, then?” Miles 
sighs and says, “no, it’s not, but it’s a good question. We are mainly funded by NHS 
contracts, but we will always be a charity…” I chime in, explaining what I had 
learned early on about the history of this organisation, and others like it: that the 
founders had all wanted to develop therapeutic models that would eventually be 
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taken up into the NHS. We talk about the current situation and how it is ironic that 
they remain so different from the NHS but are actually closer and more dependent 
on the mainstream system than they have ever been. 
 
“But” says Miles, “it’s important to people we are not a mainstream clinical setting” 
he gestures towards the hallway outside; “they come in here, we’re a bit different, 
we’re not like a hospital or the doctors…” He sighs, repeating her question: “Are we 
part of the NHS…? Well, the NHS is so fragmented now—maybe we should be asking, 
‘what is the NHS…?’ even before we ask ‘what are we?’” 
 
There was something uncanny about this non-ending to the project, something 
cyclical about the way another interested researcher had found her way to this centre 
and was navigating her way around its nebulous relationship with the thing we call 
the “NHS.” It feels apt to conjure this sense of an “anti-ending,” as Anna Tsing has 
called it (2015, 277), to remain true to the sense of “muddling through” with people 
in precarious times. By attending to another beginning, I do not mean to suggest that 
things will simply repeat themselves. This encounter made me acutely aware of the 
increasing fragmentation of the NHS, but also of the shifting relationships between 
the third sector and mainstream, the transitory nature of the service as I had known 
it, and the constant adaptation that must come with surviving in their position within 
this configuration. The tension I identified in the introduction—between the 
universalist policies of IAPT and principles of specificity, competition and choice in 
third sector commissioning—epitomises the age old push-pull between organising 
care around the general or the particular. But questions of what the “third sector” 
“is” and the stability of IAPT as “the mainstream” of psychotherapy in the UK are 
already moving these tectonic plates (Mccabe, Wilson, and Macmillan 2018; 
Burkeman 2016). I have tried to capture some of this sense of constant movement 
and precarity in all three of the centres I spent my time in. In doing so, this 
ethnography reveals some of the painful tensions inherent in making and maintaining 
the “counter clinic”55 within this particular configuration of mental health service 
provision. 
 
 
55 The “counter clinic” refers back to the series of anthropological studies, introduced by Davis (2018), 
which I discuss in detail in Chapter 2 of this thesis. 
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The thesis set out to investigate the co-production of “place” and “need” in voluntary 
sector mental health care, in order to re-think and breath new life into the problem 
of “access.” Whilst the notion of co-production invites entirely non-linear and 
symmetrical thinking, I have divided my ethnographic chapters into two parts, 
starting with Place, followed by the second, on Need. The ordering of these parts has 
helped me to build an original argument, drawing on vitalist ideas of relationality and 
the milieu, as well as the afterlives of these ideas within medical anthropology and 
care studies, to understand how places are generative of certain forms of need, and in 
turn, can enable access to psychotherapeutic care. The legibility of different kinds of need 
reflected the global “turn” to migration as a matter of concern, as well as much more 
local organisational logics.  
 
My approach has challenged standard public health approaches to the problem of 
mental health access, which is based on assumptions of pre-existing unmet need, as 
well as assumptions about healthcare contexts as inert background space in which 
this need is met. This raises a broader point about the relationship between place and 
need in healthcare more generally: that thinking about place as an external influence 
on individual ill health fails to acknowledge the dynamic relationship between people, 
their needs, the spaces of care they inhabit and make up, and (ultimately) the success 
or failure of care “working” on these needs. Re-thinking place and need in this 
dynamic way helps think about individual need, not as fixed to static identities, but to 
situations and moments in place (not what you are, but where you are). This re-
thinking also opens up more honest conversations about how need comes to be 
known in particular ways. These ways of knowing often emerge from relations and 
responsibilities to a “mainstream,” that is itself constantly changing (“what is the 
NHS?”). They are therefore not fixed and should be open to critical analysis. Rather 
than evaluating success or failure to meet need and fill gaps within the third sector, 
we should be asking questions about how responsibilities, burdens, and failures of 
meeting need are (unequally) distributed across different care settings. 
 
Following this line of thinking, I have made visible a paradox: in trying to “solve” the 
problem of access through mobilising voluntary care providers, the precarious nature 
of this care is produced and reproduced. In my analyses, precarity—a concept that 
encompasses the marginality of care providers and recipients, as well as the 
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sociomaterial instability of the sites of care—is not an essential feature of the voluntary 
sector, or the people who it is “for.” However, because of this dynamic relationship 
between people, needs, and places, this precarity is unequally distributed and felt 
acutely in the voluntary sector. In this chapter, I draw together themes that cut across 
the two parts of the thesis, making explicit my contributions: my use of ethnography 
and creative methods to foreground the socio-materiality of “access”; a series of 
interconnected arguments on the paradoxical relations between place, precarity and 
practices of inclusion in the third sector; and finally, my theoretical approach and 
how this has shaped my contribution to knowledge about mental health need. But 
first, a reminder of the arguments I have made and refer to throughout this 
concluding chapter.  
 
*** 
Overview of the arguments, in two parts 
 
Throughout this thesis, I have been arguing for a reformulation of the problem of 
access to mental health care, which moves away from seeing care providers as 
“solutions” to “unmet need.” Instead, I propose a conception of need as emergent 
and situated, taking the places of mental health care provision as the starting point for 
analysing issues of access to care. This opens up new problem spaces around 
practices of “doing need differently,” such as my finding that practices of inclusion in 
voluntary sector mental health care are inherently precarious. This overarching 
argument has emerged through a number of threads within my ethnography, which I 
have presented in two parts: 
 
Part One describes how “place” came into view when the boundaries of services were 
crossed, and the capacities and continuity of their physical space was called into 
question. This process was particularly striking in the voluntary clinics that I carried 
out my research in because they never occupied a fixed or stable place, either 
materially or in the context of a wider landscape of mental health and social care. 
Further, I argue that this “coming into view” was tightly bound up with the spatial 
practices of access and inclusion: managing incoming referrals from a shrinking and 
overflowing mainstream in order to counter the risk of becoming a “dumping 
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ground” (Chapter 4), making and remaking the (non-mainstream) clinic as 
“sanctuary” (Chapter 5), and transition and place-making as an enactment of 
“precarious belonging,” particularly within current vernaculars around migrant 
mental health and extra-state services for “vulnerable migrants” (Chapter 6).  
 
It was in this context that therapists and staff were engaged in constant work to 
survive and adapt to an ever-changing set of demands and relationship to “the 
mainstream.” I describe this as the labour it took to include people, who for various 
reasons did not have a secure or easily accessible place in mainstream mental health 
care. Because of an ethical commitment to inclusion, and a responsibility to provide 
psychotherapeutic care to people who often had nowhere else to go, this labour 
would challenge or breach the boundaries of care providers’ capacities. Precarity was 
a product of these on-going dynamics, rather than an essential feature of the 
voluntary sector.  
 
Part Two picks up on what Part One had begun to reveal about the labour of 
inclusion, and the complicated, often fraught, relations these care providers had to 
the mainstream. It animates how need was enacted in these conditions, first by 
demonstrating how mainstream diagnoses of mental health need emerged as an 
“absent presence”: a product of relations between clients, therapists and the absent 
mainstream. The final chapter demonstrates how that “absence” was made into a 
presence of “something else,” through what I call doing need differently, within the logics 
of each care provider. In these data chapters, I am interested in the potential 
indeterminacy of need, particularly in these non-medical contexts, and the tension 
this created with notions of need as eligibility criteria for care.  
 
I found that doing need differently created possibilities, but this came at a cost. To 
produce eligibility (and therefore access), care providers had to compromise their 
commitment to understanding need as limitless, dynamic, and indeterminate. They 
would make need legible vis a vis certain forms of difference within the milieu of the 
therapy centre. Crucially, these forms of difference were therefore highly contingent 
on the boundary work, precarious positioning, and (sometimes competing) interests 
that I argue characterises voluntary sector mental health care. Throughout Part Two 
of the thesis, I have sought to amplify the ethical commitment of my interlocutors to 
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create spaces and possibilities of indeterminacy when assessing mental health need, 
whilst exposing the trade offs and compromises they made in order to maintain this. 
 
*** 
“Surfacing” Place 
 
A key contribution of this thesis is a methodological one, in which I foreground place 
in my ethnography of access. This is an empirical approach but is also intrinsic to my 
conceptual work and development of theories of relationality, milieu, and material 
semiotics. From the start of this project I was interested in doors and the boundaries 
of the places that they provide access to (Simmel 1909/1994; Latour 1992; Latimer 
2018), and became even more interested when I noticed how, the closer and more 
familiar I became with what lay beyond these boundaries, the more uneven and 
porous they seemed to become— at times almost disappearing from view.  
 
In the first three chapters, I make use of a concept that I introduced in Chapter 3 
(Placing Need: A methodology), conceptually extending Taylor’s (2005) work on 
“surfacing the body” to the notion of “surfacing place.” By this, I mean using my 
ethnography to understand how places materialise rather than treating them as static 
objects. To operationalise this concept, I developed a visual mapping technique, 
which I describe in detail in my methodology. Crucially, I treated the data that this 
mapping generated as images in the making, but also as one of many on-going practices 
and representations that produce place itself as in the making, building on perspectives 
in technoscience and non-representational theories of health and care (Barad 2003; 
Thrift 2004; Andrews 2018). This was useful when working with service users 
because it allowed them to revisit spatial and material “moments of access” in 
interviews. In this way, the data spoke to the idea that “surfacing” is also the practice 
of making surfaces of objects visible (Taylor 2005), but crucially, this “making visible” 
was a process of co-production with each person who had accessed or provided 
access to these spaces. “Making visible,” in this methodology, was not only the job of 
the researcher, but also the people whom I invited to do the “surfacing” and the 
“placing” I describe. 
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This method helped me discover that these “surfaces” (the doors, waiting rooms and 
other thresholds of therapy centres) often emerged as uneven and shifting: becoming 
more or less visible across different people’s experiences (including my own). Service 
users were often all too aware of the liminal spaces of waiting rooms and security 
buzzers, and (in one centre) the ambiguous no-man’s-land outside the main door; 
whilst for therapists, these surfaces could disappear from view over time. This was 
particularly salient in Chapter 6 when clients were “made migrant” by the spatial 
arrangements of the waiting room, whereas the sense of transition disappeared for 
staff as soon as the newness of their (recently relocated) centre subsided. The 
boundary between inside and outside came into view at moments of transition, 
newness and stuck-ness: the spatial conditions of “access”. For me, “surfacing” meant 
making place visible and then keeping it in view. Whilst the text of this thesis makes the 
methods and arguments appear linear, I was in fact constantly thinking about the 
material and spatial qualities of access and inclusion in tandem with my observations 
and analyses of mental health need and eligibility. Placing need was both a 
methodological and a conceptual contribution, established through the mapping 
work and the direction it pushed my analysis towards for the following chapters on 
the enactment of mental health need. This fed into my vitalist arguments about 
places and people as changing, unfinished entities: a refusal to fix my ethnographic 
gaze on a particular population or fixed notion of place or positioning in the care 
system. 
 
The paradox of precarity  
 
I now turn to drawing together specific findings in the first three data chapters: how 
they contribute to understandings of place and states of precarity in the “third 
sector.” Intended to be read as separate stories on interconnected themes, these 
chapters constitute three versions of a paradox that I reveal about access, inclusion 
and precarity. I argue that in all three sites, the work of inclusion reproduced precarity (of 
service providers as well as users) as they managed their position of being “always 
different” and “always almost on the outside.” My methodological and analytical 
focus on the boundaries, thresholds and “surfaces” of these places, brings this 
paradox into focus. My arguments rest on the idea that practices of inclusion and 
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exclusion are inherently spatial and include the “boundary work” that staff and 
therapists engaged in to manage the incoming flow of clients as well as their 
distinctiveness from the mainstream. Inspired by and contributing to the field of 
material semiotics and care studies (Law 2003; Pols 2016; Moser 2017), I challenge 
clear distinctions between metaphors and materiality, particularly in relation to the 
spatial metaphors and material arrangements of “access.” This means that the 
“boundary work” I talk about is often in reference to symbolic work of maintaining 
social and professional boundaries as well as the material context of that work.  
 
Chapter 4, “No Dumping” is about managing exteriority, or the threat of being on the 
outside of care infrastructure. The paradox here was that their (now impossible to 
uphold) “open door policies” created anxieties about becoming a “dumping ground,” 
as well as preoccupations with waste and “people out of place” (Douglas 2013; 
Ahmed 2000). The socio-material boundary work, which I describe as “tidying up,” 
constantly (re)enacted the organisation’s peripheral position in the health and social 
care system. The next chapter is all about the spatial politics of the Women’s Centre, 
this time focusing on the making and re-making of interiority: a place of sanctuary. I 
identified an on-going tension between the desire to preserve and maintain the 
therapeutic space and the need to adapt and extend boundaries in order to include 
excluded women, as well as simply to survive as an organisation. Paradoxically, 
practices of disaster and survival (along with the threat of encroachment, 
fragmentation and dilution of values) came to define “sanctuary” in this site. Chapter 
6 on the relationship between precarity and place exploits a moment of transition 
(the moving of the centre) to understand themes of belonging and non-belonging 
amongst providers of the service as well as clients. Ultimately, I argue that precarity 
(and more specifically a sense of precarious belonging) is produced, not only by being out 
of place but by being included in certain places, at the margins of mental health care. In 
sum, these chapters point to a broader paradox in the way that inclusion and the 
“problem of access” is addressed in the everyday practice of third sector mental 
health care. The constant socio-material boundary work it takes to create and 
maintain places of safety, inclusion and care for people who may not “belong” 
elsewhere in the mental health system, can reproduce precarity, rather than solving 
problems of uncertainty, exclusion and instability. 
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In contrast to most of the social science literature on access to healthcare, which 
focuses on practices and policies of exclusion56, I have told a story of inclusion. 
Throughout my fieldwork, I often felt that, as an ethnographer, my job was to was to 
pinpoint the “unintended consequences” of practices and to “make visible” the 
exclusions and absences caused by inadequate care provision. But the more time I 
spent with people devoting their (voluntary or poorly paid) time to getting people 
through the doors of these three small services, and critiquing the mainstream for 
failing to do so, the less I felt that another critical voice “revealing” exclusion in these 
contexts would be useful. Despite the intense discussions around whom exactly these 
services were for and where their priorities lay, it was patently obvious that their 
overarching values revolved around getting people in, rather than keeping (certain) 
people out. What I did see, however, was an astounding amount of work, 
compromise, and cost (in values and time more than financial resources) involved in 
these practices of inclusion.  
 
The boundary work I have described above was part of a broader concept I develop 
in the later chapters of the thesis on the labour of inclusion. This goes beyond the 
material and spatial boundaries of place and pertains to the production of need as 
eligibility criteria. What I seek to reiterate here, is that this too produces and 
reproduces the precarious nature of these forms of care and their accessibility. I 
therefore argue that inclusion itself warrants critical reflection, particularly in light of 
my earlier point that it matters where access takes place: when care provision is 
constantly on the edge, inclusion is troubled by risk, uncertainty, and compromise. I 
have maintained an ethnographic commitment to preserving the messiness of this 
story of inclusion on the edge. I take this forward in my discussion below on the tensions 
I observed in how need was enacted under these conditions. 
 
 
60 As I have discussed in my literature review, research on healthcare access more generally is focused 
on “barriers and facilitators,” assuming that obstacles for the “hard to reach” cause exclusion. Critical 
social science literature on immigration and access to care also focuses on exclusory practices 
(Rousseau et al. 2008; McKeary and Newbold 2010; Arnold, Theede, and Gagnon 2014, for 
example), or illegality (Miklavcic 2011), humanitarian logics in France (Ticktin 2006; Ticktin 2011; 
Fassin 2012), or, like Goldade (2009), the way the “suffering body” has been used strategically, 
illustrating constraints on medical citizenship, whilst the work of inclusion tends to go unexplored. 
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Different kinds of need, different kinds of place 
 
In Part Two of this thesis, I focus on the enactment of need as eligibility criteria for 
psychotherapeutic care from these non-mainstream services. Specifically, I aimed to 
describe and analyse the processes, practices, discourses and spaces through which 
mental health “need” comes into being. The story that these two chapters tell lead on 
in various ways from the first three chapters; one thread being the spatial, practice-
based and discursive production of difference, or more specifically, of doing things 
differently to a more standardised mainstream. Whilst methodologically I was not 
aiming to produce a comparative study of my field sites, ethnography invites constant 
comparisons between cases, as well as between the general and the particular (Yates-
Doerr and Labuski 2015). Here, I want to turn my attention briefly to the differences 
between the organisations I worked with. Two surprisingly opposing themes emerged 
in Chapters 4 and 6: dumping and belonging (albeit a precarious belonging). Why were the 
organising themes in these chapters so different and how did they reflect the 
differences between sites?  
 
Whilst both centres were places for people who were excluded from or turned away 
from mainstream services, often having “no where else to go,” Stepping Stones was 
constantly struggling against becoming a “dumping ground.” Bereavement was 
rapidly becoming a category of exclusion or “wastebasket category” (Lock 2013) for 
those without access to other forms of care. Staff at Culture in Mind also struggled to 
manage the demand for their service but I was constantly made aware that the 
heterogeneity of their staff and client group also held them together, as they shared 
various migration histories and forms of “cultural difference.” I watched as Stepping 
Stones’ open doors policies threatened to “sink them,” whilst Culture in Mind gained 
recognition from commissioners and funders and attracted the media, other third 
sector organisations, and academics with an interest in migration and culture in 
mental health.57 This reflects the global “turn” to migration and mobility that I 
described in Chapter 2 and demonstrates the powerful interconnectedness of politics, 
 
57 The Women’s Centre seemed to be well aware of this necessity to define whom the service was for 
(“whose sanctuary?”), and leaned increasingly towards organising the service around migrant 
communities and their needs. But these developments, as I describe in Chapter 6, came with their own 
specific politics of difference and recognition, that further complicate my comparative work between 
the centres. 
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public health and the academy. I came to understand that clearly demarcating 
difference helps to demarcate whose interests are at stake and whether these interests 
relate to matters of concern at larger scales (Latour 2004c; Moser 2008). Here however, I 
want to interrogate this comparison across sites with specific reference to my findings 
about the legibility of need.  
  
In Chapters 7 and 8, I argue that differentness, and doing things differently, played a 
major role in making need legible. By this, I mean that need became operationalised 
as a knowable and negotiable entity vis a vis difference, and in particular, the 
environment (or milieu) in which difference is valued and cultivated. This contrasts 
sharply with the standards and universality that were seen to characterise mainstream 
systems of classifying mental health needs, even if we assume that universality must 
also be valued and produced in mainstream settings (Berg and Timmermans 1997, 
2000). As service users came through the administrative system of referral, screening, 
assessment, allocation to a therapist, it was important to be able to articulate, and 
perhaps even more importantly, to record the kinds of needs that the person had and 
their resulting eligibility for psychotherapeutic care (making it legible even if it was not 
visible or entirely knowable). Chapter 7 speaks to the idea of being in opposition to 
the mainstream, where I tell stories of actors making diagnoses absent from their practice 
or their articulations of their own need. Samira, the young woman who had inherited 
an assortment of difficult and often contradictory assessments of need (deftly tossing 
them aside or bringing them into view when necessary) showed the risks and 
possibilities this offered her and her therapist. This chapter opens up an exploration 
of doing need differently that I address in the remainder of the thesis, following the 
“something else” that was made possible by this complex choreography of keeping 
the mainstream absent, yet always in sight.  
 
The final chapter is where I develop the notion of the legibility of need more fully, in 
terms of the internal logics of doing need differently. I argue that need comes into being 
in relation to values and articulations of difference, within a given milieu. What I do 
not explicitly discuss in the ethnographic material in this chapter is the puzzling lack 
of articulations of need from the perspective of the clients at the centres (beyond the 
therapists’ worries about the absence of the “human in need” in their administrative 
processes). During the fieldwork, I was constantly perplexed by how little I was able 
 212 
to glean from my careful questioning about what people felt their needs were and 
whether they felt they were understood in the needs assessments. Often, the distress 
they felt when they approached the centres was described elusively as “this,” 
accompanied by a gesture of hands about their chest or head; and when I spoke to 
them early on in their therapy, they would still be “finding out what was wrong” or 
“discovering new things each week.” Foregrounding place and the milieu in which 
need emerged helped me to make sense of this indeterminacy, next to (and spilling out 
of) the “boxes” that would be filled in in the administrative spaces I observed.  
 
This focus on place also helped me to make sense of the comparison I made above 
between the troublesome position of being a service for “anyone,” and the clearly 
defined role of providing care for a client group recognised by their “cultural 
difference.”58 The latter service, providing a therapeutic space specifically for ethnic 
and cultural minorities, was a more clearly demarcated and recognisable kind of place. 
Offering a new angle on how different social categories or “kinds” of person play into 
the know-ability of states of mental health (Béhague 2018; Hacking 1995), I showed 
how different kinds of need were made legible in, and in relation to, different kinds of 
place. If at times, it felt the population or “client group” of my study felt unclear or 
elusive, it is because these social categories were not my starting point and I wanted 
to maintain the shifting and at times ambiguous social criteria that determined whom 
these services were for. I was, however, interested in these categories and how they 
came into being in parallel to need: how they made different kinds of need legible. By 
foregrounding place, rather than seeing it simply as the “context” in the background of 
clinical assessments and containers for certain predefined “client groups,” I 
developed a novel and situated understanding of the way need was brought into 
being. 
 
This interrogation of the practices, places, values and interests that enact “need” is 
becoming increasingly crucial to the analyses of medical anthropologists and 
sociologists looking at the health and social care system more broadly. At least within 
the UK context, the “emerging languages of need” that I have identified in mental 
 
58 This finding builds on the work of Kirmayer (2011) on the “politics of recognition,” (Taylor and 
Gutmann 1992) with a slightly different focus; analysing the recognition of the care provider, and its 
logics and eligibility criteria over the individual or community. 
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health fields have been paralleled in the shift towards integrated systems of health 
and social care. “Need,” rather than disease or pathology, is what services are being 
designed to respond to, particularly in models of care provision that are trying to 
move the focus away from hospitals and “into the community”59 (The King's Fund 
2019). This is a direct result of the push to build a single system around health and 
social care, challenging the historical split between the two domains and the lack of 
social care which is “free at the point of access,” and currently based upon stringent 
assessments of needs (as well as means). The language of need seems to reach beyond 
standardised classifications of un-wellness or disability, particularly those needs which 
as seen to be specifically “social,” but the underlying assumption remains that they 
must be recognisable (or legible in the vocabulary I have been using) and ultimately 
“met,” even in projects that abandon notions of “cure.” And so the kinds of concerns 
I have been describing regarding how to recognise, make visible and manage upper 
and lower thresholds of “need” in non-medical terms, are by no means confined to 
voluntary sector mental health care. Medical anthropologists have a long line of 
established critique on narratives of medicalisation and diagnosis in the clinic, but we 
must develop new questions about the bureaucratic and socio-material arrangements 
of needs assessments in the increasingly blurred spaces between “the clinic” and “the 
community.”  
 
Ongoing tensions between legibility and indeterminacy 
 
What were the problems associated with making need legible, and making people 
eligible for care, in this way? Throughout the thesis, I have been committed to 
charting everyday practices—particularly of therapists and staff, whom I was able to 
observe and talk to over many months—endeavouring to convey the internal logics 
and ethical motivations for each practice I observed. But as I draw these analyses 
together below, I want to state more clearly my own critical perspective on three 
implications of this enactment of need.  
 
 
59 I use the phrase “into the community” deliberately to echo a phrase so familiar to mental health 
care, post-deinstitutionalisation (Milligan 2000). 
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The first problem with these practices of making need legible (which my 
ethnographic material vividly demonstrates) is that the legibility of these different kinds 
of need is not equal. In a cascade of various concerns, visibilities and interests, certain 
forms of difference gain traction and recognition, and in turn transform mental 
health need into inclusion criteria for specialised care. This is particularly powerful 
when those differences would otherwise represent exclusion criteria for mainstream 
mental health care. The cascade of concerns that I have been narrating is that of the 
growing global concern for vulnerable migrants, making cultural difference an 
increasingly visible and “interesting” aspect of alternative mental health service 
provision. My ethnographic data show that the opportunities this brought came at a 
cost: deploying this form of difference can render other needs illegible on an 
individual level (like in the case of Dayo in Chapter 6) or make “dumping grounds” 
of other sites that do not work with such recognisable social or cultural difference: the 
“wastebasket category” I mentioned above. These costs come hand in hand with the 
issue I discussed in my literature review about mobilising the vulnerable migrant 
category: of naturalising what Dahinden (2016, 7) has called the “migration 
container.”  
 
Harking back to the first section of this chapter on the paradox of precarity, I found 
that this way of knowing need is also inherently precarious. Given the material precarity 
of these psychotherapeutic care providers, there is an uneasy reliance on these 
alternative spaces in which to bring this need into view. If any one of these services, 
or any specialised voluntary organisation like them, do indeed “sink,” and disappear 
entirely, there is no milieu in which these different kinds of need get negotiated; no 
ground on which differentness gets transformed into inclusion rather than exclusion 
criteria for care. The same goes for the precarity of matters of concern and the 
resulting legibility of need— in other words, the way I have described funding being 
dependent on shifting concerns and interests on much larger scales than local 
commissioning. Global concerns around migration and cultural difference 
manifested themselves in this way in my fieldwork. Whilst medical anthropologists 
working in mainstream contexts such as medical education worry about the 
reification and entrenchment of cultural difference and notions of “cultural competence” 
in monolithic knowledge systems (Metzl and Hansen 2014; Willen and Carpenter-
Song 2013; Taylor 2016), I worry about ephemerality of this way of making need 
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legible in non-mainstream and marginal clinical settings: when the configuration of 
global (or national) concerns and interests change and are not reflected in alternative 
forms of care, will certain kinds of need become illegible and simply disappear from 
view?  
 
The third critical point that emerged out of my observations on making need legible 
is a more fundamental issue: can and should human need ever be made legible, 
pinned down, and attached to particular forms of difference or pathology? I argue 
that this question is crucial to understanding the assessment and naming of mental 
health need, which my data suggests is a particularly shape-shifting, difficult to 
contain concept. This all points to the nagging theme of indeterminacy in care 
provision, which has cropped up at multiple points in this thesis. I touch upon this 
theme in my literature review, identifying ethnographic data in which “indeterminate 
norms” enable psychologists to improvise within state care (Matza 2018), and how 
the indeterminate nature of eligibility in humanitarian aid helps people evade norms 
of victimhood (Cabot 2013)60.  
 
In my own ethnographic material, I too explore the potentialities and affordances of 
treating need as indeterminate, arguing that this is an ethical but inherently precarious 
position to take. In Chapters 7 and 8 I observe the wilful creation of spaces of 
indeterminacy when it came to assessing, articulating, and (more challengingly) 
recording mental health need. At times, this was done in order to avoid the risk of 
need being pinned to a diagnostic category, which could make clients ineligible for 
care, or discredit organisations because they can’t demonstrate “recovery.” At other 
times, the creation of spaces of indeterminacy opened up possibilities: in Chapter 8, I 
argue that “negotiating need” aimed to produce a more generous, inclusive mode of 
articulating need, embracing rather than trying to stamp out indeterminacies. The 
ability to treat need as indeterminate was a strength in these contexts, but this was 
painfully compromised by contractual requirements to make need legible. Here, my 
interlocutors were confronted with the on-going tension between legibility and 
indeterminacy: this, I interpret in terms of the difficult and always imperfect 
relationship between knowledge and life itself (Canguilhem 1952/2008). 
 
60 I also noted how the potential indeterminacy of “need” in healthcare service provision has been 
identified, but only within the bioethics literature (Juth 2015; Herlitz 2017; Gustavsson 2014). 
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What might we learn more broadly from this case of mental health need, and the 
observation that creating spaces of indeterminacy provided possibilities for both 
service users and providers of psychotherapeutic care? Where else might 
commitments to treating need as “indeterminate” be a particular strength in the face of 
shifting responsibilities and modes of evaluation in healthcare? I often wondered as I 
carried out this research whether the will to create spaces of indeterminacy, and to 
avoid “pinning down” specific needs before the therapeutic process began, was 
specific to a) mental health care, (or even more specifically, psychodynamic 
psychotherapy) and b) to the scale of service delivery, which was so consistently 
described as “local” and “community based” in my fieldwork. I have been suggesting 
that there is something specifically indeterminate about the psychotherapeutic need 
that emerges through client-therapist relations. However, given that the theoretical 
work I draw on is not limited to the field of community mental health care (Greco 
2004; Willen 2011; Herlitz 2017), my analysis of the value and utility of 
“indeterminate need” could play out beyond non-mainstream mental health or 
psychosocial care settings. As the NHS continues to fragment and the commissioning 
system encourages increasingly diverse healthcare providers, more spaces open up for 
ethnographic exploration of this question. Or, following the question of scale, we 
might ask how these ethnographic observations speak to “scaled up” practices in 
global mental health, where there is increasing awareness of the active use of 
“residual” or “unspecified” categories (First et al. 2018). This may revitalise broader, 
global debates on the classification of mental health and illness, which has for some 
time been in a state of profound uncertainty and flux (Pickersgill 2014; Ecks 2016). 
 
These avenues for future work would build upon my analyses of the relationship 
between categories, need, and indeterminacy. In sum, I have identified and amplified 
the practices and views of my interlocutors that performed an important (often 
overlooked) ethics of inclusion. This involved their rejection of diagnostic categories, 
and other fixed “boxes,” which inevitably create exclusion. But I have also exposed 
the ways in which this commitment to indeterminacy—to allowing need to “spill out” 
of mainstream “boxes”—came at a cost. Maintaining this ethics of inclusion, of doing 
need differently, in practice, was laborious (and at times impossible) given the 
administrative demands to make need legible to funders and commissioners. The 
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implication of all this is that often, what is valued in mental health care (inclusion and 
indeterminacy) is simultaneously constrained and threatened by the logics of voluntary 
care and clinical commissioning. Following my lines of argument, it is possible to get 
out of this impasse: the challenge of doing (and knowing) need “differently” could be 
released from the specific constraints on the voluntary care sector and taken seriously 
throughout the healthcare system. Rather than a trade-off that must be negotiated 
within the logics and spaces of charity, we might think of the possibility of doing need 
differently as a broad ethical question, acknowledged and distributed throughout 
various spaces and places of care. 
 
Reformulating the problem… “without ever imposing a 
solution”? 
 
When I started this project, I had recently returned to the UK, having worked for 
some years in or in collaboration with global non-governmental organisations that 
were also engaged in projects to improve access to healthcare. Though critical of 
many of the discourses around charity and humanitarianism, I was somewhat 
seduced by questions about whether alternative, community-based service providers 
were providing “solutions” to the much talked about problem of access to mental 
health services, particularly in the UK where the mainstream health infrastructure 
was so much better resourced than in humanitarian or low income settings. In 
abstract terms, if people were being excluded from services because they did not “fit” 
mainstream eligibility criteria or models of mental health care, rather than a 
complete lack of state care, then these alternatives might perform a very different and 
potentially exciting function. Later, after becoming immersed in the social lives of my 
field sites and the broader systems of care they were embedded in, talk of 
“innovation” and “impact” became painfully tangled with the struggling and 
fragmented landscape of care that Miles talked of in the scene I described above. My 
concerns turned to notions of fragmentation, brokenness, and even failure—a spectre 
that I have written about in my chapter on sanctuary, and later on, when the risks of 
“doing things differently” presented therapists with a near impossible task. What I 
have been arguing in this thesis is that thinking about access to psychotherapeutic 
care is much more productive when we turn our attention to the emergent and 
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constantly shifting nature of the problem. In doing so, I have challenged the very 
notion that the access problem can ever really be “solved,” or the “gaps filled” by 
alternative care providers. 
 
By abandoning frameworks of isolated problems and solutions in our thinking about 
mental health care provision, I am not suggesting that problems do not exist, or that 
as care providers or researchers, we do not have to respond to them. Rather, I am 
saying that there is an inherent tension in the problem-solution way of thinking, 
because the problem of access is a moving target, and need is dynamic, always emerging 
in relation to care. Ethnography is useful for revealing these tensions, but perhaps 
more importantly, it opens up new ways of thinking about problems. However 
elusive notions of “mental health” and “need” might be, we can observe and sense 
the practices of inclusion and exclusion, of place-making, of encountering care, and 
all the other ethnographic material that I have been working with, to interrogate how 
they relate to and even produce these abstract concepts. By foregrounding place, and 
later on, broader notions of the milieu in my ethnography of access I have upended 
some of the assumptions that underlie much of the research and policies around 
issues of access to care. Rather than seeing need as a pre-existing entity or “gap” 
waiting to met or filled, I have described need as emergent and responsive to the 
sociomaterial arrangements of inclusion and exclusion at any given moment. 
Whether a “place for people with nowhere else to go,” a “sanctuary,” or a “space in 
between,” places have profound implications for the way that need and eligibility 
criteria for care are enacted. 
 
How then, to respond to the tensions and paradoxes I have been describing, if not by 
providing a solution? We often hear anthropologists talking about revealing how 
something might be “done differently” as a result of their research, but of course this 
is what I was shown every day, through observing the practices of therapists and (at 
times) the clients they worked with. Critique of the mainstream was so hardwired into 
their practice of “doing need differently,” that it was sometimes hard to know what 
exactly the role of the visiting anthropologist should be at these sites. If I have 
“revealed” anything, it was the inherent precarity of these practices: “doing need 
differently” (but not too differently) was perilous, laborious and required constant 
sociomaterial boundary work in relation to an ever-present but ever-changing 
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“mainstream.” This fed into the making of precarious lives, and an uncertain sense of 
belonging amongst clients, even as these practices strived to produce inclusion and 
eligibility.  
 
If, as I have been suggesting, precarity continues to be built in, and even traded 
upon, in our systems of mental health care, we must keep asking questions about the 
new problem spaces this opens up. Crucially, these questions should speak to care 
provision across these porous and fragmented systems, beyond what we currently call 
the voluntary sector. Problems of access and inclusion, as well as the possibilities of 
doing need differently, might then be distributed throughout spaces and places of 
care. To make this kind of thinking possible, we must attend to these spaces and 
places as generative and lively rather than merely inert absorbers of need. 
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1: Analytical questions to “ask” the visual maps  
 
On the circumstances and interactions through which maps are 
produced: 
 
Important contextual information on the space and atmosphere in which map is 
produced (from field notes) 
 
Are there patterns or specific non-verbal expressions that bear on the production of 
the map? 
 
On the production of maps: 
 
How do interactions with or interventions from me help produce the story of data? 
 
How does the mapping unfold over time? Is it fast/slow? Does it afford reflection? 
See Gauntlett and Holzwarth on pace in creative methods (2006) 
 
What affective processes does the mapping exercise induce? 
 
What does the quality of the hand-drawn image afford in terms of expression, 
fluidity, texture etc.? 
Ingold (2006) on lines 
 
On what was being produced visually: 
 
To what extent does the map show a coherent, (temporally/spatially) linear narrative 
event? Are there disruptions? 
Literat (2013)  
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What kind of metaphors/allegories does the mapping throw up? Is it obvious why? 
Gauntlett and Holzwarth (2006), Law and Singleton (2003) on allegory 
 
What does the map say about how objects ‘participated’ in the experiences of clients 
as they entered into the space? 
McGrath (2013) on objects in clinical spaces, Latour on the door and other “mundane objects” 
(1992) 
 
How maps speak to specific to research questions: 
 
How do maps engage with or illustrate boundaries/frontiers, inside/outside? 
 
Are there particular forms of mental distress expressed through mapping?  
 
How do people talk about personal embodied experiences of entering space—what 
does this say about what they are becoming through the experience? 
 
Do participants feel a sense of their own precarity in/on the way to the space? How? 
Where? 
 
What about precarious (or more safe/stable) elements of the place, and/or other places 
on their journey?  
 
How ‘easy to place’ is the building and space within cultural templates of care 
settings? 
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